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Executive Summary 
This case study analyses Dutch foreign policies towards the conflict in Afghanistan since 1989. It 
investigates the efforts that the Dutch government has undertaken to contribute towards ending 
hostilities, the results of these efforts and the lessons that can be drawn from Dutch interventions in the 
conflict. Chapter 2 outlines the background and causes of conflict in Afghanistan, the major parties 
involved and the dynamics of the conflict. The analysis points to a multiplicity of factors underlying 
the conflict. From a historical point of view, the Afghan state lacked coherence and suffered from the 
struggle of traditional communities against state control. The Soviet invasion and continued infighting 
eroded the political balance among the various ethnic groups. At another level, the rise of the Taliban 
also resulted in a struggle over the nature of society. At the same time, regional factors also fuel(led) 
the conflict.    
 Chapter 3 sketches the nature of interventions undertaken by external actors other than the 
Netherlands. Despite intense negotiations the c flict has continued. Efforts at mediation since the 
departure of the Soviets failed for several reasons. The Geneva Accords of 1988 were mainly an 
agreement to settle the external factors in the conflict and were not linked to a political settlement at 
the domestic level. Efforts to set up an interim government failed, because of limited interest by the 
international community to enable its implementation, a lack of commitment by the local parties, and 
the lack of basic state institutions to facilitatethe process. The rise of the Taliban did not alter this 
situation. Mediation efforts failed, as, expecting a complete victory, the Taliban were not willing to 
negotiate. Secondly, they rejected interventions by external mediators who represented a contesting 
ideology of state and society. Due to support from neighbouring Pakistan, and the resources available 
to the Taliban through narcotics and arms smuggling, the international community has little leverage 
over them. To influence the situation in Afghanistan through assistance-related instruments, the donor 
community developed a new administrative structure for international assistance, which aimed to 
support peace through linking assistance with diplomatic and political instruments. It appears, 
however, that it was insufficiently linked with the context in Afghanistan, and posed moral dilemmas 
to donors.   
 The analysis in Chapter 4 of Dutch policies and instruments as used vis-à-vis the Afghan conflict 
shows the Dutch insistence on linking humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance and conflict 
prevention. This came to expression in the Dutch funding of projects focusing on these concepts, and 
their active international promotion of the ‘development-for-peac ’ concept. However, this went too 
far for many actors in the international donor community. Moreover, application of the concept proved 
very difficult in the Afghan situation. 
 Chapter 5 lists the lessons learned from this case study. Firstly, it emphasizes the importance of a 
thorough understanding of the conflict in order to make a meaningful contribution to its ending. 
Secondly, in order to have influence at all on the development of conflict through development 
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assistance, one needs to be aware of the possibilities and limitations that one has as an outsid r. 
Thirdly, it highlights the necessity of making fundamental choices, or of weighing short-term 
humanitarian goals against longer-term conflict management goals. Fourthly, it proves how difficult it 
is to come to consistent and thus well-informed principles that adequately relate to the conflict 
situation. A fifth lesson is not to rely too heavily on concepts in conflict interventions, and that too 
much focus on coordination may even obstruct the effectiveness and timeliness of assistance. Those 
lessons apply particularly to the Dutch development-for- eace approach, which is not automatically a 
success story, but requires adequate analysis and instruments, monitoring of the impact of 
interventions and continued analysis of the dynamics of the conflict. 
© The Clingendael Institute   
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Objective 
 
This study was executed within the framework of the ‘Conflict Policy Research Project’ carried out by 
the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ for the Netherlands Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The aim of this project is to formulate a model for conflict prognosis as well as 
identifying policies and instruments (the ‘policy mix’) for interventions related to intrastate conflict. 
These goals are to be achieved on the basis of a review of relevant literatur , a study of the policies 
and practices of selected major other-donor countries, and in- epth case studies into the specific Dutch 
policies and practices in six countries in or emerging from conflict.  
 The present case study focuses on the Dutch foreign policies towards the conflict in Afghanistan 
and attempts to answer the following research questions: 
 
· What are the Dutch policies for conflict-related interventions in Afghanistan? 
· Which instruments have been used to realize these policies? 
· Which specific (Dutch-supported) interventions have been executed in this connection? 
· What are the results of these interventions? 
· What are the experiences of other donors regarding conflict-related interventions in Afghanistan? 
· What lessons can be drawn from Dutch and international interventions in the conflict in 
Afghanistan? 
 
The remainder of this chapter will outline some conceptual aspects with regard to conflict 
interventions. Chapters 2 and 3 will present a description of the causes and eruption of the conflict, he 
actors involved and the dynamics of the conflict, and the nature of the interventions undertaken by 
external actors other than the Netherlands. Chapter 4, which constitutes the core of this study, will 
analyse Dutch policies and instruments as usedvis-à-vis the Afghanistan conflict. Major findings and 
lessons learned for policy will be presented in chapter 5. 
1.2 Conceptual Aspects 
The concepts and terminology used in the policy documents and literature on the subject of conflict-
prevention in intrastate conflict are not unequivocally clear. One will observe that words such as 
peace, conflict, conflict prevention, humanitarian action, rehabilitation, and a whole array of notions 
derived from traditions in humanitarian assistance and development cooperation are, in fact, used in a 
very imprecise manner. Apart from cultural, disciplinary and epistemological reasons, this is caused or 
at least aggravated by the situation on the ground, which in many of these countries cannot be grasped 
  © The Clingendael Institute 
 
10
 
easily by referring to neat categories or typologies. Most situations in countries with intrastate conflict 
are extremely unstable, fluid or transitional. Some countries move between peace and war, depending 
on the region or the season. 
 Moreover, situations do not oly differ according to the specific conditions encountered in the 
field but also for each actor involved, varying from the government and parties in the country 
concerned, to particular donor countries and their governments, departments, agencies, civil or 
military authorities and non-governmental organizations. All these actors have specific interests, 
backgrounds and perceptions. This makes the description and analysis of the situation, an assessment 
of policy actions and corresponding lines of action extremely complicated. The same ambiguities and 
questions affect Dutch policy formulation and implementation.  
 The following basic distinctions are important for this study. The two concepts of ‘conflict’ and 
‘intervention’ are central to this research project. Although the conflict in Afghanistan had already 
started before the retreat of Soviet forces in 1989, the analysis will focus mainly on the dynamics of 
the conflict and the interventions since then. The Soviet retreat set an end to some major external 
factors fuelling violence and marked a new phase in the conflict. With the waning influence of the 
superpowers, the stage was prepared for fighting among the political factions that were once united in 
their resistance against the Soviet Union. It was in this context of internal competition for state power 
that the communist government was ousted and an interim government installed, and that the Taliban 
made their renowned appearance. At a more general level, however, attention will be paid to the pre-
1989 period as well. 
 The concept of ‘intervention’ requires more detailed discussion. One definition refers to 
intervention as a ‘portmanteau term which covers a wide variety of situations where one actor 
intervenes in the affairs of another’.1 While this naturally begs the question of what actually 
constitutes the intervening act, this definition has the advantage that it may be interpreted as 
encompassing various forms of activity by one actor vis-à-vis another. International law relates 
intervention to other concepts such as ‘internal affairs’ and ‘domestic jurisdiction’. In view of the 
domestic jurisdiction clause of the United Nations Charter (art. 2.7) it has been pointed out that one 
can only speak of ‘intervention’ if the activity involved goes further than mere ‘talk’, i.e.oral and/or 
written communication between an actor and the target of its intervention.2 In this study, however, any 
legal connotations and linkages to terms such as ‘domestic jurisdiction’ and ‘internal affairs’ are 
discarded. In recognition of the fact that the instruments of intervention are now much more refined 
and sophisticated than in the past – transforming intervention into a more pervasive phenomenon than 
ever before3 – this study considers a range of activities as falling under the concept. Thus not only 
military actions are interpreted as intervention, but also activities in other areas such as economics, 
development cooperation and, indeed, even ‘mere’ communication between one actor and the object 
of its intervention. This approach has the benefit that it underlines the importance of gradualism and 
incrementalism as features of the intervention concept. In this sense the intervention concept does not 
necessarily have to involve a rupture from conventional or ‘normal’ behaviou  of on  actor towards 
another.4 Even the contention that the target of intervention should be the structure of government5 is 
                                            
1 G. Evans and J. Newnham, Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and 
Institutions (New York, 1990), p. 198.  
2 See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 1979), p. 294. 
3 Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of World Politics, p. 200. 
4 Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of World Politics, p. 200. 
5 Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of World Politics, p. 200. 
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not followed here, as interventions may be focused on NGOs, the civil society and sometimes the 
population at large. 
 Yet our definition of intervention, while allowing for any kind of activity (military, economic, 
political, diplomatic, cultural or other), is linked to conflictand the intention of the intervening actor to 
affect that conflict. Thus, intervention is taken to mean or involve any activity in the above-mentioned 
areas which is intended to influence the course, intensity or scope of hostilities, and/or activity geared 
at attenuating the effects of conflict. In this sense, intervention amounts to conflict-related 
intervention. 
 Such conflict-related intervention may thus involve, firstly, interventions that are aimed at 
influencing the hostilities (i. . course, scope and intensity of the violence) – d fined here as direct 
conflict-related intervention. Such interventions include, for example, political and diplomatic efforts 
to mediate a settlement, military interventions to end the conflict, or the imposition of economic or 
military sanctions. Direct conflict-related intervention may, however, also involve activity geared at 
affecting the ‘dispute’ – i.e. pre-hostilities – phase (which is conflict prevention in the strict sense) or 
the post-conflict – i.e. post-violence – situation.  
 Secondly, conflict-related intervention may involve interventions that are aimed at attnuating the 
effects of a conflict, defined here as indirect conflict-related intervention. Such intervention involves 
the provision of aid to war-stricken areas and populations to help them survive the hostilities. This 
includes both relief aid, which is assi tance given during or immediately upon the permanent or 
temporary conclusion of hostilities, and ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘reconstruction’ aid, i.e. assistance given 
after the conflict has ended and aimed at helping to reconstruct the country and the popula ions’ 
livelihoods. 
 Furthermore, for the Netherlands, development assistance can also be considered as a conflict-
related instrument. The reason is that development efforts per se may contribute to increased tension 
or even overt conflict on the one hand, and help to reduce tension on the other. In addition, 
development projects may consciously be used or designed to affect peace. Examples include the so-
called development-for-peace projects. However, not all ODA is evidently relevant in that it is meant 
to contribute to solving, managing or preventing intrastate conflict. For the purpose of this study, 
conflict-related ODA is all aid that aims at influencing the course or intensity of a conflict, or the 
possibility of escalation or reoccurrence of conflict, and in ludes: 
 
· Projects aimed at finishing or de-escalating conflict; 
· Projects aimed at cooperation between the conflict parties and peace-buildi g; 
· Projects promoting ‘good governance’ and democratization with the aim to finish, mitigate, or 
prevent conflict and to manage societal tension and conflict in a peaceful, non-violent manner. 
 
The Dutch Directorate for Crisis Management and Humanitarian Aid (DCH) comprises two sections: 
humanitarian aid (DCH/HH); and conflict prevention (DCH/CP).6 Humanitarian aid comprises relief 
and rehabilitation aid, while conflict prevention aims at reducing the susceptibility to conflict and at 
reducing the influence of conflict-escalating factors. In practice, it also is seen to include a number of 
conflict-resolution measures. Whereas relief, rehabilitation, development and prevention were earlier 
                                            
6 This Directorate and its sections were in existence while this study was carried out. As of the first quarter of 
2000, however, there is a new Directorate for Human Rights and Peace-Building (DMV) with separate 
sections for Humanitarian Aid (DMV/HH), Human Rights (DMV/MR) and Peace-Building and Good 
Governance (DMV/VG). 
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seen to constitute very distinct activities related to corresponding phases in the conflict, it is now 
acknowledged that there is not a necessary, logical, and temporal order between these activities and 
that they may occur simultaneously or be linked in other ways in nearly any phase of the conflict. 
Preventive activities have to be undertaken in several phases of the conflict cycle, at least with a view 
to preventing the re-em rgence of conflict after a first, often fragile, settlement has been reached. 
Similarly, development aid may already be provided during conflict. 
 Likewise, the distinction between humanitarian aid, conflict prevention and ‘normal’ 
development aid is fluid and may vary per country. The distinction may sometimes be argued on the 
basis of content (the nature of the activity concerned), but often only reflects the simple decision of 
from which budget a project was initially paid. In the latter case an administrative logic finally 
determines what is to be considered as humanitarian aid, what as conflict prevention and what as 
‘normal’ development aid.  
 Finally, interventions can be distinguished in a number of broad categories: diplomatic and 
political initiatves, civilian (conflict-management) initiatives, military measures, economic and social 
measures, political development and governance measures, judicial and legal measures, 
communication and education measures. The boundaries between these categories are omewhat 
arbitrary, and in practice many projects and programmes combine several of these different measures. 
1.3 Methodology 
The study is based on a perusal of relevant literature, and on files (see Annexe 1 for an overvi w of 
files consulted) at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Dutch co-financing agencies. Study of 
the files at the Ministry was undertaken by Stijn van Bruggen, who published a report on his findings,7 
and chapter 4 on Dutch policy and interventions in Afghanistan is largely based on his work. The 
authors are grateful to Jaïr van der Lijn for his inventory and analysis of Dutch government assistance 
programmes (see Annexes) to Afghanistan and for his contributions to the collection of relevant 
literature.  
                                            
7 Stijn van Bruggen, Case-study Afghanistan: een onderzoek naar Nederlandse beleidsinterventies in 
Afghanistan 1989-1 98 (Den Haag, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’, August 
1999). 
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2 An Outline of the Conflict in Afghanistan 
 2.1 Background and Causes 
 
Few historical events of the last decade have carried such a symbolical connotation as the September 
1996 capture of Kabul by the Taliban. Either regarded as a culmination of radical Islam or the ultimate 
disintegration of a state, it brought the world’s attention back to Afghanistan, which it had lost since 
the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. The end of the Soviet occupation had initially seemed to 
introduce peace to the troubled country, but with hindsight it can be concluded that it instead 
introduced a new phase of conflict with new dynamics.  
 Any explanation of the background of the current conflict likely starts from the internal divisions, 
which proved to be an enormous obstacle for attempts to develop an ‘Afghan’ nationhood. 
Afghanistan is characterized by ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. The issue of ethnic identity 
is complex. None of the main ethnic groups are homogenous in internal composition or social 
structure, as they are composed of a large number of tribes and sub-tribes. Although 99 per cent of the 
population is Muslim, a similar diversity can be observed in religious affairs. Relations among Sunni 
and Shia sects have never been harmonious. The issues of ethnicity, religion, state and political power 
in Afghanistan also have a regional context, because all major ethnic groups spill over into the 
territories of neighbouring countries. This has frequently resulted in foreign support for groups with 
whom such relations of kinship exist. 
 Secondly, the Afghan conflict includes international elements. Afghanistan is strategically 
situated at the crossroads of three regions (Central Asia, South Asia and South-West Asia), and 
historically was therefore located on the invasion route into South Asia. While Afghanistan was the 
high-priced trophy at stake between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, more 
recently, internal developments are closely followed by neighbouring countries seeking for strategic 
alliances. Observ rs from outside the region continue to have an interest, frightened as they are by the 
implications that the conflict might have for regional instability, international criminality, and 
terrorism.  
 This chapter aims to put the foreign and Dutch interventions in the Afghan conflict in their proper 
context. It focuses on the different actors and dynamics of the conflict since 1989, the year in which 
the Soviet forces retreated from Afghanistan. However, the analysis also refers to historical 
developments dating back to earlier periods, as these are essential for an adequate understanding of 
contemporary developments.  
A Country of Diversity 
By starting an introduction on the conflict in Afghanistan with a description of its various (ethnic) 
groups, one risks that the reader is tempted to believe that the root causes of the conflict are purely of 
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an ethnic character. However, ethnicity only grew into a major political issue over the last two decades 
of the twentieth century. Traditionally, a sort of political balance evolved among the different groups, 
in which all of them had allocated spaces in the hierarchical system. Since the system was also 
authoritarian, ethnicity remained confined to identity and was not expressed politically.8 The following 
description of the different groups is consequently not meant to introduce the major factions in the 
conflict, but instead it tries to give a short overview of Afghanistan’s geographical, historical, cultural, 
linguistic and religious diversity, in an attempt to set the scen  for analysis of the conflict.9  
 
Pushtun  
By far the largest group in Afghanistan are the Pushtun. The Pushtun mainly live in the southern part 
of the country around the central Hazara area and alongside the Durand line. This rather contrived 
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which resulted from an agreement between the Afghan 
ruler Abdur Rahman and the British in 1893, separates the Afghan Pushtun from the Pushtun-
inhabited areas in Pakistan. Resulting from resettlement policies of this same Abdur Rahman, aimed to 
get rid of opponents among Pushtun tribes in the south, enclaves of Pushtun can be found scattered 
among other ethnic groups in the northern and western regions. The Pushtun mostly speak Pashto, and 
are generally Sunni Muslims (although there are some Shia Muslim groups as well). For the larger part 
they make their living from animal husbandry, agriculture and trade. Tribal and sub-tribal divisions 
have been a source of conflict among Pushtun throughout their history. Even today, the Pushtun 
political parties are divided along tribal lines and occasionally fight one another. 
 Since its foundation, Afghanistan has traditionally been dominated by the Pushtuns. However, the 
refugee flows as a reaction to the 1979 Soviet invasion and war considerably changed the composition 
of the population. Before 1978 (the date of the last reliable census in Afghanistan) the Pushtun 
represented 40 per cent of the population. About 85 per cent of the approximately six million Afghan 
refugees who fled to Iran and Pakistan during the Soviet occupation were Pushtun. Consequently, the 
percentage of Pushtun in Afghanistan’s population diminished to about 13 per cent (in 1987), 
implying that the Pushtun were no longer the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. However, their 
(temporary) minority status, in combination with the preferential treatment of the Soviets towards the 
northern regions, has seriously affected ethnic politics in post-Soviet Afghanistan. This will be 
touched upon in the following paragraphs. The return of many refugees in the mid-1990s restored the 
balance, and by 1998 the Pushtun again constituted about 38 per cent of the population.10
 
Tajiks 
The Tajiks are the second largest group. Before 1978 they constituted 23-30 per cent of the population. 
Most Tajiks remained in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. During this period they constituted 
about 33 per cent of the population, and at the moment about one-quarter of th  population. For the 
larger part they live in the north-east and in the west. A minority lives in Kabul. They speak Persian, 
and are mostly Sunni Muslims (with a minority of Ismaili Shia Muslims). Those living in rural regions 
engage in agriculture and herding. As a result of their relatively better education and wealth, the r 
political influence is considerable and they are the traditional rivals of the Pushtun for political power. 
                                            
8 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and Neighbours’, Ethnic Studies: Report, 
17(1), 1999, pp. 1-19, at p. 2.
9 For the convenience of the reader, a map of Afghanistan can be found in Annexe 2. 
10 Jonathan Fox and Kathie Young, Pushtuns (Pathans) in Afghanistan, Minority at Risk Project, University 
of Maryland, 1994, 1995, 1999, http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/mar/afghpash.htm. 
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Apart from two brief periods, one in the fourteenth century and one of ten months in 1929, they have 
never ruled their region. The unity of the Tajiks did not erode during the Soviet occupation, hence 
leaving them in a better position to challenge Pushtun dominance afterwards.11 
 
Hazaras 
The Hazaras are mainly Shia Muslims, although some adhere to Sunni Islam. They speak the Farsi 
language. In 1998, the percentage of Hazaras in Afghanistan was estimated at 19 per cent. The 
Hazaras historically suffered from Pushtun expansionism and Sunni prejudices of Pushtun, Tajiks and 
Uzbeks against Shia Islam, and they were driven from their traditional homeland to the barre  dry 
mountains of central Afghanistan (the Hazarajet). They are primarily sedentary farmers, practising 
some ancillary herding. Many Hazaras migrated to the major towns, particularly Kabul, where they 
came to occupy the lowest economic ranks.12  
  
Uzbeks 
The Uzbeks are Sunni Muslims, and their language is Turkic. They occupy most of Afghanistan’s 
arable land in the north. They are ethnically related to the majority Muslim population living in the 
Central Asian states across the border to the nor h. Their far ancestors came as invaders from Turkey 
in the sixteenth century, and many of them are descendants of Uzbeks who fled from Soviet Central 
Asia in the 1920s and 1930s. They were involved in Afghanistan’s earliest industrial enterprises and 
many have also reached high-level posts in the government bureaucracy. Because of their economic 
wealth, the Uzbeks were not dependent upon the central government and maintained a considerable 
degree of autonomy. Yet they have always allied themselves with the central government. The Uzbeks 
formed about 13 per cent of Afghanistan’s population before 1978, about 19 per cent until the mid-
1990s, and now they constitute about 6 per cent.13 
 
Smaller minorities 
There is a great variety of minor ethnic groups apart from the groups mentioned above. These include: 
the Aimaqs (who live in the west); the Turkmen (living alongside the border with Turkmenistan); the 
Baluchis (living in the southern part of Afghanistan, bordering the Pakistani province of Baluchistan); 
the Nuristani and Panjshiris (in the north-east), and the Kirchiz (in the far north-eastern Wakhan 
corridor, which points as a forefinger to touch China’s back).  
A Short History of State Formation  
Afghanistan became a united state in 1747 under the leadership of Ahm d Shah Durrani, a Pushtun. 
This leader from the southern city of Qandahar first united the various Pushtun tribes and then, as his 
power increased, conquered the Hazara, Uzbek and Tajik areas. His kingdom, however, began to 
disintegrate within twogenerations. The Pushtun tribes were only reunited when they faced a common 
enemy during the first Anglo-Af han war (1839-1842). This war was started by Britain, which, to 
protect its Indian empire from Russia, tried to establish authority in neighbouringAfghanistan. From 
                                            
11 Jonathan Fox and Kathie Young, Tajiks in Afghanistan, Minority at Risk Project, University of Maryland, 
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that moment, the tribal leaders started to recognize the king as their sovereign, although his power 
remained limited. In return for their recognition, the king had to accept that the tribes continued to be 
administered by their local chiefs. In fact, a sort of political balance evolved among the various 
groups. This order may have implied a hierarchical system in which Pushtun royal clans provided the 
rulers, but at least all groups occupied positions within the system. The authoritarian, ierarc ical 
system succeeded in keeping group grievances, demands and aspirations under control.  
 Successive efforts by Afghan leaders since the late nineteenth century to reduce the dependence 
on the tribes and their leaders and to transform Afghanistan into a ‘modern state’ have failed. King 
Amanullah Khan (1919-1928), for example, tried to open up Afghanistan. He established modern 
educational institutions, recruited and trained a state elite, and founded a military academy for the 
army. He tried to increase the state’s capacity by raising revenues. His policies aimed at restricting the 
power and privileges of the clergy, as well as promoting education for women and their participation 
in nation-building. However, his wide-ranging reforms struck at the power of the traditional landed, 
tribal, conservative and religious elite and provoked rebellion and his overthrowing.14  
 For a short time, power came into the hands of Bacha-e-Saqqao, a Tajik. Some writers on 
Afghanistan mark this Tajik intermezzo, short as it was, as the beginning of the still continuing battle 
for power between the (Durrani) Pushtun tribes and the other ethnic groups in the country. However, 
although ethnicity certainly came to play a role during, and especially after, the Soviet occupation, at 
that particular time discord was instead at the interface between the Durrani elite and other Pushtun. 
Over the preceding two centuries, the Pushtun Durrani tribe had held power. The Durrani elite, 
however, became detribalized and urbanized. As a r sult of these processes the elite became more 
‘cosmopolitan’ and less inhibited about recruiting Uzbeks and Tajiks into the bureaucracy, or Hazaras 
and Nuristanis into the army. This implied that the linkage between the Durrani elite and the other 
Pushtuns became more tenuous, as Pushtuns were no longer the only group from which manpower for 
the army was conscripted. The tribal discord promoted the development of Marxist and Islamist ideas 
within the non-Durrani Pushtun population.15  
 Rather than as an ethnic schism, the years leading to the 1978 revolution and the coming into 
power of the communists can be characterized as a period of contested modernization, in which the 
introduction of radical change was faced with an ultra-conservative rural society.16 Under the reign of 
Muhammad Zahir Shah (who reigned from 1933 to 1973)17 new attempts at modernization and 
constitutional reform were made. A benchmark was the 1964 constitution, which provided equal rights 
for both men and women and gave precedence to the se ular legal system over shariah law, although 
Islam remained ‘the sacred religion of Afghanistan’. According to the new constitution, an elected 
parliament and provincial councils had to be set up. Women gradually entered the urban workforce. 
Attempts to modernize Afghanistan resulted partially from the economic and military aid given by the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. At the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth centuries the British had aimed to make Afghanistan a strong-enough buffer 
                                            
14 Rasul Bakhsh Rais, ‘Afghanistan: Country Paper’, in: K.M. de Silva (ed.), Causes of Conflict in 
Developing Countries: South Asia – Regional Report (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International 
Relations ‘Clingendael’, and Kandy, Sri Lanka: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 1998), pp. 457-
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15 Richard S. Newell, ‘Post-Soviet Afghanistan: The Position of the Minorities’, As an Survey, 29(11), 
November 1989, pp. 1090- 108, at pp. 1093-1101. 
16 P. Marsden, The Taliban: War, Religion and the New Order in Afghanistan. Politics i  Contemporary Asia 
series (London, New York: Zed Books; Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 21. 
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state to protect the Raj from a possible Russian attack. During the Cold War both the United States 
and the Soviet Union provided development aid in order to win the support of the leaders in Kabul. 
However, attempts by external powers to promote the process of state-building never took root in 
Afghan society. Strong dependence on foreign aid even isolated the state from society, as it created a 
foreign-educated elite longing for modernist change that no longer had its cultural roots in 
Afghanistan.  
 The 1964 constitution generated a period of political unrest and growing radicalism. Young 
people coming from all parts of the country to enjoy the expanded opportunities for education in 
Kabul were dissatisfied with the still highly el tist state system that helped the traditional elite to 
perpetuate its social and political control. The discontent resulted in the expansion of radical 
movements. Some found their claims for a much faster process of reform represented by the 
communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Others opposed the changes that had 
already taken place and argued for a return to Islamic values and the creation of an Islamic state based 
on shariah law. These socialist and Islamic movements became stronger in voicing their discontent, 
and the unrest culminated in a military coup nd the deposition of King Zahir Shah in 1973. The coup 
was led by Lt. Gen. Muhammad Daoud Khan, who had been Prime Minister ten years earlier.18 Daoud 
proclaimed a republic, of which he became President. He initiated further processes for reform, 
including land reform, cautiously tacking alongside the conservative rural opinion. To get rid of 
political opponents, the Islamist parties were forced to flee to Pakistan.19  
 Neverthelss, Daoud and some sections within the PDPA did not go along well. Initially, the 
Central Committee of Daoud’s government comprised members of the PDPA, but with tensions 
developing, these were removed from the government. In the end, the same forces that brought Daoud 
to power also ended his rule, through the bloody PDPA revolution in 1978. The PDPA introduced a 
series of measures to limit large landholdings, reduce rural indebtedness, limit the bridewealth, set a 
minimum age for marriage, and embarked on a large literacy campaign, aiming both at male and 
female as well as young and old Afghans. Apparently, the PDPA had not learnt the lessons from King 
Amanullah’s earlier attempts to introduce radical reforms without attempting to build a gradual 
process of reform from below.20 Its 18 months of power brought excessive violence, which might have 
cost as many as 50,000 to 100,000 lives. The violence was directed against those who were perceived 
to belong to the ‘elite’. Most of the victims were either Durrani Pusht n or educated Tajiks. In an 
attempt to escape from the radicalism of the new government and its efforts to eliminate opponents, 
large numbers of professionals fled to Pakistan, Europe, and the United States.  
 The ingredients for a mass revolutionary m vement were abound. Society at large was religious, 
conservative and traditional in its values. Foreign influence was an affront to the cultural sensibilities 
of a largely peasant society, let alone the Soviet brand of socialism, which was generally perceived as 
atheistic and anti-Islam. Moreover, history learned that all attempts to centralize the state had failed in 
the face of persistent resistance. This time, too, the local leaders wanted to cling to their autonomy. 
The PDPA’s reforms and their use of force to introduce them alienated the PDPA from the rural 
population. The result was massive resistance, and a call for a Jihad (Holy War) by leading Islamic 
scholars (or ulema) against the government, which was deemed un-Islamic a d atheistic. One area 
after another embarked upon violent resistance against the regime, and the resistance was supported by 
Islamist movements of Afghan refugees operating from Iran and Pakistan. Those resistance 
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movements, both those inside and outside the country, came to be known as th  Mujahideen, or 
fighters in a holy war.  
Socialist Afghanistan 
In 1978, the Soviets signed an agreement with the PDPA to provide military assistance if the need 
arose. Although the Soviet Union was not happy with the unfolding situation in Afghanista , it felt 
obliged to continue its support to the Kabul government. Lacking domestic support and legitimacy, 
Afghan Marxists leaned heavily on the Soviet Union to ensure their political survival. The Afghan 
regime’s interests in countering the rising power of Islamist movements converged with those of 
Moscow, which was afraid of the potential impact of this development on the political climate in its 
Central Asian Republics. 
 There has been a lot of speculation about why Moscow sent its troops to invade Afghanistan in 
December 1979. Three factors are likely to have played an important role. First, the Soviet advisers 
stationed in Afghanistan became increasingly apprehensive about the growing strength and massive 
popularity of the resistance groups among the Afghan public. They feared that further weakening of 
the regime could bring the Islamic fundamentalists into power. Second, the Soviets were highly 
distrustful of Hafizullah Amin and his inappropriate socialist programme and his resort to terror. They 
wanted to replace him by installing the relatively pragmatic and politically reliable Babrak Karmal. 
Finally, the balance of power in South-West Asia underwent a fundamental change with the collapse 
of US security arrangements resulting from the Islamic r volution in Iran, and the Soviets no longer 
feared any counter move by the Western bloc. The states in the region, on their part, lacked the 
required level of capabilities to deter the Soviet move. 
 The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan became a disaster, both for the regime it wanted to protect 
and for itself. Mass desertions from the PDPA army forced Soviet troops to become involved in direct 
battles with the resistance movements, resulting in large losses on the Soviet side. More important, 
however, was the Soviet invasion’s contribution to the process of undermining the very basis of the 
Afghan state. First, the image of the Afghan state as being occupied by an imperialist power had 
already developed deep roots among the population since the British occupation during the nineteenth 
century. The presence of Soviet forces and their active participation in counter-insurgency op ations 
further alienated the Marxist regime from its people. In 1986 the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with 
Muhammad Najibullah, wo had headed the regime’s secret police from 1980 to 1985. But this 
strategy failed and only created a split within the PDPA.21 Second, as the Mujahideen resistance 
gained popularity, it also increased its strength through foreign support. The Afghan state was forced 
to retreat to Kabul and a few other strongholds, leaving the vast rural areas to a large variety of 
Mujahideen groups. Finally, the Soviet invasion not only strengthened the old tribal and ethnic 
confrontations but also further fragmented the country through its divide-and-rule policies. Whatever 
fragile balance had existed in terms of national solidarity and harmony among various ethnic groups 
before the Soviet invasion was completely wiped out by the war.  
 In total, 9.5 million people were aff cted by the invasion. The military campaigns against the 
Mujahideen resistance resulted in the largest single refugee population ever, driving 6 million people 
to Pakistan and Iran. Internally, the campaigns not only destroyed the economic infrastructure f the 
country, but also produced 2 million internally displaced people, as well as 1.5 million casualties. 
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 The Soviets remained in Afghanistan for over nine years. During this period, the Afghan 
resistance raised the economic and military costs of the occupation t  an unacceptable level for the 
Soviet Union. The war drained too many resources from the strained Soviet economy, and resulted in 
large numbers of disillusioned veterans.22 After Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union 
and in the dusk of the Cold War, Moscow hoped to leave Afghanistan. Negotiations between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, with the United Nations as a mediator, brokered the Geneva 
Accords, which were signed on 14 April 1988. The Accords ended the superpower part of the conflict 
in Afghanistan and provided a timeframe for the withdrawal of the 115,000 Soviet troops. The 
withdrawal was finalized on 15 February 1989.  
On the Threshold to a New Phase of Conflict
Afghanistan found itself in a worrying situation in 1989. S x million people had left the country. Out 
of the remaining 11.7 million, 535,000 were disabled veterans, and 700,000 were widows and orphans. 
In addition, there were more than two million internally displaced persons, who had fled to urban 
centres for protection. With the countryside depopulated, food production had declined severely. One-
third of all villages were destroyed and the infrastructure was heavily damaged. Because of the land-
mines scattered all over the country – maiming thousands of peasants yearly – agriculture became a 
hazardous affair.23  
 The retreat of the Soviet forces did not end Afghanistan’s suffering. It instead introduced a new 
phase of conflict: different, but not less destructive than the Soviet military intervention. In the 1988 
Geneva Accords, peace between the internal parties of the conflict was considered a second priority 
and Afghanistan was effectively left to its own devices.24 The r treat and therefore the waning 
influence of the United States and the former Soviet Union caused an internal power vacuum, setting 
the stage for fighting among political factions that had once been united against the Soviet occupation. 
The power vacuum also set the stage for a new role for regional powers. From a superpower-
dominated conflict, the Afghan conflict grew into a civil war, influenced by local and regional power 
politics. 
 The later chapters of this case study will focus on external interventions in the conflict as it 
evolved after 1989, and the remainder of this chapter will concern the parti s involved and the 
dynamics of the conflict. 
2.2 The Parties Involved and their Objectives 
At first glance the conflict, as it developed after the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, appears to be 
an anarchic and irrational situation. Closer analysis reveals a series of actors with clear strategic 
objectives, which form part of a volatile, multi-layered and interdependent conflict system. Subtle 
changes in alliances, sometimes at the level of personal feuds, have resulted in fluid and shifting 
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alliances between the warring groups and, externally, have had far-re ching effects on the competing 
interests of surrounding countries.25  
 This section reviews the various actors that were and became involved in the conflict as of 1989. 
It deals with the different groups in Afghanistan,26 as well as with the conflict’s international actors. A 
later section will pay attention to the dynamics of the conflict.   
The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) / Watan  
The communist party of Afghanistan, the PDPA, was divided. It was basically made up of two 
factions: the Khalq (‘Banner’) and the Parcham (‘Masses’). The Khalq was strong among the armed 
forces and was hard-line revolutionary. It had a sort of Pushtun tribal background and support, and the 
leaders of the faction were mainly affiliated with the Ghilzai Pushtun tribes. The Parcham faction was 
more conciliatory. It had a lot of support among the de-tribalize  Kabul intelligentsia and bureaucracy, 
who had felt excluded by the narrow Durrani in-g oup that had dominated Afghanistan during the 
monarchy and the Daoud Republic. The strongest fundamentalist cadres of the PDPA, however, had 
their origins in ethnic minority areas, notably the Panshir valley (mainly a Tajik area).27 The more 
hard-line Khalq faction came to power with the 1978 revolution, led by Presidents Nur Muhammad 
Taraki and Hafizullah Amin.28 Most of the citizens killed under their governance were either Durrani 
Pushtun or educated Tajiks. The Khalq regime of terror stimulated Moscow to intervene and install the 
leader of the opposing Parcham faction, Babrak Karmal, as President. In 1986 the Soviets replaced 
Karmal with Najibullah, who remained in power until 1992.29  
 After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the PDPA renamed itself the Watan Party and 
renounced its communist agenda. Since the Islamic Interim Government of the Mujahideen took over 
power in 1992, the Watan has been marginalized politically.  
The Mujahideen  
Generally speaking, Mujahideen refers to all Afghans who regarded themselves as engaged in a Jihad 
against the PDPA and the Soviet forces,30 in luding all those fighting in Afghanistan itself, as well as 
those who had fled to Pakistan and Iran and undertook incursions into Afghanistan. Some Muj hideen 
were organized in parties or groups, others acted more spontaneously at village or community level. 
Nevertheless, a prominent place among the resistance movements was claimed by the Islamist parties 
that had fled to Pakistan in the mid-1970s, leading some Western observers to egard them as 
representing ‘the Mujahideen movement’. The Pakistani Mujahideen parties were mainly Pushtun and 
Sunni, and operated from the Pakistani town of Peshawar. When the United States increasingly 
channelled aid to those parties through Pakistan from 1979 to 1986, they were able to justify their 
claim for prominence as they came to form the major channel for arms and resources to the 
Mujahideen fighting within Afghanistan. In reaction, leaders that had emerged in Afghanistan itself 
started to claim a prominent position as well, and also asked the Pakistan government for support. In 
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response, the Pakistan government stated at the end of 1980 that it would only recognize and support 
seven of the Pakistan-b sed groups and their affiliates.31 Pakistan stimulated them to establish control 
over the refugee population by setting up offices in the camps or to set up their own camps. Refugees 
were urged to become members of whichever party held sway in their camp.32 Bearing in mind 
Pakistan’s attempts to support fundamentalist tendencies and downplay tribal leadership (see below), 
it is hardly surprising that those parties were mainly non-triba ist, that they had few territorial 
strongholds inside the country, and thus a limited power base.33 The major Pakistan-based Mujahideen 
parties were the Jamiat and the Hizb-i Islami.  
 Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), or in short the ‘Jamiat’, was 
founded by Burhanuddin Rabbani in 1973. That same year its leaders had to flee to Peshawar, because 
President Daoud tried to suppress the organization. Among the Pakistani Mujahideen it was the only 
non-Pushtun and non-Sunni party. The Jamiat mainly recruited from the newly educated of rural 
backgrounds.34 Although allegedly supra-ethnic and embracing a range of ideological tendencies,35 it 
was primarily composed of Tajiks. It proved particularly difficult for the Jamiat to find support in 
Pushtun areas and it has always remained a party that mainly represents the northern minorities.36 
During the Jihad, however, its troops under local commander Ahmad Shah Masoud were the best 
organized. The Jamiat even saw a chance to create a regional governmental structure inside 
Afghanistan (in the Panjshir Valley, to the north-east of Kabul), resisting the Soviet occupation.37 The 
party gained most power in Kabul after the downfall of Najibullah, and its leader, Rabbani, became 
President of the 1992-formed Mujahideen government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. Despite the 
Taliban’s takeover of Kabul and most of the c untry, this government still occupies Afghanistan’s UN 
seat. Rabbani still nominally leads the Jamiat, although its de facto leader is Masoud. The goal of the 
Jamiat is a centralized government, although with local autonomy. Rabbani has, for instance, argued 
for respecting existing beliefs, traditions and practices, including the traditional emphasis on 
consensual decision-making. 
 Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan (Islamic Party of Afghanistan), or in short the ‘Hizb-i Islami’ split 
from the Jamiat in 1979. Hizb-i Islami was the largest Mujahideen movement and long-time protégé 
of Pakistan, in particular among those elements in Pakistan that supported the Mujahide n. The 
Jamaat-e-Islami Party and the Inter-S vices Intelligence, in particular, gave their support to this 
party.38 From 1985 onwards the movement also received a large proportion of US military support to 
the resistance. Furthermore, it was, at different times, able to secure support from Saudi Arabia and 
Arab extremists.39 Hizb-i Islami was led by Gulb ddin Hikmatyar, a Ghilzai Pushtun and an extremist 
Sunni Islamist. Hikmatyar was originally the deputy leader of the J miat, but after Masoud failed to 
start a rebellion in the Panjshir Valley during the Daoud regime, he started quarrelling and broke 
                                            
31 Marsden, The Taliban, p. 29. 
32 Marsden, The Taliban, p. 34. 
33 Harrison, ‘Afghanistan’, p. 53. 
34 Rubin, ‘Post-Cold War State Disintegration’, pp. 475-476. 
35 William Maley, ‘The Future of Islamic Afghanistan’, Security Dialogue, 24(4), 1993, pp. 383- 96, at p. 
386. 
36 Marsden, The Taliban, p. 34. 
37 Marvin G. Weinbaum, ‘War and Peace in Afghanistan: The Pakistani Role’, Middle East Journal, 45(1), 
winter 1991, p. 79. 
38 Arney, 1990, referred to in Marsden, The Taliban, p. 34. 
39 Maley, ‘The Future of Islamic Afghanistan’, p. 387. 
  © The Clingendael Institute 
 
22
 
away.40 Hikmatyar aimed to follow a more radical line than the Jamiat, and has sought to replace 
existing customs with the aim of creating an Islamic state. He mainly recruited from refugee camps in 
Pakistan, and also received support from relatively well-educated young radicals.41 Nevertheless, he 
failed to consolidate support among the Afghan Pushtun.42 Hikmatyar opposed any compromise with 
the Kabul government, the conciliatory resistance groups or the monarchists. Already during the 
Jihad, his men were not only opposing the Kabul government, but also the other Mujahide n, and they 
left the brunt of the fighting against the communist regime to the rest of the resistance. After the 
Soviet withdrawal, Hikmatyar’s forces deliberately started to fight the other resistance groups in a 
quest for power.43 In the face of the Taliban’s success, Hikmatyar joined Rabbani’s government as 
Prime Minister in 1996. After the Taliban captured most of the Hizb-i Islami’s heavy weapons and 
became Islamabad’s new client, Hikmatyar controlled few military and political resources. Some of 
his commanders joined the Taliban, while others in the north are apparently joining the forces of 
Masoud.44 
 Apart from those Mujahideen parties in Pakistan, there were a number of Shia parties that had 
found refuge in Iranian refugee camps. The principal among them was the Hizb-i Wahdat–i Islami-yi 
Afghanistan (Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan), or in short ‘Wa dat’. Wahdat was created under the 
sponsorship of Tehran in order to unite the eight ShiaMujahideen groups,45 which had their bases in 
Iran. Its leaders were Muhammad Karim Khalili and Abdul Ali Mazari. During the Soviet occupation 
these parties were reportedly more directed at fighting the conservative Sunni groups than the Kabul 
and Soviet armies. Wahdat had its main support among the Hazara ethnic group, and its goal was a 
form of power-sharing in which the Hazara groups would have control over their own areas.46  
Junbish  
Since 1989, a number of factions came to play a role in the Afghan conflict, some of them breakaways 
from Mujahideen parties, others arising independently. A significant role was played by Junbish-i 
Milli-yi Afghanistan (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan), in short ‘Junbish’. The Junbish’s 
founder and principal leader was Abdul Rashid Dostam. The Junbish was mainly an Uzbek party of 
former militias, whose loyalty was ‘bought’ by the communist regime. In 1992, however, they 
mutinied against Soviet-backed President Najibullah to side with Masoud of Jamiat. The Junbish 
atracted support from some of the Uzbek Mujahideen commanders, but was also subject to internal 
disputes. Between 1992 and 1997 the organization was the strongest in northern Afghanistan. 
Dostam’s goal was to establish a government in Afghanistan that would guarantee regional autonomy 
through a form of power-sha ing.47  
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The Taliban 
 
Although they were first heard of in 1994, the Taliban are not essentially a new force. They are the 
products of twenty years of war in Afghanistan. Those who organized the militia an  ave come to 
command it were originally Islamic scholars, or ulema. During the Soviet invasion the ulema called 
for the Jihad against the un-Islamic, atheist government. Although they actively participated in the 
Mujahideen resistance, they went back to the madrassas (the Islamic religious schools) after the 
Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of the communist regime in 1992. Disappointed with the 
achievements of the Mujahideen to rebuild the country and to establish Islamic laws, the more 
conservative of the ulema started to devote their time and energy to raising a new group of students of 
Islamic theology, or Taliban.48  
 In the early 1990s a group of such madrassa teachers from the southern city of Qandahar formed 
a militant movement, the Taliban, to end the continued factional competition of the Mujahid en. 
These mullahs were mainly affiliated with the Deobandi movement, which is common in the Pushtun 
tribal areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Following the creed of the Deobandi, the Taliban reject the 
use of reason to create innovations in shariah in response to new conditions. They oppose all forms of 
hierarchy within the Muslim community (including tribalism or royalty). They also oppose the 
participation of Shia in policy.49  
 The Taliban were able to generate large support. The political movements of that time had little 
support among the population of the rural areas and relied, at least partially, on men that had to be paid 
for their loyalty. The failure of the other movements to create a sustainable government contributed to 
the conditions for a mass movement to emerge.50 The Taliban appealed very much to the desperate 
wish of the populace for peace. They were disappointed with the Mujahideen movement’s failure to 
come to an arrangement for power-sharing, and the stigma of power abuse and corruption that 
surrounded them. Although the objectives of the Taliban largely coalesced with the objectives of the 
Mujahideen groups, according to the Taliban these groups could no longer be trusted, as they were 
morally and materially corrupt. The official goal of the Taliban was to come to a reunified, 
demilitarized, and centralized state with a Sunni Islamic signature. In their attempt to create a 
centralized Afghan state, the Taliban have increasingly adopted a discourse of Afghan nationalism in 
addition to their Islamic traditionalism.51  
 There has been a lot of speculation about the nature and extent of their backing. As the 
educational system in Afghanistan had totally collapsed, a whole generation of Pushtun boys had only 
received education at the rural madrassas, providing fertile ground for recruits. It is nearly beyond 
doubt that the madrassas in the refugee camps in Pakistan also produced strong adherents to radical 
Islam.52 This also applied to orphanages for Afghan children in Balochistan and the North-West 
Frontier Province of Pakistan, which were supported by Middle Eastern governments and private 
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philanthropists.53 Less clear is how far Islamist parties in Pakistan were responsible for training the 
youth, and how and where the Taliban received their military training.54  
 In addition, there has been much debate and speculation about how far it is essentially a Pushtun 
movement. The Taliban had their origins in traditional Pushtun areas and today a majority of them a e 
still Pushtun. It has been suggested that the Taliban are attractive to a large number of Pushtun, as 
their quick rise to power held the promise of their ability to reunite the country and to re-establish the 
Pushtun’s pre-Soviet status, in which they took the lead.55 According to an explanation that focuses 
less on the ethno- istorical component, the Taliban call for unification appealed especially to the 
Pushtun, as the Pushtun traditional areas mostly suffered from the factional infighting that had 
characterized the early 1990s.56 They prefer the harsh control of the Taliban above no order at all.57 
Some observers also see a parallel between the Pushtun culture (in which greater importance is 
attached to the value systems that it incorporates than to membership of the Pushtun community) and 
the Taliban emphasis on values.58 Most of these explanations probably hold some truth. Nevertheless, 
many Pushtun, including traditional Afghans, also oppose the Taliban’s harsh ideology and the radical 
social change that they have introduced. They regard it as an essentially foreign movement, whose 
creed was bred in the Pakistan refugee camps rather than nourished by Afghan traditional values.59 
Others, however, have seen the Talibanchange into a real Pushtun movement after their more recent 
conquests in traditionally non-Pushtun areas. 
 Despite their expansion beyond their original home base, the centre of gravity of the Talib n 
remains Qandahar. Here the Qandahar shura resides, which brings together the leading figures in the 
government council, and which resides over other shura in Taliban areas, including the one in Kabul. 
It operates very much by consensual decision-mak ng. The ‘absolute’ leader of the Taliban is Mullah 
Muhammad Omar, who presides over the Qandahar shura.60  
Pakistan  
Of the region’s countries, Pakistan has the closest and most complex relationship with Afghanistan. Its 
interests are geopolitical (versus India), as well as internally driven (minorities). These interests have 
not changed over time. With regard to Afghanistan, this has implied seeking a secure, stable, unitary, 
friendly, and peaceful Afghanistan. However, Pakistan’s policies as to how to achieve these aims, and 
with whom, have changed with the situation in Afghanistan.61  
 During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s role was rather ambiguous. On the one 
hand, Islamabad contributed to subverting the Soviet-backed Kabul government. Pakistan hoped that a 
victory by the Islamist Mujahideen would provide Pakistan with a secure border to the west and north. 
Such an outcome would give Islamabad ‘strategic depth’ in its confrontation with India, and would 
ward off a coordinated attack from both India and Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. During the Soviet 
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occupation India supported th  Soviet intervention and the Kabul regime, because with American aid 
flowing into Pakistan, India had to restore the ‘natural’ balance of power in the region.62 Moreove , 
Pakistan favoured an end to the war, as this would facilitate the return of its Afghan refugees. In a 
number of cases the Mujahideen and the refugee communities were held responsible for economic 
dislocations and the breakdown of law and order in Pakistan. 
 At the same time, Pakistan attempted to keep the Mujahide n divided. Although t ere have 
repeatedly been Pakistani attempts to unify the resistance, this was only undertaken to the level where 
they would be coordinated enough to ease the need for Pakistani influence and control. An important 
reason for this approach was that the conflict in Afghanistan also helped Zia ul-Haq maintain his 
martial law regime and had brought generous financial and diplomatic backing from the United States 
(through the 1980s more than 7.2 billion dollars).63 A more important objective of Pakistan was to 
block Afghan nationalism so that the Durand line, once established by the Raj and often disputed by 
Afghan regimes, would remain Pakistan’s international border. Pakistan was afraid both of nationalists 
who would like to establish a Greater Afghanistan, and traditional Pushtun clamouring for the creation 
of an independent Pushtunistan.64 Both options would imply the loss of Pakistan’s Pushtun areas, 
which would largely separate Jammu and Kashmir (the stake in the conflict with India) geographically 
from the rest of the country.65  
 This two-faced interest of Pakistan in a strong Islamic neighbour without aspirations for 
redrawing the Afghan-P kistani border resulted in parallel policies. US weapons aid was channelled to 
groups that were cooperative about the objec iv  f installing a fundamentalist Islamic state, while at 
the same time attempting to bypass Pushtun nationalism and tribal leadership.66 The suppo t funnelled 
to Jamiat, primarily a Tajik group, can be interpreted in this perspective. Simultaneously, rather than 
fighting the Afghan Pushtun and alienating itself from them, Pakistan tried to maintain friendly 
relations to be able to exert some control. The importance of Pushtun in Pakistan’s armed forces and 
the importance of the armed forces in Pakistan’s pol tics contributed to the fact that they had to receive 
considerable support as well.67 Over the whole period of the Jihad, Islamabad’s favourite ‘client’ was 
Hikmatyar, who had his support among both Tajik and detribalized Pushtuns from migrant families in 
northern Afghanistan. Hikmatyar was in fact the ideal compromise for both Pakistani objectives. He 
was a Pushtun, but at the same time he was an Islamist. As an Islamist, he would not attack a brother 
Islamic state. As an internationalist he would not claim its territory. Islamabad tried to push Hikmatyar 
by funnelling foreign arms through the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) to mostly 
Hizb-fighters.68 Support to Hikmatyar was continued until mid-1994.69 It has been suggested that 
through supporting only these radical movements, Pakistan obstructed chances for negotiations to 
pave a way for the peaceful replacement of the communist regime.70 
 After the withdrawal of the Soviet army, Pakistan was in need of a strong and unified resistance, 
for only then could peace be negotiated and the refugees repatriated. Furthermore, after an eventual 
peace, a weak Afghan government would only be ‘prey’ for India or Iran. Islamabad therefore urged 
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the Mujahideen parties to form a broad-based Afghan ‘government-i -waiting’,71 which it hoped to 
direct through clientelistic control over the religiously orientated Pushtun groups in Afghanistan.72 The 
dissolution of the Soviet Union added another dimension to Pakistan’s ‘strategic depth’.73 Islamaba  
saw possibilities for trade with the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, and next to 
these trade routes also the possibility of oil pipelines via Afghanistan to Pakistan.74 
 When Hikmatyar defected to Rabbani’s government after its installation, and after his loss of 
power to the Taliban, he became less important in Islamabad’s strategy.75 In 1994 Benazir Bhutto’s 
government shifted its support to the Taliban and in 1995 Pakistan threw its full weight behind this 
group. The Taliban, as well as Hikmatyar’s Hizb, are an Islamist, Pushtun group, and above all 
seemed in the position to unify and stabilize Afghanistan. Moreover, it has been suggested that the 
Taliban, due to their partial roots in Pakistan, the absence of personality-driv n struggles for
leadership in the movement (in contrast to the factional fighting of the Mujahideen), and an apparently 
stronger ideological basis, were more appropriate for Pakistan’s strategic aim of controlling the 
Afghan situation.76  
Iran 
In Iran, the perception of the persecution of Afghan Shias (mainly the Hazara population) by the Sunni 
majority was very strong. Tehran’s main goal in Afghanistan has thus been to seek greater 
representation of the Shia parties, and this has been a serious cause of differences with Pak stan and 
the Mujahideen groups. In 1988 Iran took the initiative of uniting most of the Afghan Shia parties into 
the Wahdat. Iran’s goals were also of a geopolitical character. It hoped to gain access to the Persian-
speaking populations of Central Asia, and tried to counterbalance Saudi Arabia’s role as a regional 
power. However, Iran kept a rather low profile in the Afghan conflict until the end of its war with Iraq 
and the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, and its involvement remained limited to 
support to the Shia parties and the provision of safety to Afghan refugees in Iran.  
 After the withdrawal of the Soviet forces in 1989, Iran saw the Najibullah regime as the main 
force capable of blocking the takeover of Afghanistan by Sunni parties. It therefore continued to 
support the Shia factions, but stopped helping them in their war against Kabul. This policy changed 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Taliban. Iran’s goal was now to support Shia 
factions in order to block the Taliban. Iran started to give military and economic aid to a broader range 
of groups, even beyond the Shia parties. In fact, the whole Northern Alliance of factions and parties 
resisting the Taliban takeover (including the Jamiat, the Junbish and the Wahdat), started to receive 
aid from Iran. By 1995, Iran had become the principal supplier of arms to groups fighting the Taliban, 
and this assistance is still continuing. After the Northern Alliance lost the northern cities of Mazar-i 
Sharif and Bamiyan to the Taliban, Iran turned to the Central Asian states to supply the northern 
provinces that were still under control of Masoud.77 Ir n’s hostility towards the Taliban is fierce and 
mutual: many Taliban leaders regard the Afghan Shia and the Iranian regime as renegades of Islam.78  
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 By supporting the resistance against the Taliban, Iran opposed Pakistani interests in Afghanistan, 
and the rivalry between Pakistan and Iran therefore became the main external factor fuelling the war. 
Since 1997 Pakistan and Iran have embarked upon a dialogue in order to prevent the conflict from 
further destabilizing their bilateral relations. However, the success of the Taliban of ensives, their 
massacring of the Hazara and their killing of nine Iranian diplomats in 1998 resulted again in a 
deterioration of the Iranian-Pakistani relationship.79  
Saudi Arabia 
During the Soviet-Mujahideen crisis, Saudi Arabia, as a partner of the US, not only wanted to combat 
communism, but also to promote its brand of Sunni Wahabi Islam. Additional y, Saudi Arabia tried to 
prevent Iran, its Shia rival, from gaining ground. Saudi Arabia therefore reinforced the Pakistani 
agenda, and allowed the ISI to channel its assistance to the Mujahideen, without paying too much 
attention to what Pakistan wanted to achieve out of the crisis.80 
 Saudi Arabia was among the only three countries that recognized the Taliban r gim . Apart from 
some affinity with the Taliban’s interpretation of Islam, Saudi Arabia’s main reason to support the 
Taliban is geopolitical in character. This support is both an exponent of the Saudi policy of long-term 
cooperation with Pakistan, and of preventing Iran from extending its influence. Moreover, some Saudi 
companies and individuals have interests in the various pipeline proposals in the regi n, in which oil 
would be channelled through Afghanistan.  
 As a strategic partner of Washington and in light of a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement after the 
election of Muhammad Khatami as President of Iran, Riyadh severely reduced its aid to the Taliban in 
the summer of 1998.81 The Saudi government even decided to downgrade its diplomatic relations with 
Kabul at the end of September 1998. This was perhaps done as part of the wider international 
condemnation of the Taliban regime’s acts, but most likely as a protest against the continuing presence 
in Afghanistan of Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden.82 
The Soviet Union, Russia and the Central Asian Republics 
Since its withdrawal, the Soviet Union’s (and later Russia’s) policy on Afghanistan was geared 
towards tabilizing the country with a non-Islamist government. This policy aimed to protect political 
stability in its Central Asian republics. By continuing the aid to Najibullah, Moscow hoped that the 
Mujahideen would become wearied, after which negotiations could take place.83 After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and with the empowerment of the Taliban, Russia played a major 
role in supplying the northern groups, especially Masoud’s forces. Russia still viewed the now 
independent republics of the former Soviet Union as its sphere of influence and tried to prevent 
Pakistan from gaining predominance in the region. Moreover, fear of Muslim extremism in the Central 
Asian region remained another motive for Moscow’s Afghanistan policy.84  
 The Central Asian states of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have both become actively involved in the 
Afghan conflict, supporting co-ethnic groups across the border. They both fear that the T liban might 
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sponsor Islamic radicalism in their countries.85 Du ing the conflict in Tajikistan, and while the Jamiat 
was in power in Afghanistan, Islamic guerrillas from Tajikistan found shelter, training and aid in the 
predominantly Tajik areas in north-eastern Afghanistan, leading sometimes to conflicts between 
Moscow and the Tajik government on the e side and Kabul on the other. After the signing of the 
Tajikistan Peace Accord in June 1997 and the deposition from power of the Rabbani-Masoud 
government, Masoud was offered access to an airbase in Kulab, Tajikistan, were he received both 
Russian and Iranian aid. In this way Tajikistan facilitated the use of its territory for military actions 
against the Taliban. 
 Uzbekistan’s hopes were set on a secular regime in Afghanistan, in order to create a buffer 
against Islamist fundamentalism. By giving aid to the Dostam forces, it supported the opposition to the 
Rabbani government, as well as to the Taliban. The Uzbek government stopped assisting Dostam in 
May 1997, but is still concerned about the Taliban and its influence in and outside Afghanistan, and is 
consequently looking for a new Afghan ally.86 
 Turkmenistan has remained neutral in the Afghan conflict, but has been dealing directly and 
indirectly with the Taliban. Its main interest in enabling peace is the diversification of trade, the 
lessening of dependence on Russia, and the exploration of new markets for energy resources, all of 
which remain impossible as long as the conflict in Afghanistan blocks the main trade routes.  
The United States of America 
During the Cold War era it was only obvious to the United States that it should support the 
Mujahideen in its resistance against a communist government, especially after it ‘lost’ Iran as a partner 
in the region. Washington funded about half of the Mujahideen’s arms deliveries, and for the whole of 
the 1980s this added up to roughly 2 billion dollars.87 Nevertheless, allocation of the funds was left to 
Pakistan, and unknowingly the Americans supported Pakistan’s pro-fundamentalist and anti-
nationalist objectives (see above).88  
 There is no evidence of overt United States aid to the Taliban. It is assumed, however, that 
Washington supported the Taliban at least until the bombing of the American embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania in mid-1998. Indeed, the Clinton administration initially expressed some supportive vi ws 
about the Taliban. The main reasons for this policy were to enhance chances for an American-Saudi-
built oil pipeline through Afghanistan, and to further isolate Iran. However, Washington increasingly 
felt uneasy with regard to the Taliban, especially as a result of its drugs and gender policies, and 
Afghanistan’s role in supporting international terrorism. It started to condemn the regime. 
Furthermore, it was realized that the T liban would not be able to unite Afghanistan.89 In spring 1997 
Washington announced its new South and Central Asia policy. This new policy featured India’s 
growing economic importance, America’s continued interests in oil pipelines from Central Asia, and 
the Kashmir conflict in view of the nuclearization of Pakistani-Indian relations. Stability in 
Afghanistan was an important condition for these American interests,90 wh ch was translated into a 
call for the creation of a multi-ethnic, broad-based government, observing ‘international norms of 
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behaviour’.91 After the embassy bombings and the supposed links between the Taliban and suspected 
terrorist Osama bin Laden, relations between Kabul and Washington further deteriorated. As a result, 
recent US policies are mainly concerned with Afghan terrorism and supporting efforts at peace-
making.92 
2.3 The Dynamics of the Conflict 
The conflict since 1989 can be divided into three periods. The first period covers the aftermath of the 
Soviet occupation and the continued governance of Soviet-backed Najibullah and the PDPA until 
1992. Over this period, the Mujahideen continued their struggle to oust this non-Islamic government. 
A second period comprises the years from 1992 to 1996. This period started with the expulsion of 
Najibullah and the installation of an Islamic Interim Government, made up of the Pakistan-based 
Mujahideen parties headed by President Burhanuddin Rabbani. Nevertheless, peace was short-liv d, as 
fighting continued among the political factions forming the government. Various factions came to 
control parts of the country. A third per od started when the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996. This 
group had made a sudden and drastic appearance on the stage over the 1994-1995 period. Since their 
conquest of Kabul they have become the most dominant force in Afghanistan, but they have not been
able to end the fighting or to impose their governance on the whole country. 
The Ousting of Najibullah 
As was mentioned earlier, the Geneva Accords of 1988 made no provisions for a new government 
replacing Najibullah’s after the departure of the Soviet occupational forces. It was assumed that the 
PDPA would stay in power. The Mujahideen had been excluded as potential participants for the 
administration. Nevertheless, the international community expected that with the retreat of the Soviet 
forces, the Najibullah government would rapidly collapse. The US and Pakistan therefore strongly 
pressured the Pakistan-based Mujahideen to form a government-in-waiting, and an Afghan Interim 
Government (AIG) was established, that included the seven Pakistan-based Mujahideen parties.93 At 
the same time, the UN started preparations for the return of the refugees from Pakistan and Iran. 
 However, the Najibullah government survived the departure of the Soviets, and several obstacles 
prevented the Mujahideen from taking over power. First, the Mujahideen were internally divided; 
there was rivalry between the various groups. The Najibullah regime profited from the growing 
fragmentation, and from its ability to play the Mujahid en commanders off against each other and to 
approach traditional leaders for support.94 Secondly, the guerrillas lacked sufficient training and 
strategic guidance to confront seriously the strong Kabul forces. Thirdly, with the vanishing of the 
Cold War, the Mujahideen lost the United States as one of its main uppliers.95 Furthermore, the 
withdrawal of the Soviet forces had more or less ended the Jiha . As a result, external support to the 
holy cause faded. Najibullah’s troops on the other hand became relatively stronger as a result of large 
quantities of weapons and other military equipment left behind, and still supplied, by the Soviet army. 
He was, moreover, able to buy the services of various militia groups, such as that of Rashid Dostam in 
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northern Afghanistan. Finally, the unforgiving stance of the Mujahideen and their demand that 
Najibullah had to step down made him stiffen his back. For him and the Kabul government there was 
no alternative to continuing the struggle for survival.96 
 The Peshawar-based AIG, moreover, failed to win both power and legitimacy inside Afghanistan. 
It was plagued by infighting, especially between the Jamiat and the Hizb-i Islami, which eventually 
contributed to Hikmatyar leaving the AIG. Furthermore, the non-P shawar Mujahideen saw the AIG 
as a Pakistani instrument that was not really representing the people of Afghanistan. Besides, nobody 
was convinced that the AIG’s administrative structures could effectively take over power from the 
Najibullah regime.97 As a consequence, over the 1989-1990 period, while the Mujahideen were 
present everywhere in the countryside, the Najibullah government managed to maintain firm control 
over the major cities of Kabul, Mazar-i Sh rif, Qandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad. Kabul tried to win the 
support of influential local and tribal leaders in exchange for weapons, money and political offices, as 
well as by granting autonomy to tribal chiefs (thereby contributing to a further fragmentation of the 
country in the longer term).98  
 However, Najibullah also fell victim to the infighting that plagued the Mujahideen. This resulted 
in various coup attempts against his government. The series of events that eventually led to the ousting 
of the Najibullah government started shortly after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of 
Soviet aid (March 1992) with an ope  revolt by non-Pushtun forces in northern Afghanistan. These 
rebels were lead by the Uzbek general Dostam, who between 1989 and 1992 had supported the Kabul 
government. He now allied with Masoud’s Jamiat, and enjoyed the support of Parchami elements 
within the armed forces and the Watan Party.99 No longer getting support from Moscow, Najibullah 
realized that no other option remained than to give in. It meant the end of Najibullah’s rule, as well as 
the Watan Party, which had already effectively split along ethnic lines, its factions allying with their 
former Mujahideen opponents (the Parchami with Dostam and the K alqi with Hikmatyar). 
 Nevertheless, the Mujahideen in Peshawar could not reach agreement on how to proceed, 
hampered especially by the fact that the major participants – Hikmatyar and Masoud – were on very 
bad terms with each other.100 Jamiat commanders Masoud and Dostam stood on the point of capturing 
Kabul, which Hikmatyar and his Hizb-i Islami forces intended to prevent. Before the Peshawar leaders 
were able to reach an agreement, Dostam and Masoud entered the city on 26 April 1992. That same 
day the Mujahideen leaders in Peshawar reached an agreement on an Islamic Interim Government that 
became known as the Peshawar Accords. This interim government was accepted by Masoud and 
Dostam and came over to Kabul on 29 April 1992. Sibghatollah Mujaddedi was installed as its first 
interim President. He was succeeded three months later by Rabbani, of the Jamiat party. The change 
in government put a legitimate end to the Ji ad, and was quickly followed by the return of about 2.6 
million refugees from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran.  
The Interim Government and Continued Factional Competition  
The Peshawar peace accords did not hold for a long time. The Islamic Interim Government was 
obviously not capable of any nation-buildi g. The division of power among the different factions in 
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the broad-based interim government remained fragile and the arrangement waited for an occasion to 
collapse.  
 From the beginning, Hikmatyar did not agree with the Peshawar Accords, and did not stop the 
battle for Kabul. From May until August 1992 Hikmatyar’s forces bombarded the city with rockets, 
according to the United Nations killing more than 4,000 people and forcing over 500,000 t  flee the 
city.101 It proved difficult to come to terms with Hikmatyar. Defence Minister Masoud could not get 
along with Hikmatyar, whom he regarded as a representative of Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. 
Moreover, Hikmatyar was in search of more power and Masoud was an obstacle to this objective.  
 Within the capital, Rabbani had to deal with continued hostilities between forces of the Wahdat 
(which occupied large parts of Kabul at the time that Najibullah was ousted) and those of the Ittiha-I 
Islami, a Saudi-backed former Mujahideen party. In order not to alienate the Pushtun inhabitants, 
Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Masoud (of the Jamiat) decided to support Ittihad, which set him 
against the Hazara population.102 Furthermore, Masoud and Rabbani also became alienated from 
Dostam, as time and again his arguments for a federal system of government with far-reachi g
autonomy for the regions were disregarded.103  
 When in December 1992 the leadership council was designed to vote on a new interim President, 
several Pushtun Mujahideen groups and the Shia boycotted this council meeting. Rabbani completely 
disregarded the claims of other leaders and had himself re-elected by a hand-picked national assembly. 
The other Mujahideen parties saw this election as illegitimate and decided to quit the council. During 
1993 relations continued to deteriorate. Pakistani efforts to stimulate talks in order to reunite the 
Mujahideen resulted in the Islamabad Accord of 7 March 1993, and yet another agreement on 20 May 
1993, which called for power-sha ing in the interim government and eventual elections. Based on 
these agreements, Hikmatyar was appointed Prime Minister within the Rabbani government. However, 
afraid that the victims of his rocket attacks on Kabul might seek revenge, Hikmatyar did not dare to 
enter the city, and was to be a Prime Minister in name only. Dissatisfied with this outcome, he 
continued his struggle for Kabul in January 1994 by renewed rocket attacks. Dostam, who also aimed 
for a more important position n the government, decided to choose his side and sent over his forces 
from Mazar-i Sharif. Their alliance was a weak one, as Dostam did not favour Hikmatyar’s Islamic 
fundamentalism.104 Their attempt to topple the Rabbani regime failed, but it resulted in a n w spate of 
internal displacements and refugee movements.  
 Hikmatyar continued attacks on the city until March 1995. Then his forces had to flee the 
advance of the Taliban, which took over his base in Charasyab. Simultaneously, the forces fighting f r 
Wahdat were removed from the city as a result of an Iran-brokered settlement.105 At last, peace 
returned to the city, although blockades by Hikmatyar and the Talib  created a humanitarian crisis 
over winter 1995, as a result of food and fuel shortages. Finally, in May 1996, Rabbani was willing to 
concede to a peace deal and the installation of a new government of national unity. In this government, 
Hikmatyar would become Prime Minister. Dostam rejected the offer to join. For the few months 
preceding the takeover of power by the Taliban, Rabbani, Masoud, and Hikmatyar were able to run a 
government. 
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 While the new government was contesting military and political control over Kabul, the rest of 
the country remained divided but rather peaceful. Without any cen ral administration, it fell apart. In 
the process of disintegration, separate fiefdoms were created, with different Muja ideen factions in 
power. In some provinces, local governing councils were established and reconstruction made a start. 
Substantial numbers of refugees returned from Pakistan to their destroyed villages. In Herat, J miat 
commander Ismail Khan managed to start a process of reconstruction, while Mazar-i Shar f 
experienced relative peace under Dostam. Other areas, in contrast, experienced vir ual anarchy. In 
Qandahar, for example, several Mujahideen factions competed for power.  
 Various factors reinforced the process of disintegration. The traditional Pushtun tribes, which had 
kept the country together to some extent, had been severely eroded as a r sult of the Soviet 
occupation, as well as of the war against Najibullah. Non-Pus tun local leaders were only interested in 
maintaining their autonomy.106 This now also seemed to apply to the Pushtun, who were also more 
interested in their control over the opium cultivation than the fate of the central government.107 Th  
Islamic Interim Government, in the meantime, was never able to establish a strong power base among 
the Pushtun in the countryside. This was partly a result of the weak position of traditional parties in the 
government. Another factor was the fact that Rabbani was a Tajik, and therefore unable to generate 
Pushtun support. The Islamic signature of the interim government had insufficient cement for uniting 
the divided Afghan population. The result was a de facto division of Afghanistan in regionally based, 
autonomous, ethnic coalitions. The Government of National Unity, installed in May 1996, suffered 
from the same lack of support as the 1992 interim government. Hikmatyar was installed as Prime 
Minister, with the aim of broadening the coalition against the Taliban with him as a Pushtun leader. 
His installation, however, was no success, as he was still linked to his cruel rocket attacks on Kabul 
several years earlier. The new government was furthermore still related to the continuous struggle for 
political power, which had alienated most Afghans from the Mujahideen politics.108 This lack of 
legitimacy of the Government of National Unity set the stage for the arrival of the Taliban. 
The Coming toP wer of the Taliban 
In 1994 the Taliban had their first military success when they conquered Afghanistan’s second city, 
Qandahar. The population welcomed the militia because it was freed from the local warlords.109 The 
remarkable success of the Taliban in bringing order and peace to Qandahar gained them considerable 
popularity. When they moved on, in the areas they captured banditry was brought to an end, 
abandoned weaponry was seized and many people responded to the call to join their ranks.110 The 
Taliban had no shortage of recruits, and were backed by the tribal and village elders and Afghans 
outside the country.111 The popular support among the Afghan rural population that the Taliban were 
able to generate, can be related back to their claim of bringing order a d their commitment to 
introducing a society according to Islam. They saw the government as falling short of the standards 
expected of an Islamic state, despite the long involvement of its leaders in Islam.112 In the areas that 
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they captured, an Islamic code was installed, including prescriptions for men to grow beards, to cut 
their hair short, and to attend mosque. Restrictions were imposed on women, such as banning them 
from education and employment and requiring them to wear veils. Social mingling or communication 
among men and women outside the family were completely forbidden. Although the code was 
publicized as being the traditional shariahlaw, it may be interpreted as an opportunistic mixture of 
Pushtun traditional law and the shariah. Nevertheless, this appeal to religious purity was received 
well. 
 During this period of increasing influence by the Taliban, the position of international actors in 
the conflict showed some significant changes. Taliban victories resulted in Iran’s approach to 
Rabbani. The US, in contrast, grew suspicious of the Rabbani government, and refused aid to Kabul. 
For Pakistan, Hikmatyar’s defection from the Islamabad Accords and the Kabul government in early 
1994, as well as his continued attacks on Kabul, enabled a shift in support to the Taliban.113 The 
Bhutto government consistently denied accusations that this political support was also translated into 
military assistance. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the absence of Pakistani military forces, the Talib n 
forces have been joi ed by large numbers of Pakistani volunteers affiliated to various religious and 
some even to mainstream parties. Moreover, military analysts have concluded that some of the 
Taliban’s military operations could not have taken place without the foreknowledg and logistical 
support of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI).114 
 Supported by outsiders or not, the perseverance of the Taliban did not alter. Their success story 
continued with their next significant victory, the occupation of Herat in late summer 1995, and finally 
with their taking over of Jalalabad and Kabul in September 1996. Rabbani and Hikmatyar fled over 
the Hindu Kush to the cities of Taloqan and Konduz, while Masoud’s forces retreated to their home 
base in the Panjshir Valley to the north-east of Kabul. Many people in Kabul were weary of the war 
and responded with relief. 
 One of the first acts of the Taliban in Kabul was to hang former President Najibullah and his 
brother in front of the United Nations compound where he had tak n refuge after his dismissal. As in 
other areas that they had conquered, the Taliban introduced a series of Islamic edicts. However, it was 
evident that the Taliban saw the people of Kabul as different to those of the rural areas, and their 
enforcement was stricter. The Taliban feared an uprising and sympathy with the opposing forces. The 
strict rules led to a series of confrontations with representatives of international organizations (NGOs 
and UN agencies),115 and the repudiation of a large part of the international community.  
 The Taliban did not bother much. Being in a winning mood, they continued their advance to the 
north. However, at the entrance of the Panjshir Valley they were stopped by Masoud.116 By this time a 
new alliance, the ‘Northern Alliance’ (also called the ‘United Islamic Front’), was formed between 
Masoud, Dostam, Hizb and the Wahdat. Dostam’s faction became the strongest of this alliance. The 
Taliban, who had lost some northern territories to the resistance in 1996, were eager to negotiat  with 
him. Dostam refused, but in May 1997 his field commander Abdul Malik Pahlawan defected to the 
Taliban, enabling the Taliban to move up to Mazar-i Sharif and cross the Hindu Kush into north 
Afghanistan. Dostam fled via Uzbekistan to Turkey, Rabbani had to go to Tajikistan, and the Wa dat 
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were left in a nearly defeated situation. The outcome was that the Taliban possessed 90 per cent of the 
country, with only Masoud remaining.  
 However, when shortly after the capture of Mazar-i Sharif the Taliban endeavoured to disarm its 
(mostly Shia) population, they refused to cooperate and, led by the Wah at, start d to drive out the 
Taliban in bloody battles that killed thousands. Abdul Malik Pahlawan, who saw the writing on the 
wall, quickly changed positions again nd sided with the Wahdat. An attempt to recapture Mazar in 
September 1997 was also thwarted because of Iranian efforts to resupply the city.117 At the same time 
Masoud’s forces, together with the Wahdat, managed to reconquer the Hindu Kush passes, moved into 
southern Afghanistan and proceeded up to the outskirts of Kabul. The only Taliban militia left in 
northern Afghanistan fled to Konduz, the last of Hikmatyar’s bulwarks. Nevertheless, the Hizb forces 
in this city decided to join the Taliban, and the situation turned another 180 degrees, as the Taliban 
were able to establish a stronghold in Konduz. It provided the Taliban with a possibility to recover and 
to renew their attacks on Mazar-i Sh if, now from Konduz, in October 1997.  
 It took several Taliban offensives before they were able to conquer Mazar-i Sharif in August 
1998. In the process of doing so, various alliances failed to stop them.118 In the end, the Taliban 
massacred the Hazari population of the city into submission,119 killing 5,000 to 8,000 people in a 
three- to four-day period.120 The result of the Taliban’s July-August 1998 offensive was not only that 
Masoud, Dostam and Rabbani had to flee the country, but also that the Taliban again controlled 90 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s territory. Only a few opposition holdouts remained: much of Badakhshan, parts 
of the Hazarajat, and the Panshir Valley. Since then, the situation has not changed significantly.  
The Present 
The Taliban still experience considerable resistance, and they have not succeeded in crushing the 
Northern Alliance,121 yet Masoud continues to be the only remaining major opposition force.122 
Nevertheless, the Taliban seem determined to bring the whole country under their control. Afghan 
initiatives to establish a negotiated settlement have failed. For example, the January 1999 attempt by 
two former moderate Mujahideen leaders to create an impartial Peace and National Unity Foundation 
Party to enable negotiation procedures was welcomed by the opposition alliance but rejected by the 
Taliban.123 Various initiatives for peace and a negotiated settlement by outsiders, among others from 
the side of the UN and Pakistan, have also failed (see Chapter 3). A short- m political solution seems 
hard to attain. As all sides continue to receive military and financial support from outsiders, they can 
continue the struggle for power militarily. Unfortunately, these outsiders also continue to have their 
interests in the country and a continuation of war. For example, while Pakistan has openly expressed a 
preference for a broad-based government, Pakistan’s ISI continued to back the Taliban in the hope that 
it could conquer the whole country militarily.124 Moreover, a ‘criminal economy’ of drugs trade and 
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smuggling125 has come into existence in the country, mainly benefiti g th  Taliban. For many Afghans 
the war implied that few ways were left to earn money, and apart from joining a guerrilla army the 
main alternative has become to grow poppy.126 The Taliban prohibit its consumption, but its 
cultivation is stimulated.127 It is quite cynical that by now poppy is the main source of revenue for the 
Taliban,128 yielding them US$ 20 million yearly in taxes.129
 The Taliban’s international relations can be characterized as problematic at the very least. Their 
continued hostilities towards the Hazara population, including their blocking of the central Hazarajat 
over the 1997-1998 period in an effort to starve the Hazara into submission,130 had affronted the 
Iranians. The massacring of the Hazara and the killing of nine Iranian diplomats in the Taliban 
conquest of Mazar-i Sharif in August 1998, and another massacre during the conquest of Bamiyan in 
September 1998, resulted in growing military tensions between Iran and the Taliban.131 In October 
1998 Tehran amassed 200,000 troops along its border with Afghanistan. The Taliban dispatched a few 
thousand troops to its border as well.132 It took the interference of UN negotiator Brahimi and 
Pakistani diplomats to prevent an outright interstate war. Tehran backed down after the release of 26 
Iranian prisoners by the Taliban. Relations between the two countries remain tense. Apart from its 
discontent with Afghanistan’s internal affairs, Iran is frightened that the main militant Iranian 
opposition groups might find an operational base in Afghanistan.133 
 Other countries in the region also experience the effects of the situation in the country. Now that 
the Taliban have proven to be successful, liberal sections of the Pakistani population, and even some 
in the government, see the Taliban as a threat to regional security. This fear is understandable, as there 
are groups in Pakistan propagating the same harsh interpretation of Islam, and aspiring for a similar 
role in Pakistani politics.134 So far, Pakistan’s immediate interests in the territorial integrity of 
Afghanistan and a peaceful neighbourhood have outweighed this threat.135 Paki tan’s determination to 
see Taliban rule imposed on Afghanistan has isolated it diplomatically.136 As a result of the fear of 
being drawn into Afghanistan’s internal conflict and the conflict between Tehran and Kabul, as well as 
the effects of the Afghan instability on Pakistan (in the form of a ‘gun culture’ and heroin-addiction 
problem spilling over the borders), Islamabad has been pushed into a more conciliatory role as 
negotiator,137 insisting on a broad-b sed government through negotiation. However, the military coup
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in Pakistan in October 1999 brought into power a government that may prove to be even more 
supportive of the Taliban.138  
 There is no direct threat to India from the conflict. Nevertheless, like Pakistan, India also feels 
some side- ffects such as drug-trafficking and weapons proliferation.139 This is especially the case in 
Kashmir. Another regional player, China, suffers from heroin imports from Afghanistan, as well as 
from Islamist support to Uighur nationalist movements. Uighur militants have trained and fought 
alongside their fellow Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan, and the heroin trade has been used to finance 
their movements. Some say that bin Laden, if not the Taliban, has ties to these movements.140 The 
same goes for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is said to have received assistance from the 
Taliban.141 
 But discontent with the Taliban regime is not only regional. It also has wider international 
implications. The country has become the world’s number one producer of poppy. According to the 
UN Drug Control Programme, in 1999 it produced 4,600 tonnes of opium, of which 90 per cent came 
from Taliban-held areas.142 Moreover, Afghanistan has come to be regarded as a major hide-out nd 
training ground for international terrorism. With the morale of the Taliban declining, they needed new 
recruits whom they found among the Islamic fundamentalists of the world. Those who joined the 
Taliban were mostly no longer welcome in their own country. They not only found refuge in 
Afghanistan but also an income. Next to fighting the resistance, they earned wealth by trafficking 
drugs and consumer goods through Afghanistan. For those reasons, internationally, Afghanistan has 
received the label of a ‘rogue state’. Lastly, the Talibanhave gained the discontent and even outright 
rejection of a large part of the international community with their harsh interpretation of Islam and 
deplorable human rights record.  
 Although the US initially took a moderate stance against the Taliban, relations deteriorated over 
the 1997-1998 period. The Taliban’s gender policies, as well as their protection of poppy production 
and harbouring of international terrorists generated discontent in the US. Just as the Taliban prepared 
to campaign for international recognition, the United States launched a cruise missile attack on targets 
in Afghanistan in August 1998. The attack was aimed at camps that were suspected of forming the 
base of the exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin Laden. The US associated him with the bombing of US 
embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam a few weeks earlier.143 The continued protection of bin Laden 
by the Taliban and their denunciation of the missile attack ruled out a dialogue with the US and led the 
US to levy economic sanctions against the regime in 1999.144 Saudi Arabia, which had earlier 
recognized the Taliban together with Pakistan and the United Arabic Emirates, in September 1998 
withdrew its representation in Kabul in response to the Taliban hosting bin Laden.145 The murder of a 
UN military adviser in Kabul and the abduction and killing of two local UN employees made the UN 
withdraw its workers from the country in August 1998 until the security situation improved.146 
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 The deteriorating track reord of the Taliban has also had far-reaching economic consequences. 
When they came to power, the construction of an oil and gas pipeline through Afghanistan from 
Turkmenistan to Pakistan was already agreed. The American company UNOCAL and the Saudi firm 
Delta were to build the pipeline at a cost of US$ 2 billion. UNOCAL therefore proclaimed the victory 
of the Taliban as a positive development.147 After the cruise missile attacks of 1998, however, 
UNOCAL decided to withdraw from Afghanistan.148 
 Until now, the Taliban seem not to be impressed by the international developments and opinions. 
They have little experience in running a government administration. Their military campaigns and the 
eradication of corruption and law and order remain the main concerns of the regime. Nevertheless, 
they have been able to establish a kind of overlordship, partially built upon the re-emerge ce of 
traditional village-based rule, giving the regime its internal coherence to stay in power.149 The jirgas, 
made up of village elders and other notables, have been given decision-taking power at the local level 
by the Taliban. However, it remains to be seen whether their tactics work in other parts of the 
country.150 Despite their successes in bringing some unity to the areas that they have conquer d, 
guerrilla or commando activities were not eradicated, and new factional schisms may still occur.151 
This may apply to the Qandaharis and others, as well as to moderates and radicals.152 At the same 
time, in the absence of a civil administration, social issues have mainly come to be a concern of 
Western aid agencies. 
2.4 Recapitulation 
This chapter aims to provide a background for the analysis of interventions in the Afghan conflict 
discussed in chapters 3 and 4. In order to identify how far these interven ion  wer  or could have been 
a success, and to identify the gaps in the knowledge to contribute actively to peace, a list of the factors 
underlying the conflict is attempted.  
Historical Weakness of the State and the Struggle against State Control 
After the retreat of the Soviet Union in 1989, Afghanistan witnessed fighting among competing 
political factions, which had formerly been united in the guerrilla war against the Soviet invader. How 
to explain the lack of internal coherence and the continued retur  to competition and fighting? Most 
observers see a major cause as being that the country has never had a strong government or sense of 
state. Consequently, a centre that could manage to build the state had never really developed. On the 
contrary, traditional communities strongly resisted the encroachment on their domain by the state.153 It 
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has been suggested that in the absence of (regional) outsiders, their promotion of modernization and 
the establishment of the current borders of Afghanistan, Pushtun, Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara military 
leaders would have established their own independent ‘emirates’ or ‘khanates’. Now, however, they 
were virtually forced to fight the central authorities in Kabul.154 
 Whatever power-sharing system had existed in the past, it was destroyed during the Soviet 
invasion. As of 1979 regional identities gained extra importance, as did the non-Pushtun groups in 
particular, and crushed every existing state-socie y relationship. While different factions denied each 
other the control over Kabul, the countryside experienced its own dynamics, which in some regions 
led to factional competition at the local level (as in Qandahar) while other regions were relatively 
peaceful.  
 Chances for centralization of power and unification of the Afghan sate were weak in the past, but 
are even worse at present as the old relations between tribal leaders and the population has also waned. 
At the same time, factional competition through opportunistically changing alliances has become the 
norm rather than the exception, destroying prospects for party politics, if this had ever been an option 
at all. Nevertheless, while Afghanistan is basically a failed state, it continues to exist in some form, 
leaving open possibilities for other forms of governance. 
Control over the State and the Ethnic Factor 
The Soviet intervention and the consequent infighting eroded the traditional political balance among 
the various ethnic groups. Non-Pushtun groups have become more powerful than twenty years ago. 
This resulted from several factors. As most of the resistance against the Soviets came from the 
Pushtun areas, the Pushtun were also the major targets of retaliations. At the same time, the Soviets 
assured themselves of the cooperation of the Uzbeks by launching development projects and giving 
aid. For different activities, the Soviets profited from their militia (Dostam and his Junbish p rty, for 
example, originated from their ranks). During the Soviet occupation the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazara 
were able to exercise full administrat ve and political autonomy. Secondly, as a result of the territorial 
base of the ethnic groups, the militia that have emerged in the different regions have come to represent 
the general political objectives of the populations from which they come.155 T  result was that the 
organization and mobilization of the population was along ethnic lines.156  
 These changes in relative power positions among the various ethnic groups brings some observers 
to characterize the present civil war as ‘symboliz[ing] the two opposite struggles in Afghanistan, one 
by the P[u]shtuns to re-establish their dominance, and the second by the Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek 
minorities to seek adequate representation in political power at the centre and autonomy of their 
respective areas’.157 Although ethnicity certainly plays a role in the Afghan civil war as of 1989, it 
would be wrong to interpret the past too much from this perspective, as it downplays the importance of 
several other factors. In the first place, focusing on ethnicity results in igno ing the above-m ntioned 
regional factor, with leaders seeking power through the mechanism of seeking strategic alliances. At 
the lowest level, this may translate into local leaders of the same ethnic group opposing each other, 
while on higher levels l aders from different ethnic groups may temporarily align. The fact that on 
higher levels one deals with different ethnic groups suggests an ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, a 
classification of the conflict as a personal rivalry among different leaders (rather than among different 
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groups) might be more correct, especially in the rural areas. Secondly, by focusing on ethnicity the 
different ethnic groups are represented as homogeneous, ignoring the fact that opposing political 
blocks cut through ethnic groups, and internally divide them. In the civil war over Kabul from 1992 to 
1996, ‘virtually every group was at one time both the ally and the opponent of every other group, 
regardless of ethnicity’.158 There was, for example, a lot of infighting among Mujahideen groups from 
Pushtun areas, and citizens from rural or urban backgrounds had different views on Islamic law and 
how to implement it.  
 The conflict received an ethnic component with Pakistan trying to promote its interest in a 
fundamentalist Islamic nation with no aspirations to change its borders. Support was thus given to 
fundamentalist, nationalist, but non-expansionist parties. At the same time, not to alienate itself from 
the Pushtun, channelling aid through Pushtun movements (mainly Hikmatyar’s Hizb) was cho en. 
Although not representative for all Pushtun in Afghanistan, this at least fuelled the impression of a war 
of Pushtun against the non-Pushtun ethnic groups. This impression was strengthened by the strong 
Pushtun character of the Taliban movement. The presence of an ethnic factor became more apparent 
when the Hazaras, Tajiks and Uzbek people joined forces to defend their traditional territories in 
northern and central Afghanistan against capture by Taliban forces. The Taliban’s acts of ethnic 
cleansing in areas and cities that they had conquered reinforced this effect.159 The ethnic factor has 
grown into a political reality at last, with the northern minorities currently demanding a share of power 
on the basis of ethnic grounds. This claim is fiercely rejected by the Taliban, who are only willing to 
consider power-sharing on the basis of the strength of political groups.160 At the ame time, however, 
it should not be forgotten that the increasing politicization of Islamic identity has increased the 
salience of the Sunni/Shia sectarian differences, which again cut through the ethnic divide,161 and 
which – especially in the Taliban resistance against the Hazara population – p yed a more important 
role than ethnicity. 
Outside Interference 
‘Afghan tribal societies had a tradition of using violence in social conflict, but they also had traditions 
to resolve conflicts and limit violence’.162 Th  high levels of violence and the continuation of armed 
struggle are not simply the results of local society or culture, but can be related to the high levels of 
material and military support from outside powers, especially the neighbouring countries. The 
departure of the Soviets caused a power vacuum, and resulted in intensified external interference. 
Although during the Soviet occupation each group was already supported by kin groups residing in 
neighbouring countries, the end of the Cold War reactivated several oppressed, slumbering regional 
conflicts. The political polarization inside Afghanistan and the civil war motivated the Afghan groups 
to seek support from outsiders to counterbalance their internal opponents.163 This pr vided the regional 
powers with an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of the collapsing Afghan state, further intensifying 
the conflict. Apart from ethnic and religious interests, regional powers had political and security 
interests motivating their interest in the Afghan conflict. While the Taliban are supported by Pakistan, 
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Iran, Russia and the former Soviet Central Asian states support the opposition.In this re pect, an 
understanding between Iran and Pakistan would be an important factor in enabling a meaningful 
dialogue among the Afghan groups.164 On the other hand, the importance of outsiders should not be 
overrated: despite its support, Pakistan seem to have very little political leverage over the Taliban.165 
Contest over the Nature of Society 
With the rise to power of the Taliban, the conflict has gained yet another, although not completely 
new, dimension, namely a struggle about the nature of Afghan society. The Taliban interpretation of 
Islam, which includes the imposition of a harsh Islamic rule, the expulsion of women from public life, 
and the use of war to bring about national unification and political consolidation, alienated Afghan 
moderates and minority groups.166 Nevertheless, with its aim of introducing Islamic law and 
reunifying the country, the Taliban movement does not differ so much from the other Afghan parties 
in the conflict. All parties to some extent promote Islam (although maybe not in as strict an 
interpretation as the Taliban), and all have the unification of Afghanistan on their agendas. These 
movements furthermore have in common that they arose in response to successive attempts by Afghan 
leaders since the late nineteenth century to transform Afghanistan into a ‘modern state’, based on a 
Western liberal ideology, in which the role and behaviour of women played a central role. The aim of 
the Islamists was to obstruct this process and to install their own Islamist government.  
 The world view of the Taliban is in line with the long-standing resistance in mainly rural 
Afghanistan against ‘modernity’, and is reminiscent of the earlier responses to modernization attempts 
by the state. The Taliban, however, differ from the other Islamist movements in what they want to 
achieve. Their creed is primarily religious and not political, and centres on personal behaviour and 
religious community.167 They do not seek to create a political ideology. Instead, they want to use 
shariah as sole guide, with help of the ulema (men of religious learning who interpret shariah law). As 
such, they can be perceived as seeking a return to the status quo xisting before intellectual 
movements in the 1950s and 1960s.168  
 These aspirations do not oppose their interests in a unified state. On the contrary. But according 
to them this union has to be achieved through the establishment of a religious community. Such a 
community excludes any form of regional autonomy or federal arrangements, which is thus fiercely 
opposed by the Taliban. They aim for a unified Afghanistan and the abolition of historic leadership 
structures. To some extent they have been successful in doing this. While the opposition was divided 
into several groups, which were again further divided into feuding factions, theTaliban were able to 
establish a unitary structure in the territory that they conquered.169 
 The present confrontation between Western countries and the Talib  must be seen in the light of 
these contesting visions of ‘state and society’, ‘modernity’, and ‘religious fundamentalism’. The 
international donor community is seen as a Western community with Western norms and values, 
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which are opposed by the Taliban.170 In this context, portraying the Taliban as a medieval 
phenomenon is besides the point. It shows the failure to recognize the Taliban as a ‘contemporary’ 
movement, which deliberately refuses to compromise to the Western world view and value system.171 
With the disappearance of Cold War antagonisms, the role of the West has gradually changed from 
political participant to merely political observer. With the end of the Cold War, ‘the West put on new 
lenses’172 and came to see the Islamic motivations of the supported Afghan fighting parties as 
destabilizing. The fundamentalist Islamic Taliban gender policies, as much as Western interest in gas 
and oil pipelines, and the Taliban’s harbouring of terrorism have placed Afghanistan back in the focus 
of international attention.173 Now the accent in Western involvement has shifted to humanitarian 
assistance and diplomacy. This will be discussed in the following chapter.  
                                            
170 Brabant and Killick, The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and 
Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations, p. 4. 
171 Brabant and Killick, The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and 
Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations, p. 11. 
172 Rais, ‘Conflict in Afghanistan’, p. 17. 
173 Rubin, Testimony on the Situation in Afghanistan.  
  © The Clingendael Institute 
 
42
 
 
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
43
 
3 International Efforts to Bring the Conflict to an End 
Chapter 3 reviews the interventions by outsiders to end the Afghan conflict. The major interventions 
by the international community were along three tracks: diplomacy, in the form of negotiations and 
political relations; military force as well as restrictions in military assistance; and economic and aid 
policies.  
 The Afghan conflict has been subject to intense mediation. The huge number of actors involved 
in those negotiations added to their complexity. The major diplomatic efforts will be analysed here, 
starting from the Geneva Accords of 1988, which were meant to settle matters in Afghanistan after the 
Soviets had retreated. As was hown in the preceding chapter, the Geneva Accords remained largely 
ineffective in ending the violence. The diminishing political involvement of the former Soviet Union 
and the United States over the following years coincided with a diminished interference from th  UN 
in particular. This paved the way for regional powers, especially Iran and Pakistan, not only to initiate 
peace initiatives, but also to pursue their own policies. With the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, 
interest in Afghanistan was renewed, thus inciting diplomatic efforts by the international community at 
large. 
 The post-1996 initiatives included some minor military responses, but these were no serious 
threat to the Taliban’s leadership. Although regional powers interfered in the conflict by supporting 
the warring factions, the conflict retained its mainly intrastate character. The military responses 
referred to came respectively from Iran (threatening military intervention) and the US. At the military 
level, there were also allegations of external military support. As a result, imposing an arms embargo 
was considered, but until now this has proved impossible to implement. 
 Another level of external involvement concerns relief, rehabilitation and development assistance. 
These may also contribute to ending violence, as well as to reconciliation and prevention of future 
escalation of conflict, but the role of these instruments has proved less significant in the case of 
Afghanistan. In earlier stages of the Afghan conflict, aid played an important role in supporting 
warring factions. In the post-1996 period, withholding development assistance and relief aid became 
ways of indicating international discontent to the Taliban regime. 
 The chapter ends with an assessment of the external interventions in the Afghan conflict. The 
limited success of these interventions is related to a lack of political commitment by international and 
regional actors, a lack of connection between intended outcomes of the interventions and realities on 
the ground, a failure to address ideological differences adequately, and misconceptions about the 
leverage of aid.  
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3.1 Diplomatic Efforts 
 
The United Nations was involved in many of the diplomatic efforts to end the war. The UN was the 
only intergovernmental organization actively involved in the Afghan conflict. Its political involvement 
started in 1981 with a first mission of a personal representative of the Secretary-General. During the 
1980s developments in the former Soviet Union, Europe and Afghanistan paved the way for the UN to 
become more involved in finding a solution to the conflict. In 1988 the diplomatic efforts of the UN 
resulted in the signing of the Geneva Accords, which led to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan in 1989. However, it is debatable whether thes  Accords were a success. The Geneva 
Accords were mainly an agreement to settle the external factors in the conflict. They provided a 
diplomatic cover for the Soviet decision to withdraw, and intended to end international military aid to 
the Mujahideen. The Accords aimed at establishing a role for the United Nations in implementing and 
monitoring the Accords, as well as in the provision of humanitarian assistance for refugee repatriation 
and national reconstruction.174 The Accords, however, were not able to end Soviet support to 
Najibullah’s regime. The resistance movement denounced them for this reason. Originally, part of the 
deal was also that the United States and Pakistan would stop supporting the M jahideen. However, 
when they realized that the Sovi ts would withdraw their forces regardless of continuing external 
assistance to the Mujahideen, this was omitted.175 The most important omission of the Accords, 
however, was that the end of international involvement was not linked to a domestic political 
settlement. The fact that it was foremost an externally induced agreement echoed through in the later 
endeavours to set up an interim government. 
Efforts to Establish an Interim Government 
In order to achieve an internal settlement, the UN put all their efforts into forming an interim 
government that would hold elections. This reflected an approach that has proved successful in 
countries like Cambodia, Nicaragua and Namibia.176 Initially, the effort to reach agreement on an 
interim government appeared to be a ypical post-Cold War dialogue between the US and the former 
Soviet Union, in which the United Nations played a complementary role.177 It proved difficult to get 
the Mujahideen to negotiate with the Kabul government. The resistance did not recognize Najibullah’s 
regime, as it was perceived as being illegitimate and a puppet of Moscow. Nevertheless, in December 
1989, the UN Secretary-General managed to get consent for negotiations in which all parties in the 
conflict would take part, including Moscow, which might be regarded as quite an achievement.178 
However, rather than coming to an agreement with Kabul, the US and Pakistan continued their efforts 
to achieve a then seemingly conceivable Mujahideen military victory.179 
 Changes came with the Gulf War, when radical elements of the Afghan Mujahideen (in particular 
Hizb) joined the international Islamist opposition to the US-led coalition against Iraq. This resulted, at 
least temporarily, in Saudi Arabia suspending funding to Hizb. Moreover, when the Mujahideen failed 
to establish a government, Pakistan backed away from them, and opted for a political settlement as 
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well. Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia began to look at the proposals for an interim government more 
favourably. By November 1991, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and I n indicated that they would support the 
US-Soviet agreement. All parties thus seemed ready to accept a UN-mediated settlement. This implied 
that an interim government would be formed that would organize free and fair elections for a broad-
based government, as well as a moratorium on weapon supplies by all external partners. The plan 
failed due to several reasons. First, the UN made limited provisions for its implementation. In other 
cases where the UN has assisted in installing an interim government, the Security Council has 
provided armed forces to disarm hostile forces, or administrative assistance to enable a process of 
elections. In Afghanistan the consensus included only limited involvement by the international 
community. Although the US and the USSR would try to remove sophisticated weapons and weapons 
of mass destruction, no provision was made for disarming or merging the various armed forces in the 
country. Moreover, the UN did not intend to monitor the elections. The UN General Assembly only 
pased a resolution asking the Secretary-General to use his good offices to promote a negotiated 
solution.180  
 Second, the warring factions inside Afghanistan did not seriously consider the UN-me iated 
transition, let alone the plan to disarm. The UN plan furthermore relied on the belief that with the end 
of external assistance the various Afghan parties and armed forces would all have to revert to the 
internationally sponsored interim government for patronage. This was a miscalculation. With the end 
of aid from the US and Moscow, the Afghan government and the resistance fell apart and fragmented 
along ethnic lines, and power came into the hands of autonomous local commanders spread over the 
country. Moreover, at a higher level, the negotiations had too narrow apolitical basis. Former 
President Zahir Shah, the Shia parties and the Mujahid en commanders inside Afghanistan resisted the 
prominence of eastern Pushtun leaders in the procedures for transition to the interim government. 
During the Soviet occupation, the Pushtun (with many of them in exile) had lost power, while the 
Uzbek factions and Hazaras had become more powerful. This came to the fore in the anti-Pushtun 
revolt in January 1992, which aimed to topple the government and threatened the transition process.181 
It was thus a weak plan, based on insufficient analysis of the causes of conflict, the changes in relative 
power positions that had taken place during the Soviet occupation, and, consequently, the post-Soviet 
situation. 
 In addition, the concept of an interim government was never likely to succeed in the Afghan 
context. As Barnett Rubin concluded: ‘When […] state institutions collapse, and armed factions 
emerge as the main form of collective action, interim governments offer no quick solution to the 
problem of political order’.182 Afghanistan lacked basic state institutions such as unified armed forces, 
administration, legal system, let alone some degree of social order or a law-bound state structure. 
Moreover, no consensus existed on the nature of the political community for which to aim. For the 
Afghan Mujahideen, the proposed procedures for the formation of an interim government through 
democratic elections were in fact unacceptable. Rather than whether it would be democratically 
elected or not, they regarded it of utmost importance that the new government would be an Islamic 
government.183 
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 Finally, developments inside Afghanistan went faster than the process of negotiation. Two of the 
Mujahideen parties did not agree with a pre-transition council, which was supposed to take over all 
powers and executive authority from the government, whereupon it would convene to choose the 
interim government. Before matters could be settled, in April 1992 the Jamiat-Dostam alliance took 
over Kabul and ousted Najibullah. This urged the Peshawar-based parties to come to an agreement 
(the Peshawar Accords) and the hasty formation of an Islamic Interim Government which, although 
accepted in Kabul, could not get sanctioning from Hikmatyar. Hence when fighting over Kabul 
restarted, the efforts of the UN for an interim government ended. Although in December 1993 it was 
decided to re-establish a political office – the United Nations Special Mission for Afghanistan 
(UNSMA) – until the rising of the Taliban, the role of the UN in Afghanistan remained limited. 
Efforts to come to an Agreement in the Factional War 
The installation of the Jamiat-headed provisional government led by Rabbani was no success. It had 
no prospects of significant support from outsiders, and was challenged by Hikmatyar’s continuing 
attacks. With the diminished interest of outsiders, efforts for reaching a peace agreement now mainly 
had to come from within the region. Pakistan took the lead in reaching an agreement, and in 1993 
started a policy to support stability in Afghanistan. This policy, however, was based on Pakistan’s own 
interests, especially the importance of Afghanistan for Islamabad’s trade with Central Asia.184 Iran 
cooperated with Islamabad in stabilizing Afghanistan, because it hoped to gain more power for the 
Shia by striving for a power-sha ing arrangement. The Saudi-Iranian détente added another positive 
factor.185 The stage seemed set for a regionally induced peace accord for Afghanistan. Negotiations on 
power-sharing resulted in the Islamabad Accord of 7 March 1993. This Accord attempted to define the 
mandates of the President and the Prime Minister, and gave a clear timeframe for organizing elections. 
One of the outcomes was that Hikmatyar was given the position of Prime Minister within the Rabbani 
government. Further negotiations were held in Jalalabad to form a cabinet and to transform the 
Ministry of Defence into a Defence Council. They resulted in another agreement on 20 May 1993. 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed the accords as guarantors.186 The deal held for less than one 
year. Hikmatyar again resumed fighting, this time allied with Dostam. Pakistan and the United Nations 
were able to negotiate a series of ceasefires, but the military and political hostilities did not stop.187 
 Several factors contributed to the failure of the Islamabad Accord. First, it was an ‘elite 
settlement’, a compromise between leaders, which did not settle the root causes of political 
instability.188 Hikmatyar was prepared to compromise. His craving for power could not be disregarded. 
As a result of the large armoury built up with US and Pakistan assistance, his Hizb forces were still an 
important military power. Secondly, while the tribal structure of the Pushtun had served as an 
insurmountable obstacle for carving a coherent plan to oust the communists, Masoud’s success in this 
respect created resentment with the Pushtun against the new regime. Moreover, the retreat of the state 
to urban centres strengthened local and regional leadership. An important factor was also that the 
accords were the result of external pressure, instead of being based on a real compromise between 
Afghan elites. They suggested a consensus that was not there, and indicated no contours for an interim 
policy arrangement. The fact that Hikmatyar was given a pecial position in the government also 
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conveyed the implicit but important message that ‘the straightest path to the Afghan premiership was 
through pools of civilian blood’.189 This became apparent when Hikmatyar attempted to get the 
Defence Ministry of his rival Masoud under collegial control. When Rabbani resisted, Hikmatyar 
threatened to continue the war, and Rabbani had to backtrack.  
 The UN’s role during this period was very limited. An attempt for UN mediation by Special 
Representative Mahmoud Mestiri became futile as the Taliban rapidly advanced in January and 
February 1995. Further efforts by his successor, Norbert Holl, resulted in initiatives for a ceasefire, the 
demilitarization of Kabul and a national peace process. However, these plans also b came irrelevant 
since the Taliban were victorious on the battlefield.190  
Diplomacy and Negotiation with the Taliban
The Taliban’s victories put Afghanistan back at the centre of international attention. Nevertheless, it 
took until July 1997 before Afghanistan returned high on the agenda of the UN, when Secretary-
General Kofi Annan raised the priority of Afghanistan by appointing a high-level spec al envoy, 
Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi.191 Later in 1997 he was also appointed as head of the UN Special 
Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA). Both Brahimi and Secretary-General Annan called attention to the 
fact that foreign interventions were an important factor in intensifying the Afghan conflict. Their 
statements and reports referred especially to the supply of arms and milit y tr i ing by foreign 
countries. They therefore questioned the sincerity of some countries’ support for the United Nations 
missions.192 Brahimi, then, initiated the so-called ‘6+2’ group, consisting of Afghanistan’s neighbours 
Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and China, as well as the US and Russia, which 
aimed to strengthen the diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the conflict.  
 The UN, however, was slowly manoeuvred into a difficult position vis-à-vis he Taliban regime. 
Despite their takeover of Kabul, and although the Taliban occupied the larger part of the territory and 
population, they were not recognized as the legitimate leadership of the country. The Rabbani 
government continued to hold Afghanistan’s seat at the United Nations. Only three countries – namely 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – recognized the new Taliban regime. The 
international community took an awaiting stance. While until 1996 the US had given the Taliban the 
benefit of the doubt, they too became more critical as of early 1997. The US realized that it could not 
embrace the Taliban, either politically or ideologically, and it started to call for the creation of a multi-
ethnic, broad-based government, observing ‘international norms of behaviour’. Together with the 
European Union’s continued criticism of the Taliban and Pakistan’s backing, this prevented the 
Taliban from being recognized internationally.193 Re ations only deteriorated, as during the course of 
1997 the UN increasingly addressed certain controversial Tal ban edicts, especially with regard to 
women. Being one of the largest providers of assistance and formerly the major mediator in diplomatic 
efforts, the UN became regarded by the Taliban as a Western/US-oriented opponent. This also applied 
to many foreign organizations that had raised doubts or criticized the new edicts. 
 Organizations increasingly started calling for making development assistance conditional on the 
extent to which the Taliban would give in on their harsh ideological position, and no support would be 
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given to institutional capacity-building.194 The failure of the Taliban to comply with demands of the 
UN and international organizations to guarantee their employees’ security and to become more 
flexible on gender issues resulted in a suspension of ECHO funding, as well as a withdrawal of 
expatriates from Afghanistan in August 1999.  
 Recent initiatives from the UN have also failed. Two rounds of UN-sponsored peace talks in 
Ashgabad, in January-February and March 1999 between the Taliban and the Afghan opposition 
initially appeared to be successful. They resulted in an agreement in principle to form a shared 
executive, a shared legislature and a shared judiciary,195 and promises that each side would settle a 
truce in orthern Afghanistan during the next round of discussions.196 However, the Taliban withdrew 
from further talks because of the opposition’s refusal to accept a unified Taliban command for the 
whole country.197 Continuing the ‘6+2’ formula, the United Nations attempted o bring the Taliban 
and the Northern Alliance to the negotiating table in Tashkent in July 1999. This attempt also failed 
when the Taliban rejected a ceasefire.198  
 Apart from the UN efforts, some regional initiatives for conflict resolution were undertaken. 
These included the so-called ulema talks of April 1998, during which the Taliban, under pressure from 
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Sharif, agreed to negotiate with the Northern Alliance in Islamabad. These 
negotiations, however, remained at the stage of appointing the members of a commission that was 
supposed to deal with resolving the conflict. A tentative agreement was reached on the nomination 
procedures and a ceasefire. However, all the agreements broke down.199 At that time peace was low on 
the agenda of the Taliban, as they were tied down by the offensive in the north-east.200 More recently, 
efforts by Pakistan and Iran to resolve the conflict reportedly led to quarrels between the two 
countries.201 Pakistan increasingly lost credence in being willing to come to a settlement of the 
conflict, due to its continued political and alleged military support of the Taliban regim . In August 
1999, for example, the northern-based opposition rejected a Pakistani offer for mediation, saying that 
Pakistan should first end its military and economic support to the Taliban.202 
 Another effort worth mentioning is the ‘Frankfurt Process’, aimed at bringing together Afghan 
intellectuals in a search for peace. While Northern Alliance members have supposedly responded to 
invitations from this group, Taliban representatives have not. Although they are not actively involved, 
Western countries responded positively to the effort.203 On 29 April 1999, former King Zahir Shah 
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called for a Loya Jirgah (a grand assembly of senior leaders). Th  Taliban rejected this effort, while 
the Northern Alliance, Afghan groups, and the US welcomed it.  
 What made diplomatic efforts to deal with the Taliban so problematic? The difficult relationship 
between the UN and the Taliban is exemplary of the clash of ideologies and cultures in which the 
Afghan conflict has turned, and that has made it difficult for the international parties to remain neutral. 
This, again, handicaps negotiations.  
 It has, in addition, become very difficult to get a grip on the Taliba. T y show no flexibility in 
their position and, apparently, cannot be forced either. While they are interested in development 
(especially economic infrastructure) and international political recognition, there are so far no 
indications that withholding assistance has resulted in any toning down from their side. This is not 
surprising, considering the amount of aid that the country receives (US$ 300 million per annum) 
compared to the US$ 2.5 billion the country is able to gain from smuggling and US$ 1.25 billion from 
drugs. Moreover, the aid flows promised as an incentive by the West are limited in comparison to the 
Taliban’s other financial sources (notably Pakistan and Saudi Arabia). The T liban do not see 
themselves as aid-dependent, nor do they value highly the development efforts of the past.204 Hence, as 
Afghanistan is economically rather independent, the effect of political isolation by the West is limited. 
 There are, however, indications that the T liban are susceptible to economic and financial 
pressure from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.205 As regards Western actors, international political 
recognition remains a major issue for the Taliban. In October 1998, the UN Credentials Committee 
voted not to recognize the Taliban.  
3.2 Military Force and Restrictions in Military Assistance 
The Taliban were never seriously threatened militarily by external powers. There were only two 
instances during which a military confrontation with foreign powers appeared likely. The first 
concerned the confrontation of troops at the border with Iran in 1998, which resulted from the Iranian 
indignation about the suffering of the Hazara population and the killing of Iranian diplomats during 
the Taliban conquest of Mazar-i Sharif. The second confrontation concerned the UnitedStates’ cruise 
missile attack in August 1998, aimed at the training camps of terrorist bin Laden. It can be debated as 
to how far this confrontational stance has brought a solution to the conflict any closer. Neither of the 
two incidents seems to have had l verage on the internal military position of the Taliban or their 
political agenda.  
 Military assistance was a powerful factor in sustaining the war. In chapter 2 it was pointed out 
that regional powers supported all warring factions in the Afghan conflict. T e Najibullah regime was 
supported by the USSR; the Mujahideen -and later the Taliban – were supported by Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and the US. The Northern Alliance received military support from Iran and Russia. All external 
actors considered support necessary for bringing the conflict to an end in a way that was favourable to 
them. However, the support also led to competition between the external actors. By supporting the 
resistance against the Taliban, Iran found itself opposing Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. The 
rivalry between Pakistan and Iran hence became the main external factor fuelling the war. Since 1997 
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these two parties have embarked upon a dialogue in order to prevent the conflict from further 
destabilizing their bilateral relations. Nevertheless, this has not been effective up until now. 
 The importance of regional parties in the continuation of conflict has led to considerations to 
impose an arms embargo. Up until now, this has not been realized. There are several reasons for its 
failure. First, the external powers still consider the struggle for power in Afghanistan open-ended. 
Supporting the parties is therefore imperative. Secondly, it is practically impossible to implement an 
arms embargo. The borders with neighbouring countries are too porous for monitoring. Thirdly, there 
is the issue of timing. By now, an embargo would likely work in favour of the T liban. Strengthening 
the Taliban through an arms embargo is not considered desirable by some of the Western actors.206
Nevertheless, the Council of the European Union at the end of 1996 decided to place an embargo on 
all deliveries of arms, ammunition and military materiel to Afghanistan. 
3.3 Humanitarian and Development Assistance  
During the Soviet occupation, the UN used to be the only larg  international organization providing 
aid to the country. The United Nations’ humanitarian role started in 1979 with the UNHCR giving aid 
mainly to the three million Afghan refugees residing in Pakistan. During the Soviet years the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) started a much smaller operation in Kabul, supporting 
development programmes of the Soviet-aided Afghan government. In addition, the UN was 
represented through a Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, appointed in 1984 by the UN Human Rights 
Commission. Overall, however, UN activities were concentrated in Pakistan and the bulk of assistance 
inside Afghanistan was provided by a limited number of foreign NGOs.207 ICRC gained access to the 
country in 1986.208  
 The UN insisted on political neutrality in its assistance.209 This was, however, complicated by the 
non-neutrality of other interveners. In fact, UNHCR support to refugees in Pakistan became political 
as well, as it provided an entry for the US and Pakistan to organize the Mujahideen. It was further 
complicated by direct US support to cross-border ‘humanitarian’ efforts for Mujahideen capacity-
building. Over the 1985-1990 period, the Pakistan-based Mujahideen groups received US$ 380.7 
million from the US.210 Moreover, the UN efforts were supported by the activities of various NGOs, 
who saw their support as a contribution to the struggle against the Soviets. Overall, it turned out to be 
very difficult not to get caught in the tug-of-war between different parties, and by choosing one faction 
or the other, many efforts in effect hardened the battle-lines.211 Matters were complicated by the fact 
that every UN agency had its own mandate and funds. There was almost no contact with the 
government, and virtually no cooperation between the different agencies and with the NGOs.  
 After the signing of the Geneva Accords and the withdrawal of Soviet forces, an Office of the 
Coordinator for Afghanistan (UNOCA) was installed to coordinate all UN humanitarian efforts for 
Afghans in and outside Afghanistan. In 1992 this office came under the auspices of the newly formed 
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UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, and in 1993 it was renamed the UN Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA). While the diplomatic efforts of 
the UN temporarily ended with the installation of the Islamic Interim Government in 1992, its 
humanitarian operations continued through this office.212 However, its role shifted to one of 
information-sharing and facilitation. UNDP took on responsibility for the coordination f 
rehabilitation assistance.213 With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US temporarily 
disengaged itself from Afghanistan, politically as well as on the level of humanitarian and 
development assistance.  
 From then onwards, the European Union became the largest multilateral donor of assistance to 
Afghanistan, and has remained so until the end of the 1990s. Important donor countries were Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, the UK, Norway and Denmark (see Annexe 4). In addition, WFP, 
the ICRC, UNDP and UNICEF were important financial contributors. In 1997 an estimated US$ 217 
million of aid was provided.214 There is currently a UN representation of thirteen UN agencies, with 
UNOCHA as the coordinating body, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, and about 150 NGOs, of 
which one-third are international NGOs.215 
 Major emergencies in which humanitarian assistance was provided included the large-scal  
exodus from the fighting in Kabul in early 1994, resulting in a refugee flow of 300,000 people to 
Jalalabad, Mazar and Pul-I-Khumri, and two earthquakes in the north-easte n province of Badakhshan 
in 1998, which cost the lives of over 6,000 people. Aid to rehabilitation and development concentrated 
in particular on the areas to which refugees from Pakistan and Iran have been returning, while in urban 
areas relief programmes have been continued to aid internally displaced persons. Social services – 
mainly health and education – have largely become a responsibility of NGOs, the Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Movemnt and the UN agencies.216 
Coming to Common Programming 
With the Taliban coming into power in large parts of the country, emergency and development 
assistance became more politicized than ever before. First, the donor community to Afghanistan 
seemed to have a shared understanding on a number of policy objectives. There was a common feeling 
among the donors that peace should be reached through a negotiated settlement, including the 
Northern Alliance. Second, assistance became overtly principle-centred. Human rights became a 
central issue and gender discrimination had to be specifically addressed. Moreover, the integrity of aid 
in its provision had to be maintained, and the security of aid staff assured. Apart from that, aid had to 
address the issues of narcotics and terrorism.217 Although emergency aid was to be continued 
unconditionally, these policy objectives were translated into a refusal to provide devel pment 
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assistance if these principles could not be fulfilled. In response to the Taliban’s stance on gender, 
organizations attempted to include an equal number of women and men in their programmes, while 
refusing assistance for institutional capacity-building.218 Counter-narcotics programmes were started, 
aimed at offering alternatives to poppy growers. Moreover, renewed investments were made in certain 
social services in refugee camps, especially for women.219  
 Common planning was difficult in the absence of a government counterpart developing a national 
plan. In addition, the UN agencies and NGOs all had separate mand tes and funding sources.220 In 
1997 the UN started developing a Strategic Framework to make political and assistance strategies 
better informed of each other and more coherent. In this central coordination framework for aid, 
representatives of donors, UN, NGOs and the ICRC could meet to make joint decisions about 
priorities and programmes.221 The Strategic Framework essentially implied reform of the UN, 
reflecting the broader shift in the UN humanitarian system to link the political objectives of conflict 
reduction and humanitarian goals to relief and development activities. Afghanistan was to be a test 
case of the new approach. The initiative was thus not specifically aimed at the Afghan context.222  
 A parallel and closely related initiative was the development of a ‘Common Programming’ 
structure for Afghanistan. In fact, Common Programming was the mechanism for establishing the 
goals set in the Strategic Framework. In this, aid agencies tried to come to agreed priorities and 
policies, and Common Programming among donors and NGOs. In contrast to the Strategic 
Framework, Common Programming focused on the dilemmas posed by the work in Afghanistan. 
Agencies had to deal with highly fluid, dangerous situations, in which development activities could 
never be seen in isolation from conflict. As a consequence, the common separation in categories such 
as relief and development made little sense. Thus while they are parallel and related initiatives, they 
focused on different levels. While the Strategic Framework aimed at an int gration of policy and 
programmes, Common Programming instead aimed at coordination of activities in the field.  
 It is difficult to locate the starting date of these initiatives. Although the rethinking of approaches 
and ideas for institutional reform started earlier, the initiatives gained momentum through various 
activities during 1997. In January 1997 an International Forum on Assistance to Afghanistan was 
organized in Ashgabad (Turkmenistan).223 This conference was organized by the UN’s DHA in 
cooperation with UNDP and was financially supported by the government of the Netherlands. Over 
240 participants visited the conference.224 Its aim was to assess in what way the international 
community (i.e. donor countries, UN organizations and NGOs in combination with Afghan actors) 
could design a common assistance strategy for Afghanistan. One of the outcomes of the Ashgabad 
meeting was the establishment of an informal contact group of donors and international organizations 
that were active in Afghanistan: the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG). The ASG was to convene on a 
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regular basis – two to three times a year – and would focus on specific topics. The ASG could also 
invite ‘umbrella’ organizations of NGOs.  
The Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) 
In April 1997, the ASG convened in meeting for the first time in Geneva. It was chaired by the 
Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation. The meeting focused on how to bring sustainable 
peace to Afghanistan. Special attention was paid to gender issues and UN activities. It was concluded 
that development assistance could contribute to creating room for diplomatic manoeuvre. This resulted 
in the suggestion that projects that overtly excluded women should no longer be funded.225 The
participants of the meeting agreed on the need to improve coordination of both aid and diplomatic 
initiatives. However, there was disagreement on how to achieve this in practice. A Dutch proposal to 
merge the ASG with a political meeting of 21 countries later in 1997 was rejected. There was some 
disagreement on which UN agency should take the lead. The role of UNSMA, in particular, was 
considered controversial in this regard. The only outcome was the appointment of five regional 
coordinators in Afghanistan.  
 During the second ASG meeting on 3 December 1997, all participating donor countries discussed 
and endorsed the draft ‘Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan’ (i.e. the Strategic Framework), 
emphasizing that: 
 
· Assistance must, at a minimum, do no harm, and must, where possible, aim to contribute to 
establishing a basis for future peace and security;  
· Assistance must work towards a shared purpose – empowering Afghans to build sustainable 
livelihoods, and;  
· Saving lives and reducing human suffering will, for the foreseeable future, remain a priority; 
· It was necessary to act in unity, as single actions would undermine influence on local leaders.  
 
Building on the theme of improving the coordination of assistance, all ASG participants agreed to 
finance only activities resulting from Common Programming. The UN was to play a lead role in 
facilitating this, and UNOCHA’s Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for Afghanistan was suggested as the 
major collection box. From 1998 onwards UNOCHA annually collected its funding through such 
appeals. The 1998 CAP was a firt outcome of Common Programming.226 In effect, by these various 
efforts the role of UN coordination changed from the sharing of information to the development of 
common principles, approaches and purposes.227 
 The third and the fourth ASG meetings focused on principled Common Programming, and hence 
the issue of conditional aid. The third ASG meeting on 5 May 1998 presented three options: 
 
1. To work according to ECHA guidelines. This would imply that most activities would have to end; 
2. To focus on local community-level projects and the development of non-institutional capacity on 
the local level; 
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3. To cooperate with authorities on capacity-building, and temporarily disregard fundamental 
principles. 
 
As the first option implied factually ending aid, while the third would compromise the donors’ 
position on fundamental principles, the meeting opted for the second alternative. In fact, this was the 
only alternative that made continuation of aid possible without compromising the donors.  
 During the fourth ASG meeting, which took place in Tokyo in December 1998, the ASG took a 
stronger stance on principles. For example, it was critical of the UN’s Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoUs) with the Taliban as being too compromising towards the Taliban, especially 
on gender issues. It no longer intended to tolerate Talibanrestrictions. The ASG drafted a proposal to 
station twelve human-rights monitors in Afghanistan, as well as to establish a special UNSMA ‘Civil 
Affairs Unit’. The UN should also negotiate security guarantees for aid p rsonnel with the Taliban. In 
the meantime, NGOs should be discouraged from returning individually, hence undermining a 
common strategy. The ASG also promoted the idea of establishing a ‘strategic monitoring capacity’ 
aimed at assessing the effects of aid on the peace process.  
 The principle of Common Programming was endorsed again. All participants, including the 
Netherlands, again pledged only to finance activities that resulted from Common Programming, and 
that are part of the Consolidated Appeal. 
Common Programming in Practice 
In practice, the process was hampered in various ways. First, the scope for Common Programming 
was severely limited when international assistance was disrupted in the summer of 1998. All UN 
programmes in the regions controlled by the Rabbani government (except for Hazarajat) had already 
been suspended after the WFP warehouse, as well as many agency premises in Mazar-i Sharif, were 
looted in October 1997.228 After various incidents, including a dispute between the UN and the 
Taliban about a decree banning the UN from employing foreign Muslim women staff in Afghanistan 
unless accompanied by a male family member,229 the United Nations also decided to withdraw from 
the southern Taliban-held areas between mid-April and mid-June 1998. In response to the incidents, 
New York tried to reach a memorandum of understanding with the Taliban. Negotiations led to such 
an agreement, but it was to remain unequivocal and viable to criticism. Some elements in the Taliban 
appeared to undermine the agrement, for example by issuing the order to close non-health 
programmes for women.230 By mid-July 1998 special envoy Brahimi speculated on a total withdrawal 
from Afghanistan. At about the same time, ECHO stopped its funding to Kabul. The suspension of aid 
was a response to the growing restrictions on access and employment of women, and to the demand by 
the Taliban that NGOs relocate to an abandoned polytechnic building, which NGOs viewed as 
unacceptable on security grounds. The killing of a UN officer the day after the US cruise-missile 
attack on Afghanistan was the signal for virtually all UN and NGO personnel to leave the country. The 
UN demanded guarantees for the security of its staff from the Taliban before it would allow its 
expatriates to return to Afghanistan. Only the ICRC and a few NGOs stayed behind. It took until 
March 1999 before the UN and the NGOs started to return.  
 At the same time the principled approach on gender issues and human rights, which in a number 
of instances resulted in a withholding f aid, has failed to affect the Taliban’s policies. This has been 
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attributed to several factors. Firstly, the Taliban is a movement and a not very well-organized political 
entity. Conditional aid does not have much effect in the absence of a functioning, organized state. 
Although the Taliban installed a kind of governing structure, state power is de facto decentralized, 
with local leaders pursuing relatively autonomous policies.231 Moreover, the Taliban were suspicious 
and hostile to the changes proposed by the donor community, and there was a large discrepancy 
between their priorities and principles and those promoted by the donors. Apart from this, the 
humanitarian nature of most programmes, the multitude of agencies involved and the limitations of 
donor coordination reduce the credibility of conditionality.232 Nevertheless, it appears that the 
continued concern with human rights has been somewhat effective, in that the Taliba have agreed 
upon inquiries into the Mazar-i Sharif massacres. Small advances have been made in the sense that 
both the UN and NGOs are now exploring the potential of signed agreements with the Taliban, and in 
that the Taliban have been forthcoming on the security demands since the return of aid personnel in 
1999.233 
 In addition to these hampering circumstances, a major problem was that it was very difficult to 
come to an agreed strategy. Many donors in the Strategic Framework remained sceptical about the 
possibilities of contributing to the peace process through aid. Pursuing policy goal  through assistance 
created a great number of dilemmas for donors. Doubts were raised about the possibility of promoting 
a politically conscious approach in the face of humanitarian disaster. For example, as a result of the 
conflict, major Afghan cities became overpopulated and dependent on humanitarian aid. Providing the 
cities with aid conflicted with the ‘do no harm’ approach, as it discharged the warring factions of their 
duties to take care of the population so that they could concentrate on the fighting. At the same time, 
providing humanitarian aid conditionally conflicted with the principle of the right to humanitarian 
assistance. Several actors therefore argued that humanitarian aid should not become politicized. 
Instead, they argued that the focus of the Framework should be to improve the effectiveness of aid.  
 Similar dilemmas posed themselves in the fields of more structural development. As the Taliban 
controlled the peaceful areas, rehabilitation required cooperation with the Taliban. The donors’ 
insistence on the Taliban or other Afghan parties respecting international humanitarian norms and 
human rights was often at friction with their principle to respect Afghan culture and tradition. To limit 
assistance to emergency aid contradicted the need for community development and local peace-
building, as was suggested by the ASG. And while institutional capacity-building would be the option 
in response to the country’s development crisis, as the donors perceived a crisis in governance they 
still resorted to humanitarian budget lines and criteria, thereby excluding longer-term funding cycles 
and institutional capacity building while favouring quick-impact programmes.234 
 Although aid agencies and donors endorsed both the Strategic Framework and Common 
Programming, conceptual disagreement and contextual factors resulted in the concepts’ limited 
success in practice. This became most apparent in UNOCHA’s failure to get full funding for its 
Consolidated Appeals for Afghanistan: the pièce de résistance of these policy approaches.235  
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 3.4 Assessment of International Policies and Interventions 
 
In review, the limited success of external interventions in the Afghan conflict can largely be attributed 
to four factors. Two of these factors played a role from the Geneva Accords onwards, while two 
became significant after the Taliban came to power.  
 Firstly, the failure of external interventions can partly be attributed to a limited commitment by 
international and regional actors to end the conflict. After the departure of th  Soviets, the 
international community’s attention for Afghanistan decreased considerably. As the support from the 
US and USSR ended, so did their interest in negotiations. The fading international interest was, for 
example, reflected in the moderate financial contributions to the UN emergency appeals for 
Afghanistan.236 At the same time, however, external support for warring factions did not come to an 
end, and efforts to reach a peace agreement were frustrated by the interests of the region’s countries in 
Afghanistan. The agenda for negotiations was mostly set by these outsiders: Saudi Arabia, Pakistan 
and Iran. It seemed for the regional players as if an Afghanistan in turmoil was more important than a 
peaceful Afghanistan ruled by only one faction. In this respect Pakistan played, and continues to play, 
a prominent role. While openly expressing its concern for peace, it continued to choose sides in the 
conflict, and thus helped to sustain it.   
 Secondly, failure can be attributed to the lack of connecti n that existed between the intended 
outcomes of the interventions and the realities on the ground. The number of efforts for mediation in 
Afghanistan were considerable, and initiatives aimed at coming to a negotiated settlement, including 
general elections and a broad-based government. Time and again these initiatives were disrupted by 
developments on the ground in the form of continued factional infighting. With the superpowers 
having lost interest, local factions were doing well with support from regional allies. New alliances 
were established depending on the interests of these outsiders. For the parties inside Afghanistan, 
alliances have become a means of survival. The different movements in the conflict are not political 
parties that can negotiate pow r-sharing. They can best be characterized as armed groups, with 
opposing (anti-) state projects.237 With the Taliban advance, the situation changed in so far that this 
group gained power in a large part of the country. Their claim for leadership over the whole count y 
excluded the possibility for a broad-based government, and was hence an incentive for other factions 
to continue the war.  
 In response, several observers have argued that a federal system with a central government in 
Kabul and real power devolv d to the regions might be a better option. Such a system appeals to the 
strong interest in an undivided Afghanistan that seems to be favoured by all factions.238 Moreover, t is 
an option that is likely to gain support from the regional players in the conflict. Russian and Central 
Asian fears for Islamic fundamentalism would be mitigated by a moderate Islamist buffer to the 
Taliban. Peace would offer Pakistan trade routes. Federalism would secure the rights of the Shia 
population, which is in the interest of Iran. Moreover, federalism would offer some prospects for 
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tackling Afghanistan’s booming narcotics and illegal arms trade. In the past, Masoud and Junbish have 
considered such a system, and Wahdatactively propagated it.239 
 However, at the moment the Taliban are not willing to compromise. Federalism would imply a 
change of balance of power to their disadvantage, and is seen by them as legitimating warlordism.240 
In this light, some observers have suggested supporting the Taliban’s opponents. Nevertheless, too 
close a cooperation with the Northern Alliance might also hinder a lasting solution as long as there are 
no guarantees that they will do better than the Taliban. Supporting moderate Pushtuns has also been 
proposed, as most of them reject the harsh version of Islam propagated by the Taliban and oppose 
Pakistani support to the Taliban.241 Other observers have suggested that it is probably more important 
to focus on the regional parties and to come to a common understanding between them and the US and 
Russia. In this respect, Saikal noted that a rapprochement between Washington and Tehran would be 
helpful.242 A common understanding would enable the enforcement of an arms embargo, which is now 
hampered by the region’s diverse interests. This should be accompanied by attention for the Pakistan, 
for Pakistan is likely to play an important role in any attempt at transforming the T liban.243 
 With the rise of the Taliban, a third factor accounting for the failure of outside interventions 
gained importance. It concerns the failure to address adequately the ideological differences between 
the Taliban and Western countries. While the Talibansearch to establish an Islamic state based on 
their interpretation of the shariah, the West is concerned with maintaining internationally agreed upon 
human rights. The Taliban interpret the insistence of the West on the latter issue as an unwelcome 
intervention. Since the Taliban takeover, the international community has become involved in a 
conflict over ideologies. (Western) countries have expressed their discontent politically, as well as 
through a display of force, the suspension of aid and the refusal to invest in economic infrastructure. 
Although the message is conveyed consistently to the Taliban, it could be questioned whether this 
principled position contributes to ending violence. It seems as if the Talib n are insensitive to outside 
criticism. Some observers even see the confrontational stance, for example the suspension of aid, as 
counterproductive, and favour ‘quiet diplomacy’. Brabant and Killick remarked in this respect that the 
reactions of donors ‘[…] have often been driven by principles more than by analysis of the real 
opportunities and constraints that characterize the situation in Afghanistan’.244 The use of force is even 
more debated. The timing of the launch of US missiles against terrorist camps in Afghanistan was 
terribly ill-chosen, in the sense that it disrupted difficult but important negotiations with the T liban 
over aid work in Kabul.245 A large rift thus seems to eparate Western and T liban value systems. 
Bearing in mind the notion that a sense of ownership needs to be created for sustainable peace and 
development, a major question remains of how far to accommodate the Taliban.246  
 A fourth, and perhaps fifth, factor that contributed to the failure of external initiatives for peace 
concerns the disagreement of the international community about how to implement aid in support of 
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political goals, as well as misconceptions about the leverage of aid. Although agreement on a Strat gic 
Framework was reached fairly quickly, translation into Common Programming proved more 
problematic. The coordination forums proved to be useful frameworks for expressing the international 
aid community’s values and principles, to discuss a common mission statement and assistance 
strategy, and to point to problems in the aid system. Nevertheless, the success of the outcomes of these 
forums is debatable. According to some observers, the Strategic Framework mainly aimed to 
overcome structural weaknesses in the international humanitarian aid system and did not result so 
much from specific difficulties in the aid to Afghanistan. As it lacked a real situational analysis, it 
failed to come to real common policy strategies.247 How ver, it could also be argued that the efforts to 
come to a Strategic Framework as well as Common Programming were an important step forward in 
the process of linking political goals to assistance.  
 As regards the leverage of aid in practice, it has proved difficult to influence the Taliban, as they 
are not a homogeneous movement and only to a limited extend aid-dep ndent. Moreover, the size and 
complexity of the aid apparatus, including many countries and NGOs, makes it difficult to coordinate 
actions and to make conditionality convincing. By acting independently, donors and NGOs undermine 
the possibilities of the external community to have influence on developments in Afghanistan, and 
thus strengthen the position of the Taliban and other warring parties. 
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4 Dutch Policies and Interventions 
This chapter explores the instruments used by the Dutch government to deal with the conflict in 
Afghanistan, and will give, where possible, indications of their effectiveness. Dutch diplomatic and 
bilateral relationships with Afghanistan are examined first, and the changes in the conceptualization of 
humanitarian aid and development policies in the 1990s are considered. Later sections focus on Dutch 
policies in practice, at the diplomatic and international level, and at the project level. 
4.1 Dutch Diplomacy and Bilateral Relations with Afghanistan248 
Diplomatic relationships between the Netherlands and Afghanistan are of a relatively recent nature. 
First attempts at entering official relations through a pact of friendship failed in the 1930s. It took until 
1948 before the pact was sealed, and until 1965 before both countries entered official diplomatic 
relations. In the meantime, the Netherlands had established a consulate in Kabul, as well as a 
‘Netherlands-Afghanistan Foundation’ focusing on promoting trade relations between the two 
countries. 
 Although the Netherlands was Afghanistan’s second European trade partner in trade volume, 
political or other relations between the two countries were never special in any sense. The fact that in 
the 1970s Afghanistan was on the list of the world’s 25 poorest countries, for instance, did not result in 
attempts to establish a relationship in the field of development aid. This was mainly a result of large-
scale Soviet development activities in Afghanistan and fears of Soviet attempts to absorb Afghanistan 
into its sphere of influence. These fears became manifest in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of the 
country. This invasion implied that Afghanistan had suddenly moved from the periphery to the centre 
of Cold War world politics. It also implied that allies were requested to ‘take measures’ against the 
new government under the leadership of the United States. For the Netherlands, this implied that it did 
not recognize the new Soviet-installed government. 
 After the retreat of the Soviet troops, official recognition of Najibullah’s puppet regime was not 
considered opportune for the Netherlands. As the situation in post-invasio  Afghanistan developed 
into a civil war with no clear victors, relationships on the diplomatic level remained absent. This also 
applied to the Taliban rulers, whose rule is highly contested.  
 These problems notwithstanding, the Netherlands did become more interested in the Afghan 
imbroglio. During the period 1990-1998, the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation visited 
Afghanistan on several occasions. The Netherlands even became one of the largest donors of aid to 
Afghanistan. As there are no clear historical, or important diplomatic, financial and trade relations, it 
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is suggested here that Dutch interest in Afghanistan can be linked to the new perspectives on 
development cooperation and humanitarian aid that emerged in the 1990s.  
New Conceptions of Aid 
Before the 1990s the provision of development aid was to a large degree determined and limited by 
political circumstances. The end of the Cold War seemed to provide new opportunities for aid in 
dealing with conflict and post-conflict situations, and conceptions of aid hence changed in the 1990s. 
This was also the case in the Netherlands.  
 Dutch interest in the relationship between aid and conflict increased in the 1990s. In 1990 the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs published the policy paper Een wereld van verschil;249 and in 
1993 a policy paper focusing on the role of conflict, Een wereld in geschil.250 In 1993 the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs also published a policy memorandum focusing specifically on the role of 
humanitarian aid. In this memorandum, Humanitarian Aid: Between Conflict and Development,251 it 
was concluded that the growing demand for humanitarian aid – often resulting from internal conflicts 
– in combination with the long duration of many conflicts called for a new approach. The UN had 
already introduced new concepts such as ‘peace-building’ and ‘peace-making’ in its Agenda for 
Peace.252 Yet international law, and especially the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, 
complicated or even obstructed the use of these new instruments. This applied, and to some extent still 
applies, especially to the deployment of troops with the aim of prevention, peace enforcement a d 
ceasefire enforcement. 
 The Dutch policy memorandum, however, did not focus on instruments of traditional diplomacy, 
or military means for intervention. Instead, the memorandum analysed possibilities for dealing w th 
the causes and effects of conflicts from the perspective of development aid. As such, it linked up with 
discussions on the relationship between humanitarian aid and conflict prevention, and, in a wider 
sense, the discussion on rehabilitation, reconstruction, peace, security and development. 
 The ideas touched upon in the memorandum were further developed in a statement by the 
Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation for the UN General Assembly in October 1996.253 
This address became ref rred to as the ‘Princeton Speech’. Here the concepts of development for 
peace and peace aid were introduced. These concepts were based on the following assumptions: ‘the 
needs of people whose security is threatened by violent conflict require(s) a coherent and effective 
international response integrating preventive diplomacy, political mediation, humanitarian 
relief…social action, economic alternatives, [and] cultural communication. In one word: 
development.’254 Hence, the concepts aimed at linking aid to political initiatives. Analysis and lessons 
                                            
249 A World of Difference: A new Framework for Development Cooperation in the 1990s (The Hague: 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990). 
250 A World of Dispute: A Survey of the Frontiers of Development Cooperation (The Hague: Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 1993). 
251 Humanitarian Aid between Conflict and Development (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, November 1993). 
252 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace Keeping, 
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security 
Council on 31 January 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1992). 
253 Statement by Mr Jan Pronk, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, in 
the General Debate in the Second Committee, Fifty-first Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(New York, 14 October 1996).  
254 Pronk, Statement by Mr Jan Pronk. 
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
61
 
from the cases of Somalia and Rwanda were clear: ‘humanitarian aid cannot substitute for political 
action’. The analysis identified three challenges: 
 
1. The integration of different policy instruments (political, military, relief, rehabilitation and 
development) in a coherent, overall framework; 
2. Better coordination of the various external actors. This applied to those within the UN, as well as 
between the UN, governments and NGOs; 
3. Better aligning external assistance with local efforts. 
 
Apart from this focus on policies and actors the memorandum also addressed the aspect of timing. 
Common practice was only to start assistance after peace was officially declared, i.e. after a 
government was considered worthy of receiving assistance. Even then, the focus would still be on 
urgent humanitarian needs. The Dutch analysis instead advocated a different approach with a longer-
term focus. The memorandum concluded that most countries in conflict seem to be locked up in a state 
of half-peace/half-war. Postponing aid until a situation of peace and stability arises could take too 
long. The proposed approach focused especially on countries in this state of transition from war to 
peace, with a minimal degree of security and peace as a pr condition.  
 These new concepts of ‘development for peace’ and ‘peace aid’ indicated that it was considered 
necessary to move to ‘development activities in conflict situations, which can sustain preventive 
diplomacy and other peace-building measures of a more political nature’.255 As was stated in the 
Princeton Speech, such policies obviously needed to become part of national policies as well as of 
these international organizations. The Minister considered this imperative for their success, as in most 
cases operational programmes were (and are) coordinated by international organizations. However, it 
was also stated that coordination should not become an aim in itself, as this might ‘impede quick 
action, centralize functions that are better decentralized, and lead to general blueprints rather than 
situation-specific approaches.’256 
 The development-for-peace concept thus aimed at addressing situations of half-peace/half-war. 
One could say that Afghanistan fitted this profile during the period 1989-1998. Dutch interventions 
will therefore be analysed against the background of the development-for-peace co cept. However, 
before considering the Dutch interventions in the conflict in Afghanistan at the international level, the 
implementation of ‘development for peace’ and the provision of emergency assistance, we need to 
outline the Dutch analyses of the conflict, and the implications that these had for policy-making. The 
Dutch analyses were based on various visits by delegations of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to Afghanistan.      
Dutch Analysis of the Conflict and the Possibilities for Intervention 
During the period 1994- 8, delegations of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Netherlands Embassy in Islamabad, and the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation 
visited Afghanistan on various occasions.257 The first visit took place in 1994. The report of this visit 
noted that although aid to Afghanistan had increased substantially as of 1993 (after a decline in 1992), 
the security situation in Afghanistan was far from stable. Kabul in particular was experiencing new 
outbursts of violence, which even resulted in the departure of several NGOs. The continuation of 
                                            
255 Pronk, Statement by Mr JanPronk.  
256 Pronk, Statement by Mr Jan Pronk. 
257 For an overview of those Dutch diplomatic missions, see Annexe 6. 
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violence seemed to result in donor fatigue. These facts notwithstanding, the report expected that most 
Afghan refugees in Pakistan would return, as at that point in time large parts of the country were 
relatively peaceful. It was suggested that these areas should become the focus of aid projects. The 
report also suggested improving d nor coordination.258 
 During follow-up visits, delegations concluded that aid to refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran was 
no longer a priority. Instead, attention had to be focused on repatriation and rehabilitation.259 How ver, 
as the humanitarian situation in large parts of the country was still deplorable, continuation of 
humanitarian assistance was still recommended in 1995. During 1995 it was also reported that 
although coordination had improved since 1994 due to the activities of ACBAR260 and UNOCHA, 
efficiency was still not very high.
 In a letter to the Dutch parliament on the findings of a visit to cities in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
in June 1996, the Minister for Development Cooperation concluded that although no substantial 
structural aid could take plac during the conflict, assistance should not be limited to emergency aid.261 
Assistance should focus on peaceful areas and the Afghan organizations in these areas that were 
involved in reconstruction activities, as well as on strengthening traditional social structures. In the 
letter he also announced the development of aid policies aimed at such circumstances. 
 In 1996 after a visit to the Dostam-controlled area in the northern part of Afghanistan, a Dutch 
delegation concluded that assistance in this region could f cus on rehabilitation, and, given the 
relatively peaceful situation, development aid.262 Food aid to refugee camps in Pakistan was no longer 
considered necessary. A visit to the Taliban-controlled areas during 1996 was equally positive. 
Although some critical remarks were made on the Taliban’s position on gender issues and the 
application of the Islamic shariah, it was suggested that this position was not completely inflexible. 
The reports suggested that aid could be used for moving the Taliba towards more tolerance. During 
these visits, it also became clear that the Taliban, as a result of their success on the battlefield, hoped 
for a military victory. 
 During the preparations for the Ashgabad conference (for details see section 4.2), a delegation of 
the Conflict Management and Humanitarian Aid Department (DCH) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
visited Afghanistan on a fact-finding mission from 7-13 January 1997. This mission focused on the 
options for designing a coherent strategy that incorporated various policy instruments. In line with the 
development-for-peace concept, the instruments to be included would vary from political and military 
policies, to various types of aid. The mission also attempted to inventory the actors willing and able to 
participate in such a strategy. The findings of this mission263 were partly included in the keynote 
address delivered by the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation at the Ashgabad 
conference:  
 
· Aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan should be reduced, and the funds should be diverted to projects 
in Afghanistan. An exception could be made for education projects focusing on girls; 
                                            
258 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file dmp/2025/00606. 
259 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file dmp/2025/01571. 
260 Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, a coordinating agency for NGOs. ACBAR was established 
as a result of the Geneva Accords, with the aim of exchanging information between NGOs and representing 
these agencies in negotiations with the authorities. 
261 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file DMP/NH/2017/00106, DAL/2018/00284. 
262 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file dao/2001/00024. 
263 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CP-26/97. 
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· In addition to emergency aid, assistance should also focus on rehabilitation aid in the peaceful 
areas of Afghanistan. This applied especially to agricultural projects and other types of income-
generating projects (e.g. small enterprises, vocational training, et cetera); 
· Reconstruction of institutional capacity was a serious problem that should become the focus of 
long-term aid; 
· Peace aid had to be considered as essential. Such aid should aim at strengthening the few still 
existing civil organizations, as well as promoting initiatives for Afghan civil society. Projects 
should thus focus on promoting the establishment of new organizations and on s rengthening their 
capacity; 
· Implementing peace aid in a country like Afghanistan implied taking relatively great risks. Not to 
embark upon such a course would be unlikely to contribute to ending the conflict, but instead 
would contribute to its continuation. 
 
As for the Dutch, it was concluded that the success of peace aid depended to a large degree on the 
capacity of Afghan organizations. However, developments in the field of capacity-building were 
deemed unsatisfactory. The efficacy and sustainability of aid were hence problematic.264  
 A mission in November 1997 reported that many development actors had difficulties with a 
merger of humanitarian and political goals. They were sceptical about possibilities to contribute to 
peace through aid, in the way that was promoted in the Strategic Framework. Moreover, the report 
concluded that humanitarian aid conflicted with the ‘do-no-harm’ approach. Aid discharged the 
warring factions from their duties to take care of the population, thus enabling them to conce trate on 
fighting. The development-for-peace approach also had its drawbacks. The emphasis on principle-
centred assistance was problematic in the Taliban-controlled areas. Hence, it was no longer sufficient 
for areas to be peaceful. In addition, auth rities had to be tolerant on specific topics. Lastly, the report 
concluded that civil society required strengthening.265 D spite these findings, the Minister for 
Development Cooperation decided to continue the development-for-peace approach. He suggested a 
balanced approach, in which both areas controlled by the Taliban and areas controlled by the Northern 
Coalition were to receive rehabilitation and reconstruction aid.266  
 During a visit in February 1998, the problem of institutional capacity was stressed again. The 
visit made clear that Afghanistan lacked an intelligentsia capable of providing political leadership to 
the country. It was decided to address this problem through a bottom- p approach, starting in the 
peaceful areas of the country, thereby reconfirming the development-for-peace approach.  
4.2 Dutch Political Interventions at the International Level 
The following paragraphs focus on all types of political intervention by the Netherlands related to the 
Afghan conflict during the period 1989-199 . This section considers Dutch diplomatic contacts and 
involvement in donor meetings; and the next section reviews Dutch development and emergency 
assistance. 
                                            
264 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file 1/Afghanistan/os/noodhulp – lopende map dao. 
265 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1/Afghanistan/os/noodhulp – lopende map dao. 
266 Based on a memorandum dated 14 January 1998. The suggested areas were the province of Badakhshan, in 
the north-west of Afghanistan (controlled by the Northern Coalition), and the province of Nangarhar 
(bordering with Pakistan and controlled by the Taliban). 
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Diplomatic Contacts 
Most official tours to Afghanistan in the period 1989-1998 can be characterized as attempts to 
intervene in the conflict. Delegations consisted of the Minister for Development Cooperation, 
delegations of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and delegations of the Netherlands 
Embassy in Pakistan. 
 During a 1996 tour,267 the Minister talked to the expelled President, Rabbani. During the talks, 
Rabbani pointed out that in his opinion external intervention – esp cially interference and support for 
the Taliban by Pakistan – was one of the main causes for the continuing conflict. Rabbani also 
appealed for more development aid projects. His rationalization for this appeal was that such projects 
would shift the focus from conflict to development. He even stated that the absence of projects had 
contributed to the conflict. This latter part of R bbani’s analysis was not supported, but it was 
confirmed that aid in peaceful areas could contribute to the peace process. The prospect of substantial 
reconstruction aid was directly coupled to peace, when the Minister stressed that if there was peace, a 
conference on reconstruction and development would be organized by the donor community. 
 This idea was also suggested to the Chief Minister of the North-West Fr ntier Province of 
Pakistan, Mr Sherpao. This part of the visit was linked to the plan to organize an international 
conference of countries related to the conflict, donors and aid agencies in December 1996. Peshawar 
was suggested as the location for this conference, although in the end, the conference was held in 
Ashgabad, Turkmenistan.268  
 During a 1998 visit to Afghanistan, the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation 
assessed the possibilities for initiating a peace process.269 His second aim was to assess whether peace 
aid could become instrumental for a peace process. With this aim, the M nister talked to several 
representatives of the Taliban. They indicated that they were open to outside mediation in the conflict, 
also by the UN. It became clear that the T liban set high value on official recognition of their 
authority. The Minister tried to inform the Taliban on the normal procedures for obtaining a UN seat, 
as well as on the way in which to deal with UN organizations, hence providing them with prospects 
for official recognition (or at least not downplaying chances for recognition). Th  Taliban also showed 
interest in receiving reconstruction aid. In response to their interest, the Minister indicated that 
although he favoured such aid, it had to be coordinated by the international community in combination 
with Afghan NGOs. In the report of this mission270 an indirect link is suggested between the Taliban’s 
interest to negotiate and the problems that they were experiencing in recruiting soldiers. The NGOs the 
Minister consulted perceived this problem as a window of opportunity for successfull applying the 
concept of peace aid. Peace aid projects could help to convince the war-weary ‘silent majority’ to opt 
for peace.  
Dutch Involvement in Donor Meetings 
As of 1989 when the Soviet troops left Afghanistan, the Netherlands became one of the m in d ors 
of aid to Afghanistan. The Netherlands spent approximately US$ 115 million on aid to Afghanistan 
during the period 1989-19 7. Over the years 1995- 7, the Netherlands even became the fourth 
                                            
267 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file DMP/NH/2017/00106, DAL/2018/00284. 
268 As India, one of the participants to the meeting, objected to convening in Pakistan, the conference was 
moved to a politically less sensitive location in Turkmenistan. 
269 15-22 February 1998; report in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file DCH/2019/00584. 
270 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file DCH/2019/00584. 
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
65
 
donor, spending US$ 84 million on aid according to DAC data (see Annexe 4). The Dutch also 
showed themselves to be an important actor in donor meetings. Dutch delegations mostly had the 
Minister for Development Cooperation as their leader. The Netherlands was also instrumental in 
organizing the donor meeting in Ashgabad in 1997.271 However, Dutch interest was not just cheque-
book driven. The Netherlands also promoted its development-for-peace approach. The next paragraph 
will assess Dutch participation in these meetings, as well as the points of view presented and their 
influence on the outcome of the meetings. 
 
Dutch Participation in UN Meetings 
The Netherlands participated in most UN meetings on Afghanistan, the only exception being a 
meeting in New York in November 1996 that was organized by UN-DHA. The aim of this meeting 
was to prevent individual countries from embarking upon uncoordinated peace missions. Attempts to 
do so by Pakistan, Iran and Japan were considered harmful to the UN’s initiatives.272 The Du ch 
absence at this meeting is remarkable given the fact that the Netherlands – at that point in time – was 
one of the main donors of aid to Afghanistan, and was known for advocating coordinated approaches. 
The absence was even more remarkable as the Netherlands and the UN cooperated actively in 
organizing the Ashgabad conference, which was to be held a few months later. In response to not 
being invited, the Netherlands Minister strongly expressed its disappointment to the organizer 
(UN/DHA).273 An explanation for the UN’s decision to exclude the Dutch from being invited was not 
found. 
 In April 1997 the Netherlands participated in a UN meeting that centred around political issues. 
This meeting focused mainly on UNSMA’s role in Afghanistan. The meeting concluded that a military 
victory by one of the two camps would not solve the conflict. The UN aimed at a government 
representing all parties to the conflict. In the meantime, all external interference sustaining the conflict 
should end. The meeting also advocated an arms embargo. Moreover, the UN stressed its wish to 
coordinate political and aid initiatives. These ideas corresponded with Dutch perceptions and plans. 
 
The Ashgabad Conference, 1997 
The Ashgabad meeting took place from 21-22 January 1997. The Netherlands supported this 
International Forum on Assistance o Afghanistan financially.274 During the meeting, the Netherlands 
Minister for Development Cooperation delivered a keynote address: ‘A Time for a Change: Support 
for Peace in Afghanistan’. In this speech, the Minister outlined the concept of ‘peace aid’, as well as a 
‘development-for-peace’ strategy in which development was integrated with political conflict 
management. Essential for this concept was the finding that Afghanistan was a country that was half in 
peace and half in conflict. He concluded that although this had resulted in the return of large numbers 
of refugees to the more peaceful areas, the international community had made no attempts to start a 
process of reconstruction targeted on these ‘zones of peace’. In his opinion, reconstruction in these 
peaceful areas could stimulate sectors of the economy and society, and give parties in the conflict a 
                                            
271 Support for the conference was financed through project AF005501. Financial support amounted to NLG 
1.0 million.  
272 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CP-149/96. 
273 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DCH/CP-242/96. 
274 Information on the preparations for the Forum is based on Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CP-
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prospect of a non-violent future. Hence his appeal: ‘Where a minimum degree of security exists, the 
international community must, together with actors in Afghanistan, be willing to go beyond 
emergency relief and humanitarian assistance’.275 More specifically, the strategy should focus on 
stimulating the rural economy in the peaceful areas. This would make people ‘less dependent on a gun 
for their livelihood’, and would help to address the problem of urbanization. The Minister made the 
following suggestions for an innovative approach for aid in Afghanistan: 
 
· Donors should act according to the ‘do-no-harm’ principle. This also implied that donors should 
avoid providing aid to only one party or region; 
· Aid should be used in combination with political and diplomatic instruments; 
· Afghan (civil society) organizations should be involved more actively and, if necessary, 
strengthened; 
· Donor as well as political activities should be coordinated and become part of one, coherent 
strategy. Such a coherent, unitary strategy should include all actors: donors, UN, NGOs, and 
Afghan organizations. Parochial interests should be set aside. 
 
The outcomes of the meeting showed that the conference endorsed the Netherlands’ point of view 
regarding: (a) the interdependence of peace and development; (b) the analogous implementation of 
rehabilitation and development programmes as well as emergency humanitarian relief activities; and 
(c) the need to formulate a common strategy. The appeal for a common strategy was translated into a 
request for a so-called ‘Strategic Framework’. A first draft of this Framework was to be presented 
within six months.276 It was suggested that the Framework should focus on certain principles (human 
rights, the humanitarian imperative and the impartiality of aid), as well as give particular attention to 
gender issues and illicit drug production. These requirements can be interpreted as a first indication of 
a tendency towards principle-centred aid. 
 
Dutch Participation in the Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) Meetings 
As was described in chapter 3, one of the outcomes of the Ashgabad meeting was the establishment of 
an informal contact group of donors and international o g nizations that were active in Afghanistan: 
the Afghanistan Support Group. The Netherlands actively contributed to these meetings and the 
Netherlands’ point of view several times was shared by many of the participants. Nevertheless, in a 
couple of instances, the Dutch proposals were ahead of the general opinion.  
 The first of these meetings, held in Geneva on 21 April 1997, was organized by the Netherlands 
and Norway. The Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation was chair of this meeting. 
During this first meeting, it was decided not to merge with a political meeting of the ‘Group of 21’277 
later in 1997 as was suggested by the Netherlands.  
                                            
275 Pronk, J., Time for a Change: Peace Aid in Afghanistan, speech delivered in Ashgabad, 21-22 January 
1997, p. 4. 
276 It took until December 1997 before a first draft was presented to the Afghanistan Support Group. 
277 The ‘Group of 21’ is a group of governments with influence in Afghanista , including the following 
countries: China, Egypt, France, Germany, India, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States of America 
and Uzbekistan, as well as the Organization of Islamic Countries.  
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
67
 
 During the second ASG meeting on 3 December 1997, all participating donor countries discussed 
and endorsed the draft ‘Assistance Strategy for Afghanistan’. This draft included several ideas 
presented by the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation. However, the ASG rejected the 
proposal of a ‘common fund’ mechanism (an idea supported by the Netherlands). Inst ad, the ASG 
suggested extending the Consolidated Appeal and allotting it a management task. 
 During the third ASG meeting, the Netherlands, together with all ASG members, opted to focus 
on local community-level projects and the development of non-institutional capacity on the local level. 
This was the only alternative that made continuation of aid possible without compromising the donors. 
The other options, working according to ECHA guidelines, or cooperating with the authorities on 
capacity-building, would either imply a factual ending of aid, or would compromise the donors’ 
position on fundamental principles. 
 During the fourth ASG meeting in December 1998, a DCH delegation representing the 
Netherlands again suggested a merger of the various consultation groups on Afghanistan. In view of 
the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, a merger was considered as beneficial in fusing the 
political and the humanitarian negotiation circuits. The ASG members did not react positively to this 
suggestion. Instead, the ASG took a firmer stance on Taliban restrictions, which it no longer intended 
to tolerate. 
4.3 Conflict Prevention, Development Aid and Emergency Assistance 
Over the period 1989-19 8, the Netherlands funded 158 projects on Afghanistan.278 The e rlier 
mentioned trend of an increase in Dutch interest in Afghanistan since 1989 is reflected in the number 
of projects financed. While during the period from 1989-1991 the Netherlands funded 21 projects, 
during the period 1992-1 98 this number increased by 137 projects. Of these 158 projects, five 
concerned emergency assistance after earthquakes,279 and fiv  were more or less of a general nature.280 
The remaining 148 projects can be characterized as both conflict-related and conflict-synchronous. 
Over the period 1992-1998 more than NLG 120 million of Dutch government aid was given to 
Afghanistan.281 Of this, the majority was administered by NGOs (almost 50 per cent) and IGOs 
(almost 48 per cent).282 The Netherlands also contributed to various UN Inter-Agency Appeals and 
Consolidated Appeals for Assistance to Afghanistan.  
Characteristics of Dutch Aid to Afghanistan 
It could be questioned whether certain of these 148 projects, which were identified as conflict-related,
should indeed be considered as such. One of thes types of aid concerns agricultural projects. In 
general, such projects are not seen as conflict-preventive. In the case of Afghanistan, however, one has 
to make an exemption. One of the problems confronted by post-1989 Afghanistan concerned an 
almost total destruction of its agricultural structure. In pre-invasion Afghanistan, agriculture 
contributed up to 50 per cent of the country’s national income, and up to 80 per cent of its export 
earnings.283 Post-invasion Afghanistan showed an almost completely revers d picture. Because of the 
                                            
278 Annexe 7 contains an overview of these projects. 
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conflict, the countryside had been highly depopulated. The conflict had also resulted in a process of 
urbanization, concentrating up to 25 per cent of the population in the cities. In addition, a large number 
of people had fled the country. Those still active in agriculture had often shifted activities to the 
cultivation of cash crops for the main cities, as well as to opium poppies. For these reasons, any 
reconstruction of Afghanistan required special attention to the agricul ural sector. Rebuilding this 
sector appeared to be imperative for the country’s economy and food supply, as well as for promoting 
the return of (internal) refugees to the countryside. Several Dutch programmes during the period 1989-
1998 focused on theagricultural sector. These programmes aimed at regenerating agricultural 
activities in the so-called ‘zones of peace’, in order to promote repatriation of refugees or peace 
building in ‘zones of peace’.284 In total, 19 post-1991 projects related – more or less – to the issue of 
regenerating the agricultural sector. Programmes related to veterinary training were not included as 
being ‘conflict-related’.285  
 Gender and human rights projects are also characterized as conflict-related. In the case of 
Afghanistan, the focus of Western donors on the role of women and girls caused serious controversy 
with the fundamentalist Islamic T liban. The cultural controversy on the role of women in society had 
its effects on the aid provided by Western donors to the reconstrucion pr cess. On several occasions 
donor countries, including the Netherlands, discussed the role of women, especially the educational 
opportunities for girls, with the Taliban leaders. These discussions were never successful in that they 
failed to make the Taliban leadership more liberal in its point of view. In total, some seven post-1991 
projects focused more or less on the role of women in Afghan society.286 
 Dutch projects on Afghanistan also focused on the repatriation of refugees. A large number of 
Afghans fled to the neighbouring countries of Pakistan (around 3.3 million according to 1990 
government of Pakistan figures287) and Iran. After the Soviet retreat, projects for repatriation started. 
The Netherlands supported approximately 25 post-1991 rojects aiming to promote repatriation, as 
well as to support those who repatriated.288  
Shifts in Attention in Dutch Assistance  
The signing of the Geneva Accords of 1988, and the retreat of Soviet troops in 1989, seemed to pave 
the way for donors to start repatriation, resettlement, reconstruction, and other types of assistance 
programmes for Afghanistan. In a letter to the Netherlands parliament, the then Minister for 
Development Cooperation P. Bukman stated: ‘The framework for development cooperation is to a 
large degree determined by political circumstances’. In his letter to parliament he also pointed out that 
                                            
284 This concerns the following projects: AF000701, AF000702, AF000703, AF001702, AF002701, 
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287 R. van Rooyen, ‘Repatriation of Afghan Refugees: A UNHCR Perspective’, in S. Irfani and F. Rahman 
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UN agencies were vital in coordinating resettlement and rehabilitation programmes. As regards the 
political situation, he stressed the historical weakness of the tate and central government in 
Afghanistan. A bottom-up approach, focusing on grass roots and specific target groups, was hence 
considered imperative. As the political circumstances in Afghanistan were still too diffuse, he 
concluded that Dutch aid should also focus on refugees in neighbouring countries. Since these 
refugees would ultimately return, helping them through specific aid could strengthen their role in 
future development activities in Afghanistan.289 Hence, from 1989-1991 Dutch aid consisted mainly of 
food aid and bilateral aid to Afghan refugees.290 
 As of 1992, aid to refugees in Pakistan and Iran was cut down gradually. The UNHCR’s aim was 
to accelerate the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan.291 From 1990-1992 there was also a change in 
Dutch aid programmes, in that the focus shifted to rehabilitation projects in Afghanistan. The 
Netherlands started rehabilitation projects in a number of Afghan provinces with the aim of 
encouraging the repatriation of refugees from Pakistan.292This shift can also be observed in the money 
spent on Afghan refugees in the region. The amount spent was reduced from NLG 12.3 million in 
1990 to around NLG 2 million in 1991. 
 When the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation, Jan Pronk, presented an outlin  of 
the concept of ‘development for peace’ during the Ashgabad conference, Dutch aid projects were 
already designed along these lines. Projects funded by the DMP/NH,293 in particular, rested on the 
opinion that reconstruction could start in peaceful areas. In practice, this implied a focus on 
rehabilitation projects aimed at facilitating the return of Afghan refugees. Such projects were already 
started in 1989, and included mine-clearance, education and agricultural rehabilitation. Although 
rehabilitation was part of Dutch aid before 1992, it certainly became more prominent as of 1994.294 As 
regards training and education, the trend is clearer. There were about 15 training and education 
projects during the period 1992-19 8, increasing as of 1995- 6 from roughly one each year to five 
in 1997. 
 Rehabilitation aid is the best indicator for the development-for-peace policy. In the case of 
Afghanistan this implied promoting peace through development and rehabilitation projects in the 
relatively peaceful areas. Our data show that the Netherlands funded three to four projects in 1991-
1992. There was a dip in 1993, and a sudden increase as of 1994 with, depending on the definition of 
rehabilitation, five to ten projects. In 1996, there was a relapse in the number of proj cts, while 1997 
showed an increase. The fluctuation seems to indicate a link between rehabilitation projects and the 
dynamics of the conflict. 
 Another indicator for assessing the importance of the development-for-p ace policy is that most 
assistance projects to Afghanistan that were funded by the Netherlands after 1997 were linked to the 
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ASG’s Strategic Framework and the revised Consolidated Appeal. In total, the Netherlands 
contributed to 27 such appeals during the period 1989-1998.295 The importance of the (reorganized) 
Consolidated Appeal Process for Dutch assistance to Afghanistan is also stressed in a memorandum of 
10 March 1998.296 Here, the Netherlands Minister for Development Cooperation points out that efforts 
to reorganize assistance to Afghanistan through an integrated strategy by the international community 
have proven fruitful. The Netherlands has called for and supported this reorganization. However, he 
also stated that although some progress was made, the Consolidated Appeal to a large degree still 
reflected projects of the individual organizations involved. He concluded that the 1998 Appeal still 
lacked a clear ordering of projects according to region and sector. The Minister was also critical of 
NGOs. They proved only moderately interested in par icipating in the Consolidated Appeal process, as 
well as in focusing on the do-no-harm approach and on the goal of peace-building. This last aspect is 
attributed to a lack of insight into the concept of development for peace, and to a lack of vision.  
Characteristic Development-for-Peace Projects 
A large number of Dutch aid policies on Afghanistan aimed at starting and supporting rehabilitation 
projects at an early stage. The first, relatively large-scale rehabilitation project started in 1989-91. In 
fact, the activity consisted of four rehabilitation projects in four different Afghan provinces. These 
projects aimed at promoting the repatriation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan. This project started in 
1989, focusing on one province. In 1991, the project expand d to include three additional provinces.297  
 The project first started as a result of an inventory of damage and the priorities for rehabilitation. 
The Rehabilitation Programme of Afghanistan concluded that aid should focus on strengthening the 
agricultural infrastructure, increasing agricultural production, and improvement of health care. For the 
Netherlands, supporting such a project linked up with the policy aim of accelerating the return of 
refugees. 
 The project on ‘strengthening the capacity and emergency aid on behalf of repatriating Iranian 
refugees’298 is another activity that can be characterized as typical of Dutch aid. This project was 
executed through an Afghan NGO called Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (CHA), which was 
established in 1989 with the aim of coordinating and providing emergency aid to returnees from Iran 
in western Afghanistan. As of 1989, however, CHA also focused on rehabilitation. During a visit of a 
DMP delegation to Afghanistan, it was concluded that CHA needed extra support aimed at 
strengthening its capacity. The project memorandum stressed the need for training and policy 
planning. 
 Another project during the period 1992-96 by Stichting Oecemenisch Hulp(SOH) concerned 
rehabilitation of educational facilities in th  rela ively peaceful province of Herat. At first sight the 
project seemed to be on the verge of normal development aid. However, rebuilding schools was 
perceived as an important push for rehabilitation and sustaining the peace process. The project was 
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297 In 1989, the project started as AF/92/901. In 1991 three projects were added: AF000701-AF000703. These 
projects continue up until the present. 
298 Project AF003201. 
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
71
 
executed by DACAAR (Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees), in cooperation with other 
organizations and local personnel.299 
 The Netherlands also contributed to rehabilitation projects related to an activity of the 
International Refugee Committee (IRC) in the eastern, western and southern regions of Afghanistan. 
The Netherlands funded this project300 b ause of its focus on local communities and NGOs.301 The 
project was later included in the 1997 Consolidated Appeal for Assistance to Afghanistan. 
 The Netherlands also funded a community-level project in the Argu District in Badakhshan. This 
project can be directly related to the DCH delegation’s visit in November 1997. Based on the findings 
of this mission, it was decided to start rehabilitation projects in two provinces, each controlled by 
different parties to the conflict. The aim was to strengthen the community’s capacity, and, hence, 
sustainability of development. The project was executed through Afghanaid, an NGO focusing on 
infrastructure and agrarian rehbilitation projects. The security situation in this province was anything 
but stable with the Taliban troops closing in on the region, and local commanders acting more or less 
independently. Economically, the region was, even by Afghan standards, in a poor con ition. This also 
applied to the humanitarian situation. The project aimed to contribute to peace-building in this region 
through micro-financing, as well as infrastructural and agricultural projects and community 
development.302  
 Another peace-building project, through the International Peace Academy (IPA), also matched 
the criteria of the development-for-peace concept.303 This project aimed at developing a strategy for 
peace-building in Afghanistan, and integrating activities of (I)NGOs and donor countries. In fact, the 
project matched perfectly with the attempt to establish a strategic framework for aid and peace-
building activities. However, the project was postponed, and in the end cancelled, as a result of the 
sensitive relationship between Iran and P kistan.304 
 Dutch aid also focused on capacity-building. The Dutch NGO NOVIB submitted a proposal on 
‘strengthening civil society in support of development’.305 Bas d on an analysis of local NGOs, 
NOVIB concluded that these Afghan NGOs lacked a strategic vision, as well as communicative skills, 
knowledge of development issues, knowledge of Afghanistan’s rural society, and qualified and 
professional personnel. The project proposal focused on a number of Afghan NGOs with the aim of 
strengthening their capacity through workshops and training of the top and middle management. The 
proposal furthermore focused on human rights issues (including gender), education, environment and 
long-term sustainable development. The project aimed at bringing together NGOs with various ethnic 
and religious backgrounds. 
 Notwithstanding these aspects, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ response was rather cool. The 
project’s approach was considered too broad, and focus on the peace process was only indirect. 
However, as the project evolved ut of the Ashgabad meeting’s conclusions, the advice to execute the 
programme was positive.306 
                                            
299 Project AF003801. 
300 Project AF006901. 
301 Memorandums HH-305/97 and HH-0703/98. 
302 Project AF007601. For the Memorandum, see Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, file HH-880/98/hw. 
303 Project AF007501. A first evaluation was made in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum 
CP-272/97. 
304 Memorandum from DCH to the Netherlands Embassy in Islamabad, 28 June 1999. 
305 Project AF006601.  
306 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum C-132/98. 
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4.4 Assessment of Dutch Policies and Interventions 
Various visits by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs resulted in a number of findings, analyses and policy 
recommendations. First, it was concluded that a quick fix of the conflict was not to be expected. The 
Afghan state was confronting serious problems in the field of institutional capacity and civil society. 
Strengthening both sectors was considered necessary for the development-for-peace approach, as well 
as for the sustainability of peace. It was also concluded that Afghanistan was a country with zones of 
war and zones of peace. In these peaceful areas rehabilitation and reconstruction processes could be 
started. The refugee problem was considered to become less important over the years. Therefore, the 
focus had to shift to activities within Afghanistan. The conflict areas, however, still required 
humanitarian and emergency assistance. In view of the fact that um nitari n aid could sustain 
conflict, it was stipulated that Dutch programmes had to be in accordance with the do-no-harm 
approach. The Netherlands tried to facilitate all parties in the conflict. 
 Overall, the Minister for Development Cooperation visited Afghanistan on three occasions during 
the period 1996- 8. Those visits had a strong focus on the peace process. During the visits the 
Minister tried to convince the warring factions that peace was imperative for reconstruction of the 
country. By linking substantial aid to peace and promising extra aid in peaceful areas of the country, 
even in the absence of a peace agreement, the Minister used (the perspective on) aid as a negotiation 
tool.  
 In development assistance and emergency aid, the development-for-p ace approach gained 
prominence as of 1994. The fluctuation in certain types of assistance seems to indicate a link between 
rehabilitation projects and the dynamics of the conflict. Rehabilitation projects were related to 
repatriation of refugees, agricultu al activities in peaceful areas, gender-related projects, and 
strengthening of civil society and institutional capacity at the community level. As of 1997, most 
Dutch-funded projects to Afghanistan were linked to the Consolidated Appeals, and the ASG’s
Strategic Framework. 
 At the international level, the Dutch were prominent in various donor meetings. During these 
meetings, the development-for-peace approach was actively promoted. The Netherlands was also 
instrumental in organizing the Ashgabad conference. In the ASG meetings, the Netherlands pressed 
for donor coordination through actively promoting the formulation of a Strategic Framework for 
assistance to Afghanistan, Common Programming, and participation in UNOCHA’s Consolidated 
Appeals. The Netherlands even suggested a merger of various political and developmental 
consultation groups on Afghanistan, as well as the establishment of a common fund mechanism, but 
these suggestions were not supported by other ASG members.    
 Overall, one can conclude that the Netherlands started at an early stage with a policy strategy that 
resembled the concept of development for peace, and was consistent in its approach. However, Dutch 
consistency and attempts to promote a stronger linkage between political goals and development 
assistance at the international level encountered hesitance and scepticism. One can even say that some 
proposals were ‘a bridge too far’.  
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5 Major Findings and Lessons Learned 
5.1 Analysis of the Conflict 
From the outline of the Afghan imbroglio a number of factors have been deducted as underlying and 
accounting for the continuing violence. First, the problems related to the process of state formation. 
The analysis pointed to a lack of state coherence and continued return to competition and fighting in 
Afghanistan, which resulted from the country’s history. Afghanistan has never had a strong 
government or sense of state. Hence, a centre that could manage or build the state had never been 
developed, and traditional communities have strongly resisted encroachment by the state. In the 
absence of a strong political centre, a power-sharing system emerged in which regions and their 
leaders had a certain degree of autonomy. This system provided some stability in the absence of a 
strong state, but was destroyed during the Soviet occupation. During the Soviet period, regional 
identities gained extra importance, while traditional relations between tribal leaders and the population 
deteriorated. The outcome is all but encouraging. While the chances for centralization of power and 
unification of the state were weak in the past, they are even worse at present. 
 A second factor concerns the gradual breakdown of traditional order in relations among the 
different ethnic groups. Both the Soviet invasion and the conti uous infighting afterwards eroded the 
political balance among the various ethnic groups. During their invasion the Soviets cooperated with 
the Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazara, and, in the process made it possible for these groups to exercise 
administrative and political autonomy in their respective territories. This process first resulted in a 
decline of power for the Pushtun. As most resistance came from Pushtun areas, the Pushtun also 
became the major targets for retaliation. The resulting exodus of Pushtun fleeing the country 
undermined their traditional position in Afghan society even further. The traditional order eroded 
further during the occupation and the following civil war, as militia gradually came to represent the 
political objectives of their populations.  
 More recently in particular, analyses have come to characterize the violence in Afghanistan as an 
ethnic conflict. As indicated, such characterizations are too simple, and could result in inappropriate 
attempts and measures to address the conflic . Although the role of ethnicity in the conflict grew after 
1989, it would still be inappropriate to label the conflict as ‘ethnic’. Analysis shows that the regional 
factor and personal rivalries among different leaders were more important. These resulted in various, 
continuously shifting alliances. The importance of the ethnic factor is also downplayed due to internal 
divisions within ethnic groups. In practice, almost every group was at one time both the ally and the 
opponent of every other group, regardless of ethnicity. It would hence be wrong to present the ethnic 
groups as homogeneous. These facts notwithstanding, the ethnic factor became more important with -
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the rise of the (largely Pushtun) Taliban and their acts of violence and even a type of ethnic cleansing 
in areas and cities in the north. 
 The rise of the Taliban introduced a third factor: a struggle over the nature of society. All parties 
to the conflict support the goal of an Islamic state. The Taliban, owever, differ from the other 
Islamist movements in that their creed is primarily religious and not political, and centres on personal 
behaviour and religious community. They do not seek to create a political ideology, but want to use 
the shariah as sole guide with the help of the ulema. These aspirations do not oppose the goal of a 
unified state. In fact, they presuppose a unified state. However, as this goal has to be reached through 
the establishment of a religious community, it excludes any form of regional autonomy or federal 
arrangements. This implies the end of historic leadership structures and the exclusion of power-shari g 
arrangements.  
 Apart from internal factors, the interference of regional actors fuelling the conflict constitutes a 
fourth factor. The departure of the Soviets and the fading interests of the US in the country resulted in 
a power vacuum that was filled by regional powers such as Pakistan and Iran, and minor players such 
as the Central Asian republics. These regional powers started to support warring factions in 
Afghanistan for ethnic and religious as well as political and security reasons.  
 This combination of factors indicates that the Afghan conflict manifested itself at various levels: 
the international system (during the Soviet invasion); the regional level (the relationship with 
neighbouring countries); the national level (the various groups within society); and the societal level 
(the struggle over the nature of society). All levels are interrelated. Consequently, attempts at 
mediation have to pay attention to them all. Simply focusing at one level is not enough. 
5.2 Analysis of International Interventions 
The Afghan conflict has been mediated intensively, but without clear success. First, the Geneva 
Accords of 1988 failed. They were meant to settle matters in Afghanista after the Soviets retreated. 
With hindsight it is safe to say that they were mainly an agreement to settle the external factors in the 
conflict, i.e. to provide an exit out of the conflict for the Soviet Union and the US. Internally, the 
Accords failed because there was no link to a political settlement at the domestic level. This was 
demonstrated most clearly by the fact that the Najibullah regime was able to remain in power for 
several years. Failure to solve these problems at the domestic level set the stag  for a new round of 
fighting.  
 Second, consecutive attempts by the UN to realize a settlement through the formation of an 
interim government failed due to several reasons. In contrast to its application elsewhere, the 
international community was not willing to make sufficient provisions to sustain the peace process. In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, discord among local parties and their aspirations for regional 
autonomy implied that they too were not committed to the formation of an interim government. Lastly, 
the lack of a basic governmental infrastructure with strong state institutions implied that the concept 
had little chance for success in the Afghan context. There was no agreed upon political order to sustain 
the process. These local conditions were not sufficiently analysed. Instead, the convenience of ‘proven 
concepts’ in combination with a lack of clear analysis provided input for yet another series of 
conflicts. 
 The rise of the Taliban did not alter this situation. Even the fact that they proved to be the most 
successful on the battlefield – conquering 90 per cent of the country in four years – impli d no change. 
Their authority is still highly contested. It may even be questioned whether a complete military victory 
by the Taliban would solve Afghanistan’s problems. Given their particular interpretation of Islam, 
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their predominantly Pushtun composition, and the form of government for which they stand, such a 
situation appears unacceptable for the groups in the north of the country. In addition, most 
neighbouring countries – xcept for Pakistan – will also have problems accepting a Talib nvictory. 
Even the ‘limited’ success of the Taliban so far has caused problems for the international community. 
First, as a result of their military successes and a prospect of total victory, they were not willing to opt 
for a peace process. Mediation efforts, therefore, failed time and again. Second, the mediators – 
mainly from the West – represented a contesting ideology of state and society. The e opposing 
ideologies resulted in what came increasingly to be seen as a sort of ‘clash of civilizations’. The 
persistence of the different sides in keeping to their viewpoints implies that there was – and is – little 
room for diplomatic manoeuvring. 
 The analysis of international interventions indicates that the international community (i.e. the 
West) has little leverage over the Taliban. Attempts to influence the Taliban’s goals and behaviour 
were also complicated as a result of the support that they received from neighbouring Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the Taliban were only to a limited extent dependent on assistance from donors. The 
amounts of international aid faded away compared to the income gained from smuggling and narcotics 
production. In the end, i ternational political recognition was the only means of leverage for the 
international community. The only countries that recognize the Taliban regime are Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. However, it is doubtful whether international recognition provides en ugh 
leverage to influence Taliban politics. In fact, the present labelling of Afghanistan as a ‘narco’ or 
‘rogue state’ (or, according to the latest typology, ‘state of concern’) indicates a movement towards 
isolation. 
 As regards the conflict and the possibilities for a peace process, the analysis indicates that it is 
imperative to include the regional level. All parties to the conflict, including the Taliban, depend on 
support from neighbouring countries. The ‘6+2 group’ was installed to involve these neighbouring 
countries in peace negotiations. However, as some participating countries – especially Pakistan and 
Iran – continue their support to warring factions, this group is unlikely to succeed. It is also uncertain 
whether regional supporters, notwithstanding their support, really can influence the Taliban. There are 
no clear indications so far that they can. However, it could be contemplated not only to exert pressure 
on the Taliban (and other parties), but also on their supporters. 
 In addition to various diplomatic means, the international community also tried to influence the 
situation in Afghanistan through assistance-related instruments. To this aim, the donor community to 
Afghanistan developed a Strategic Framework and Common Programming, as well as a Con olidated 
Appeal structure. Central to these instruments is the concept of supporting peace through linkage of 
assistance and diplomatic/political instruments. However, there were several problems involved. First, 
the absence of a government in Afghanistan – or, in this case, recognized authorities of that kind – 
made development of a strategy through a national plan very difficult. Second, the donor community 
had embarked upon two different processes. While the Strategic Framework in the first place aimed at 
linking humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to political objectives of conflict reduction, the 
Common Programming structure stemmed mainly from a call for improving coordination and 
effectiveness of assistance. Not only was it difficult for the donor community to develop common 
strategic goals, but pursuing these goals through assistance generated an even greater number of 
dilemmas. The various actors involved had different objectives and mandates. This complicated 
coordination and therefore consistent policies and approaches. This applied in particular to dealing 
with the dilemma of humanitarian aid versus the do-no-harm principle. 
 The limited success of assistance-related instruments resulted also from the Taliban’s firm stance. 
The Taliban did not share the donor community’s views and objectives as regards a peace settlement, 
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human rights (including gender) and the structure of society. Rehabilitation hence remains problematic 
even though a large part of the country can now be characterized as a zone of peace. The unreliability 
of the authorities and their posture not to budge an inch to the requests of the donor community 
complicate and, to some extent even prevent, application of the new frameworks.  
 In review, the limited success of external interventions in the Afghan conflict can largely be 
attributed to four factors: firstly, a lack of political commitment by international and regional actors to 
end the conflict; secondly, disconnection between the intended outcomes of the interventions and the 
realities on the ground; thirdly, the failure to address adequately ideological differences between the 
Taliban and the Western countries; and, fourthly, disagreement by the international community on 
how to implement aid in support of pli ical goals and misconceptions about the leverage of aid. 
5.3 Analysis of the Dutch Interventions 
The limitations for the international donor community, of course, also apply to the Netherlands. 
However, it should be noted that the Netherlands firmly advocated the linkage of humanitarian and 
rehabilitation assistance and conflict prevention. To this aim, several policy memorandums were 
produced, focusing on the concepts of ‘peace aid’ and ‘development for peace’. These concepts were, 
in addition, applied n a consistent way in the case of Afghanistan. Dutch-fu ded projects focused to a 
high degree on these concepts, and several appraisals explicitly refer to these concepts as guidelines. 
This applied especially to the projects funded through UNOCHA’s Consolidated Appeals. 
 The Netherlands also actively promoted the development-for-peace concept internationally. The 
Princeton Speech and the keynote address at the Ashgabad conference are cases in point. At a later 
stage, the Netherlands also participated in the Afghanistan Support Group. Here they supported far-
reaching measures such as a common-fund mechanism and a merger of various political and 
developmental consultation groups. This, however, was ‘a bridge too far’ for the international donor 
community. Discord and doubts among some participants in the ASG over the possible success of the 
development for peace approach in the Afghan context prevented any further movement towards 
integrating both concepts. 
 Afghanistan appeared as an ideal case for application of the concept. Due to its half-peace/half-
conflict character, it should be possible to strengthen the peace process through focused assistance in 
the peaceful areas. Hence, it was expected not only to support peace in these areas, but also to affect 
the zones of war in a positive way. In practice, however, application of the concept proved very 
difficult, due to the realities on the ground and the ideological differences with the Taliban. In 
addition, a principled approach propagated in isolation cannot be expected to succeed. 
5.4 Lessons Learned 
Various lessons can be learned from this study of conflict in Afghanistan and the international 
response to it. In the first place, the Afghan case highlights the importance of political commitment by 
international and regional actors to end a conflict. After the departure of the Soviets, the international 
community’s attention on Afghanistan decreased considerably, while at the same time external support 
to warring factions did not cease. Without substantial backing and limited provisions, the intentions of 
the UN for an interim government in the early 1990s stood little chance. It took until the capture of 
Kabul before the international community again took serious interest in Afghan affairs. The loss of 
interest not only contributed to a loss of control over the situation in Afghanistan, but also led to the 
© The Clingendael Institute   
 
77
 
erosion of credibility of later efforts. Hence, the first lesson teaches that mediation in a conflict 
requires a continued and long-term involvement and commit ent.    
 A second lesson is that mediation requires a deeper understanding of the factors involved and 
their relatedness, as well as the dynamics of the conflict. Assessment of the Afghan imbroglio shows a 
series of factors having influence at several int rrelated levels. Consequently, any attempt at mediation 
has to address all levels, and to incorporate the different factors. Consecutive efforts of the 
international community have fallen short in this respect. Cases in point are the Geneva Accords, 
which in essence served as a way out of the Afghan conflict for the major powers. They resorted to the 
idea that with their departure the major problems were settled, thereby negating the erosion of the state 
system by the Soviet occupation, changes in power balances among the various ethnic, religious and 
regional groups, and continued interest by regional powers. The UN efforts for an interim government, 
although addressing the internal struggle, failed to incorporate the dynamics on the ground. The 
aimed-for interim government was unacceptable to the armed factions, and in fact unattainable in the 
Afghan context of that moment, as state institutions had collapsed. All the efforts failed to come to an 
acceptable domestic settlement. It indicates that any policy response, in order to be successful, 
requires a thorough analysis of the local situation. In this regard the Afghan case may not differ from 
other cases, but the complexity of the conflict makes such understanding even more imperative. 
 Good analysis and assessments are also imperative for successful humanitarian or development 
interventions. The third lesson, therefore, is that for development assistance to become effective as an 
instrument in positively influencing conflict, one needs to be aware of the possibilities that one has as 
an outsider. In Afghanistan, efforts for generating peace have only had very limited success, if at all. 
Good intentions such as development-for-p ace approaches make no sense unless they are based on 
adequate analyses and instruments. Lack of means to exert pressure or to have leverage implies no 
sustainable success can be expected. Given the limited means available to the donor community, some 
modesty is required when it comes to expecting results in terms of conflict and peace.  
 In order to become more effective, all instruments available to the international community need 
to be integrated. This implies a complete fusion of political and developmental instruments, in 
combination with clear policies and goals. It also require  better coordination and cooperation. This is 
the fourth lesson. However, integrating political goals and humanitarian assistance implies a series of 
dilemmas. While providing humanitarian assistance may easily conflict with the do-no-harm 
approach, providing no assistance at all may collide with the right to humanitarian assistance. It is 
therefore necessary to make fundamental choices, or to weigh short-term humanitarian goals against 
longer-term conflict-management goals. In its practical implementation, the development-for-peace 
approach still has a long way to go.  
 A fifth lesson is not to rely too heavily on concepts in conflict interventions. In the Princeton 
Speech it was mentioned that coordination should not become an aim in itself, as this m gh  ‘impede 
quick action, centralize functions that are better decentralized, and lead to general blueprints rather 
than situation-specific approaches’. This is applicable to the case of Afghanistan. While the Strategic 
Framework and Common Programming have led to reorganizations that from the outside appear as 
coherent, many dilemmas and problems – mostly related to planning, coordination and implementation 
– remained. This became most obvious in the problems involved in the funding of UNOCHA’s 
programmes. Coherence in policies, strategic frameworks, principle-centred approaches and the role of 
development assistance in addressing conflicts have nearly become aims in themselves. Instead of 
discussing the need and use of certain approaches in specific cases, discussions seem to focus on 
general strategies for implementation. In the end, this may obstruct effectiveness of assistance. 
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 A final lesson relates specifically to the Dutch development-for-peac  approach. While reviewing 
the Dutch efforts to mitigate the conflict in Afghanistan, one is struck by the enormous insistence of 
contributing in one way or another. In order for development for peace to become a success story, 
adequate analysis of local situations as well as available policy instruments is requi ed. As regards 
implementation, monitoring the impact of interventions and continued analysis of the dynamics and 
the overall context of the conflict are imperative. And even then, such an approach can only be 
successful if is supported by other donors. In order to appraise the effect of activities, the do-no-harm 
principle and impact assessment should also be applied and compared to the programmes of various 
donors and NGOs in conflict areas. The need for better coordination will then become obvious. 
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Annexe 1 Political Dossiers Consulted307 
1 / Afghanistan / buitenlandse politiek / Nederland / basisgegevens 
de behartiging van de diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen Afghanistan en Nederland 
lopende map 
 
1 / Afghanistan / OS / Noodhulp 
de noodhulp aan Afghanistan 
Jaar: 1998 
lopende map 
 
DCH / beleid / landen / Azië en Oceanië 
lopende map (1999) 
 
DCH/CP / OS-activiteit / aanvragen / Afghanistan / projecthulp / IPA  
project on peacebuilding in Afghanistan 
DCH / 2005 / 00001 
 
1 / Afghanistan / ontwikkelingssamenwerking / noodhulp 
de noodhulp aan Afghanistan 
Jaar: 1996 – 1997 
DDI-DAO / 2002 / 00017 
 
1 / Afghanistan / ontwikkelingssamenwerking / hulpprogramma’s 
hulpprogramma’s t.b.v. Afghanistan  
Jaar: 1995 – 1996 
DDI-DOA / 2001 / 00024 
 
1 / Afghanistan / VN / conferenties 
conferenties mbt de situatie in Afghanistan 
Jaar: 1996 – 1997 (sep-nov) 
DAO / ARA / 00034 
 
                                            
307 The titles of these dossiers are indicated in Dutch to enable future consultation and reference. 
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DMP/IB / beleid / structureel / bijeenkomsten board landen 
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging in samenwerking met het ministerie van financien met betrekking 
tot projecten en activiteiten ten behoeve van Afghanistan ter bespreking in de board of directors 
DMP / IB / 2002 / 00043 
 
1 / Afghanistan / VN 
de verhouding tussen Afghanistan en de Verenigde Naties (VN) 
Jaar: 1995 – 1996 (aug) 
DDI-DOA / 2001 / 00047 
 
DCH / bijeenkomsten 
international conference on Afghanistan Ashgabad 1997-01-21 t/m 1997-01-22, beleid  
DCH / 2019 / 00076 
 
zittingen / 47e AVVN 1992 / speeches op land A-C / Berichtgeving ter kennisname  
speeches gehouden voor de algemene vergadering der VN door bewindvoerders 
Jaar: 1992 – 1993 
DDI-DIO / 1998 / 00076 
 
DMP/NH / beleid / structureel / dienstreizen / landen Azië regio 
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging ten behoeve van bezoek, 1996-06-14/19 van R aan Afghanistan 
en Pakistan 
DMP/NH / 2017 / 00106 
 
DCH / dienstreizen / regio Azië 
bezoek van medewerker DCH/CP en medewerker DCH/NH aan Pakistan en Afghanistan, 1997-01-01 
t/m 1997-01-13, beleid  
Jaar: 1997 
DCH / 2018 / 00107 
 
DCH / dienstreizen 
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging ten behoeve van bezoek 1996-09-18 van dirix a mbt Afghanistan 
ervaringen 
Jaar: 1996 – 1996 
DCH / 2017 / 00117 
 
DAL / beleid / structureel / Afghanistan 
beleidsvoorbereiding 
Jaar: 1995 – 1996 
DAL / 2018 / 00119 
 
DCH / bijeenkomsten / Afghanistan 
briefing tbv Nederlandse NGO’s, 1998-02-05 
Jaar: 1998 – 1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00135 
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DMP/NH / algemeen / ondersteunend / landen Afghanistan 
berichtgevingen ter kennisname inzake – Afghanistan 
DMP/NH / 2002 / 00141 
 
Dossier DMP/NH / beleid structureel / DDI-DMP / landen Afghanistan 
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging met betrekking tot – Afghanis an  
Jaar (vanaf): 1992 
DMP / 00154 
 
DDI-DPV / DPV/PZ / VN / VR / vredesoperaties  
United Nations good ffices mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), beleid, bijdrage 
Jaar: 1990 – 1990 
DPV / ARA / 00159 
 
DGIS/CM / Azië / landen / Afghanistan 
Documentatie en beleid Afghanistan 
Jaar: 1994 – 1996 
DGIS/CM / ARA / 00165 
 
DCH / dienstreizen 
dienstreizen DCH 1996-1997, beleid  
Jaar: 1997 
DCH / 2019 / 00166 
 
DCH / landen / Azië en Oceanië / Afghanistan / beleid 
Jaar: 1996 
DCH / 2019 / 00218 
 
DCH / beleid / bijeenkomsten / overlegstructuren / land 
Afghanistan Support Group meeting, third meeting londen, 1998-05-05 
DCH / 2019 / 00219 
 
DCH / bijeenkomsten / overlegstructuren 
Afghanistan Support Group, londen, 1998-05-05, beleid 
Jaar: 1998-1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00220 
 
DCH / bijeenkomsten 
Afghanistan Support Group 
DCH / 2019 / 00221 
 
DAL / beleid / structureel / bezoek n  
bezoek R (Pronk HP) aan Afgh. en Pakistan 1996-06-15 – 1996-06-19 
DAL / 2018 / 00284 
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1 / Afghanistan / buitenlandse politiek / Nederland 
de diplomatieke betrekkingen tussen Afghanistan en Nederland  
DDI-DOA / ARA / 00422 
 
DCH / bijeenkomsten / overlegstructuren / land 
Afghanistan Support Group meetings, beleid 
DCH / 2019 / 00475 
 
DCH / dienstreizen / Azië en Oceanië  
regio Azië en Oceanië, beleid 
Jaar: 1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00508 
 
DCH / parlement 
kamervragen en kamerbrieven mbt Afghanistan, beleid 
Jaar: 1996 
DCH / 2019 / 00511 
 
DCH / beleid / bijeenkomsten / overlegstructuren / land 
Afghanistan Support Group meeting, second meeting New York, 1997-12-03 
Jaar: 1997 – 1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00520 
 
DCH / beleid / bijeenkomsten / overlegstructuren / land 
Afghanistan Support Group meeting, second meeting New York, 1997-12-03 
DCH / 2019 / 00521  
 
DCH / beleid /landen / Azië en Oceanië 
Afghanistan, mijnopruiming 
DCH / 2019 / 00529 
 
DCH / landen / Azië en Oceanië 
Afghanistan, beleid 
Jaar: 1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00530 
 
DCH / bezoeken / R 
bezoek van R aan Afghanistan en Pakistan, 1998-02-16 t/m 1998-02-21, beleid 
Jaar: 1998 
DCH / 2019 / 00584 
 
DMP/NH / beleid / structureel / bezoeken / humanitaire hulp  
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging tbv bezoek aan Afghanistan en Pakistan 
vanaf: 1994 
DMP/NH / 2025 / 00606 
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DPV/PZ / landen  
Afghanistan / beleid / instructie 
Deel: 01 
Jaar: 1990 – 1991 
DPV / ARA / 00718 
 
DSI/VR / beleid / structureel / bijeenkomsten 
correspondentie inzake bijeenkomsten van de Afgh. Support Group 
Jaar: 1997 
DDI-DSI / 00741 
 
Afghanistan / ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
Jaar: 1990-1992 (jan-dec) 
DOA / 1988-1994 / 00921 
 
Afghanistan / ontwikkelingssamenwerking 
Jaar: 1993-1994 (jan-dec) 
DOA / 1988-1994 / 00922 
 
Afghanistan / Verenigde Naties (VN)  
akkoorden van Genève inzake Afghanistan  
Jaar: 1990 – 1992 (jan-okt) 
DOA / 1998-1994 / 00931 
 
Afghanistan / Verenigde Naties (VN) 
Jaar: 1991 – 1994 (jan-dec) 
DOA / 1988-1994 / 00932 
 
DMP/NH / beleid / structureel 
humanitaire hulp bijeenkomsten 
Jaar: (vanaf) 1995 
DMP / 2025 / 01552 
 
DMP/NH / beleid / structureel / bezoeken 
beleidsvorming en beleidsuitdraging ten behoeve van bezoek, 1995-03/04-31/08, van DMP/NH aan 
Pakistan en Afghanistan 
Jaar: (vanaf) 1995 
DMP / 2025 / 01571 
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Annexe 2 Map of Afghanistan 
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Annexe 3 Afghan Political Leaders since 
Independence, and Major Parties and Factions 
1933-1973 
King Muhammad Zahir Shah  
During his reign the following Prime Ministers served:    
Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan(1929-1946) 
Sardar Shah Mahmoud Khan (1946-1953) 
Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan (1953-1963) 
Muhammad Yusuf Khan (1963-1965) 
Muhammad Hashim Maiwandwal (1965-1967) 
Muhammad Nur Ahmad Itemadi (1967-1971) 
Sharifi Abdul Zahir (1971-1972) 
Muhammad Musa Shafiq (1972-1973) 
 
1973-1978 
Sardar Muhammad Daoud Khan(President and Prime Minister) 
 
1978-1979 
Nur Muhammad Taraki (Chairman of the Revolutionary Council (CRC), President and Prime 
Minister) 
 
1979 
Hafizullah Amin (CRC, President and Prime Minister) 
 
1980-1986 
Babrak Karmal (CRC, President, General Secretary of the APDP) 
Prime Ministers:  
Babrak Karmal (1980-1981) 
Sultan Ali Keshtmand (1981-1988)  
 
1986-1987 
Haji Muhammad Chamkani (CRC, President) 
Sultan Ali Keshtmand (Prime Minister)  
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1987-1992 
Muhammad Najibullah (CRC (in 1987 only), President, and from 1986 onwards also General 
Secretary of the APDP/Watan) 
Prime Ministers: 
Sultan Ali Keshtmand (1981-1988) 
Muhammad Hassan Sharq (1988-1989) 
Sultan Ali Keshtmand (1989-1990) 
Fazal Haq Khaliqyar (1990-1992) 
Abdul Sabur Farid Kuhestani (1992) 
 
1992 
Abdul Rahim Hatif (acting President) 
 
1992 
Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (acting President) 
 
1992-1996 
Burhanuddin Rabbani (President) 
Prime Ministers: 
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (1993-1994) 
Arsala Rahmani (1994-1995, acting) 
Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai (1995-1996, acting) 
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar (1996) 
  
1996- 
Muhammad Rabbani (Chairman of the Ruling Council, interim) 
 
 
PDPA/Watan   
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, came up in the 1960s, renamed into Watan after 1989. 
PDPA basically existed of two factions and split up along this division in the early 1990s:  
· Khalq (lit. ‘Banner’) the more hard-line revolutionary wing of the PDPA, came into power with 
the 1978 revolution. Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin were its leaders.  
· Parcham (lit. ‘Masses’) the more conciliatory wing of the PDPA, came into power in 1979 under 
its leader Babrak Karmal.  
 
Jamiat 
Jamiat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Islamic Society of Afghanistan, was founded by Burhanuddin Rabbani 
in 1973. Primarily composed of Tajiks. Commander Ahmed Shah Masoud is affiliated to this party. 
 
Hizb-i Islami 
Hizb-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Islamic Party of Afghanistan, split off from Jamiat in 1979, led by 
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. 
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Wahdat 
Hizb-i Wahdat-i Islami-yi Afghanistan, Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan, founded in 1988, 
Muhammad Karim Khalili and Abdul Ali Mazari were its leaders. Mainly supported by the Hazara 
population. 
 
Junbish 
Junbish-i Milli-yi Afghanistan, National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, founded by Abdul Rashid 
Dostam. Mainly composed of Uzbek. 
 
Taliban 
Arose in 1994, its ultimate leaderis Mullah Muhammad Omar. 
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Annexe 4 Net ODA Flows of the Most Important 
OECD Donors to Afghanistan; in Millions of US$ per 
Year 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 
USA 40 56 59 65 42 53 2 2 0 319 
Germany 8.6 8.1 5.5 15 16.1 21.6 15.6 17.4 18.5 126.4 
Netherlands 2.6 3.1 0.7 5.2 10 12.4 26.6 12.3 42.9 115.8 
Sweden 16.7 16.1 4.8 13 9.1 12.4 15.3 14.8 12.2 114.4 
Norway 1.2 3.4 8 8.5 8.9 8.9 9.2 7.6 8.8 64.5 
Canada 1 2.7 5.3 4.7 7.6 7.2 7.1 3.9 13.4 52.9 
UK 4.1 2.4 3.2 3.1 2.2 5.3 10.9 8.6 9.5 49.3 
Denmark 1.6 1.6 2.7 3.2 4.3 2 5.6 3.9 2.8 27.7 
France 1.9 1.9 1.5 1.4 2.1 4.4 3.5 2.5 1.7 20.9 
Switzerland 1.8 2 2.7 3.9 1.5 1.6 3.4 1.5 2.2 20.6 
Australia 0.4 1.2 4.8 0.4 0.8 2.9 2.9 2 4.1 19.5 
Finland 1.1 0.2 2.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 3.5 2.6 15.3 
Austria 1.4 1.5 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.6 0.8 2.9 1.8 11.8 
Italy 0 0 0.4 0 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 3.2 
Luxembourg 0 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.6 
Belgium 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0 0.9 1.5 
Ireland 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.6 1.4 
N. Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Portugal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total bilateral 82.4 100.6 101.7 126.7 107.4 134.7 105.9 84.5 123.4 967.3 
Multilateral 86.3 38.2 34.8 74.2 116.6 88.9 109.1 144.1 155.3 847.5 
Total ODA 168.7 138.8 136.5 200.9 224 223.6 215 228.6 278.7 1814.8 
 
Source: OECD- AC, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 
 
Note: ODA is defined by the DAC as ‘those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions 
provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, 
each transaction of which meets the following tests:  
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· It is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing 
countries as its main objective; and 
· It is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 percent. To calculate the 
grant element of an ODA transaction, a 10 per cent discount rate is used.’308 
 
The table displays net ODA, which, in the explanation of DAC, differs from gross ODA in the 
following sense: ‘At the same time as DAC Members are extending new grants and credits to the 
developing world, they are also receiving repayments of principal. Accordingly, the data on total new 
flows (gross disbursements) are adjusted to a net basis by deducting amortization receipts, recoveries 
on grants or grant-like flows, and repatriation of capital occurring during the period of report (“net 
flow” or “net disbursements”). Flows originating from transactions undertaken on initiative of 
residents of developing countries (balance-of-p yment liability side entries) are not recorded in DAC 
statistics.’309 
 
                                            
308 Development Assistance Committee statistical reporting directives, DAC(88)10, part I (24 February 1988).
309 Development Assistance Committee statistical reporting directives, DAC(88)10, part I (24 February 1988).
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Annexe 5 Overview of International Meetings 
concerning Aid to Afghanistan 
Date and 
Location 
Conference Representa-
tive for the 
Netherlands 
Objectives Outcomes 
     
1 June 1995, 
Stockholm 
Donor 
conference 
DMP/NH Meeting of donors 
and aid agencies  
– More attention needs to be 
given to fundamental issues  
– Different phases of assistance 
(emergency aid and 
rehabilitation) need to be 
integrated 
 
 
18 November 
1996, 
New York 
 
Political UN 
meeting 
 
– 
 
Finding a political 
solution for the 
crisis in 
Afghanistan 
 
 
Consultation will continue 
 
21-22 
January 1997, 
Ashgabad 
 
Donor 
conference, 
International 
Forum on 
Assistance 
to 
Afghanistan 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
– Defining a 
common strategy 
for assistance to 
Afghanistan 
– Integration of 
assistance and 
political mediation 
 
– Coordination of assistance 
needs to be strengthened 
– A better balance is needed 
between the diplomatic role and 
the provision of assistance by 
the UN 
– Optimal participation of 
Afghans  
– Strengthening governance 
structures 
– Special attention for drugs 
and de-mining 
– Priority for the rural areas 
– Involvement of women needs 
to be stimulated  
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16 April 
1997, New 
York 
Political 
meeting of 
the UN 
Permanent 
Representa-
tion to the 
UN, New 
York 
Finding a political 
solution for the 
Afghan crisis 
– UN needs to continue to play 
a central role 
– Restriction of the trade of 
arms 
– Better balance between 
political and assistance 
initiatives 
 
 
21 April 
1997, Geneva 
 
First 
meeting of 
the ASG 
(Afghani-
stan Support 
Group) 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
– Keep Ashgabad 
going 
– Discussing the 
achievements 
since Ashgabad 
 
– UN coordinator appointed 
– Strategic Framework is in 
progress  
 
 
3 December 
1997, 
New York 
 
 
Second 
meeting of 
the ASG 
 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
  
 
– Other donors voice their 
agreement with the major ideas 
of the Ashgabad meeting 
– Donors need to use financing 
to steer assistance  
 
 
5 May 1998, 
London 
 
Third 
meeting of 
the ASG 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
– Reaching 
consensus on 
Principled 
Common 
Programming 
 
– Strengthening of civil society 
is needed 
– Principles of human rights 
need to be observed in the 
implementation f activities in 
cooperation with the Taliban 
 
 
7-8 
December 
1998, Tokyo 
 
Fourth 
meeting of 
the ASG 
 
DCH 
 
– Reaching 
consensus on a 
common strategy 
for assistance  
 
– Common Programming is in 
progress 
– Proposal to set up an 
independent strategic 
monitoring capacity endorsed 
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Annexe 6 Overview of Dutch Diplomatic Visits to 
Afghanistan 
Date Department 
involved 
Objective of the 
mission 
Analysis Conclusion 
 
     
5-15 April 
1994 
DMP/NH Inventory of the 
need for emergency 
assistance 
Reasonably quiet in 
large parts of the 
country 
Less assistance is 
needed for refugees in 
Pakistan 
 
 
31 March-11 
April 1995 
 
DMP/NH 
 
Inventory of the 
need for emergency 
assistance 
 
– Violence in Kabul 
is flaring up as a 
result of the Taliban  
– Donor 
coordination is 
required 
 
 
More attention needs to 
be given to the 
repatriation of refugees 
 
26-28 March 
1996 
 
Embassy, 
Islamabad 
 
Get an impression 
of the situation in 
the northern, 
Dostam-controlled 
areas of the country 
 
– Situation in the 
north is stabile 
– emergency phase 
has almost come to 
an end 
– Rehabilitation 
assistance is needed 
 
 
Assistance to refugees 
in neighbouring 
countries has to be 
halted 
 
31 March-2 
April 1996 
 
Embassy, 
Islamabad 
 
Get an impression 
of the situation in 
the southern, 
Taliban-controlled 
city of Qandah r 
 
Large-scale 
repatriation is taking 
place 
 
Assistance might be 
used as a leverage for 
the gender issue 
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6-8 April 
1996 
Embassy, 
Islamabad 
Get an impression 
of the situation in 
Herat 
Taliban welcomes 
all assistance, 
provided it is not 
conditional 
 
 
 
15-19 June 
1996 
 
Minister of 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
Get an impression 
of the humanitarian 
situation and the 
refugee problem in 
both Afghanistan 
and Pakistan 
 
– Fighting is limited 
to Kabul 
– Taliban are not 
interested in peace 
negotiations 
 
– Supporting Afghan 
organizations might 
contribute to the peace 
process 
– More assistance is 
promised if the parties 
reach a peaceful 
solution of the conflict 
– Proposal of a donor 
conference is made 
 
 
7-13 January 
1997 
 
 
DCH 
 
 
– Fact-finding 
mission for the 
Ashgabad 
conference 
– Inventory of how 
different policy 
instruments can 
contribute to a 
coherent strategy 
  
 
– Confirmation of the 
policy to limit 
assistance to Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan in 
favour of assistance 
within Afghanistan 
itself 
– Recommendation to 
provide rehabilitation 
assistance in peaceful 
areas 
– Support to institution 
capacity 
– Peace-supporting 
assistance deemed 
necessary: support to 
local organizations, 
capacity-building 
 
 
23 January 
1997 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
Meeting with 
representatives of 
Dostam 
  
Substantial 
reconstruction can only 
take place in the 
context of peace and an 
improvement of human 
rights situation 
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9-19 
November 
1997 
DCH Considering the 
possibilities of 
contributing to the 
peace process 
A transition is 
observed from 
emergency to 
rehabilitation 
assistance  
– capacity-building 
needs more attention 
– Attention has to be 
given to the elements of 
the Ashgabad speech: 
integration of 
humanitarian and 
political objectives, 
Strategic Framework, 
Do-No-Harm, 
Rehabilitation, and civil 
society 
 
 
15-22 
February 
1998 
 
 
Minister for 
Development 
Cooperation 
 
 
– Further 
orientation on the 
possibilities for the 
peace process 
– Attention for the 
current position of 
women  
 
 
Taliban appear 
willing to talk about 
peace through 
negotiations 
 
 
The international 
community needs a 
common strategy for 
the provision of 
assistance 
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Annexe 7 List of Conflict-related Projects Financed by 
the Dutch Government 
Starting 
Year 
Project Number Category Organization involved 
    
1989 AF89901A Emergency Aid INDOORS/ICCO 
 AF89901B Emergency Aid INDOORS/ICCO 
 AF89902 Medical Aid Healthcare NOVIB 
 AF89904 Veterinary Training Afghanen in Nood 
 AF89905 Rehabilitation Agriculture UNHCR 
 AF89906 Emergency Aid ARC/NOVIB 
 AF89907 Medical Emergency Aid  
Healthcare 
AZG 
 AF89908 Education  Afghan Education 
Committee 
 
1990 AF90901 Veterinary Training Afghanen in Nood 
 AF90902 Emergency Aid UNICEF 
 AF90903 Medical Aid Healthcare NOVIB 
 AF90904 Emergency Aid  ARC 
 AF90905 Veterinary Training Afghanen in Nood 
 AF90906 
 
Emergency Aid INDOORS 
 
1991 AF91901 Emergency Assistance after 
earthquakes 
Dutch Embassy 
 AF91902 Healthcare AVICEN/Stichting 
Vluchteling 
 AF92901 Rehabilitation Agriculture IRC/Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF92902 Rehabilitation Agriculture IRC/Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF92903 Rehabilitation Agriculture  Stichting Vluchteling  
 AF92904 Rehabilitation  NOVIB 
 AF92906 
 
Veterinary Training  AFGCIE 
 
1992 AF92907 Emergency Aid FAO/WFP 
 AF92908 Rehabilitation Agriculture 
Education Medical Aid Healthcare 
NOVIB 
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 AF92909 Rehabilitation Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF92910 Repatriation 
Rehabilitation 
UNHCR 
 AF92911 Repatriation  
Healthcare Sanitation 
UNICEF 
 AF92912 Mine clearing UNOCA 
 AF92913 Medical Emergency Aid ICRC 
 AF92914 Emergency Aid WFP/UNOCA 
 AF92915 Healthcare UNICEF 
 AF92916 Repatriation 
Emergency Aid 
UNHCR 
 AF92917 Mine clearing UNOCA 
 AF92918 Repatriation  
Rehabilitation 
UNHCR 
 AF92919 Medical Aid Healthcare NOVIB 
 AF93901 Repatriation 
Rehabilitation 
Stichting Vluchteling 
1993 AF000701 Rehabilitation Agriculture  
Healthcare Education  
Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF001501 Veterinary Training AFGCIE 
 AF001701 Mine-clearing  UNOCHA 
 AF001702 Rehabilitation Agriculture FAO 
 AF002101 Repatriation  
Rehabilitation 
 
UNHCR 
1994 AF000702 Rehabilitation Agriculture 
Healthcare Education  
Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF001502 Veterinary Training AFGCIE 
 AF002301  Medical Emergency Aid
Healthcare 
AZG 
 AF002302 Medical Emergency Aid
Healthcare 
AZG 
 AF002303 Medical Emergency Aid
Healthcare 
AZG 
 AF002501 Emergency Aid  ICRC 
 AF002601 Contribution CAP-94 Emergency 
Aid 
WFP 
 AF002602 Contribution CAP-94 
Sanitation 
Medical Aid Healthcare 
UNICEF 
 AF002603 Contribution CAP-94 
Repatriation 
UNHCR 
 AF002604 Contribution CAP-94 
Mine clearing 
UNOCHA 
 PK001301 Emergency Aid ACBAR 
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 PK001403 Education Women Stichting Vluchteling 
 PK001404 Medical Aid Healthcare Stichting Vluchteling 
 PK001504 Medical Aid Healthcare HAF 
 PK001506 Medical Aid Healthcare HAF 
 
1995 AF000703 Rehabilitation Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF001503 Veterinary Training AFGCIE 
 AF002304 Medical Emergency Aid AZG 
 AF002402 Medical Aid HAF 
 AF002701 Rehabilitation Agriculture SOH/DACAAR 
 AF002801 Rehabilitation Medical Aid ICRC 
 AF002901 Contribution CAP-95 
Repatriation 
UNHCR 
 AF002902 Contribution CAP-95 
Mine clearing 
Emergency Aid 
UNOCHA 
 AF002903 Contribution CAP-95 
Sanitation 
UNCHS 
 AF002904 Contribution CAP-95 
Emergency Aid 
WFP 
 AF002905 Contribution CAP-95 
Medical Aid Healthcare Education 
Sanitation 
UNICEF 
 AF003001 Rehabilitation  Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF003101 Emergency Aid Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF003201 Rehabilitation  
Emergency Aid 
NOVIB 
 AF003301 Rehabilitation Agriculture Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF003401 Contribution UN Appeal  
Healthcare Education 
UNICEF 
 AF003501 Contribution UN Appeal 
Relief Mine clearing 
UNOCHA 
 AF003601 Contribution UN Appeal 
Emergency Aid Rehabilitation 
WFP 
 AF003701 Contribution UN Appeal 
Sanitation 
UNCHS 
 AF003801 Rehabilitation SOH 
 AF003901 Emergency Aid ICRC 
 AF004001 Emergency Aid RCNL 
 AF004101 Emergency Aid NOVIB 
 PK001302 Emergency Aid ACBAR 
 PK001405 Emergency Aid 
Healthcare Education Women 
Stichting Vluchteling 
 PK001507 Medical Aid Healthcare  HAF 
 PK001508 Medical Aid Healthcare  HAF 
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1996 AF004002 Emergency Aid RCNL 
 AF004201 Medical Aid Healthcare Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004202 Education Women Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004203 Rehabilitation Agriculture 
Education 
Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004301 Emergency Aid NOVIB 
 AF004401 Veterinary Training  AFGCIE 
 AF004402 Veterinary Training  AFGCIE 
 AF004501 Emergency Aid ACTED 
 AF004601 Contribution UNOCHA Appeal 
Mine clearing Emergency Aid 
UNDHA 
 AF004602 Contribution CAP 
Repatriation 
UNHCR 
 AF004603 Contribution CAP 
Emergency Rehabilitation 
WFP 
 AF004604 Contribution CAP 
Healthcare Education Sanitation 
UNICEF 
 AF004701 Sanitation UNCHS 
 AF004702 Sanitation  UNCHS 
 AF004801 General WFP 
 AF004901 Medical Aid 
Healthcare 
UNICEF 
 AF005001 Contribution Emergency Appeal 
Medical Aid Rehabilitation 
ICRC 
 AF005002 Contribution Emergency Appeal 
Emergency Aid 
ICRC 
 AF005101 KAP Dutch Embassy 
 PK001509 Medical Aid Healthcare HAF 
 PK013101 Emergency Aid ACBAR 
 PK013201 Medical Aid Healthcare HAF 
 
1997 AF003002 Rehabilitation  Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004204 Rehabilitation Agriculture Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004205 Education Women Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF004502 Emergency Aid ACTED 
 AF005501 Contribution to the International 
Conference on Afghanistan 
DHAUN 
 AF005601 Contribution CAP 
Mine clearing 
DHAUN/UNOCHA 
 AF005602 Contribution CAP 
Emergency Rehabilitation 
WFP 
 AF005603 Contribution CAP Medical Aid
Healthcare Education Sanitation 
UNICEF 
 AF005604 Contribution CAP 
Repatriation 
UNHCR 
 AF005605 Contribution CAP UNOPS 
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Rehabilitation Agriculture 
 AF005606 Contribution CAP 
Anti Narcotics 
UNDCP 
 AF005607 Contribution CAP Rehabilitation 
Agriculture 
ICRC 
 AF005608 Contribution CAP 
Medical Aid Healthcare 
RCNL 
 AF005609 Contribution CAP 
Medical Aid Healthcare 
UNICEF 
 AF005801 Rehabilitation  Save the Children 
 AF005901 Rehabilitation Women Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF006001 Education Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF006101 Healthcare SCFUS 
 AF006201 Rehabilitation 
Technical Training 
NOVIB 
 AF006301 Mine Action Programme 
Training civilians 
UNOCHA 
 AF006401 Emergency Medical Aid 
Healthcare 
AZG Belgie 
 AF006601 Rehabilitation 
Civil Society 
NOVIB 
 AF006701 Rehabilitation Agriculture SOH 
 AF006901 Rehabilitation Agriculture Stichting Vluchteling 
 PK013102 Emergency Aid ACBAR 
 WW111514 DGIS-Mission  DGIS 
 WW113501 Conflict Research + Extension ICHR 
 
1998 AF006703 Sanitation SOH 
 AF006801 Emergency Assistance after 
earthquakes 
RCNL 
 AF006802 Emergency Assistance after 
earthquakes 
OCHA 
 AF007001 Medical Aid Healthcare AZG 
 AF007101 Medical Aid Healthcare Health Net International 
 AF007301 Sanitation  SOH 
 AF007401 Emergency Assistance after 
earthquakes 
NOVIB 
 AF007601 Rehabilitation Agriculture 
Healthcare  
Community Development 
Afghan Aid 
 AF007701 Education Women Stichting Vluchteling  
 AF007901 Emergency Aid ACBAR 
 AF008201 Contribution CAP 
Medical Aid Healthcare 
Rehabilitation Agriculture 
ICRC 
 AF008301 Rehabilitation Agriculture UNOPS 
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 AF008401 Repatriation UNHCR 
 WW133508 Rehabilitation Education SCFUS 
 WW133512 Evaluation Healthcare programme ETC 
 WW135101 Mine clearing UNOCHA 
 WW135107 Mine clearing UNOCHA 
 WW143001 Emergency Assistance after 
earthquakes 
Dutch Ministry of Defence 
 WW149611 Contribution Emergency Appeal ICRC 
    
Starting  AF001703 Emergency Appeal UNOCHA 
Years not  AF005701 Cultural Activities SPACH 
Specified AF007002 Medical Aid Healthcare AZG 
 AF007201 Forensic Research PHR 
 AF007702 Education Women Stichting Vluchteling 
 AF008502 Rehabilitation Agriculture AREA/NOVIB 
 AF008701 Sanitation Healthcare SOH 
 AF008801 Medical Aid Healthcare HNI 
 
Source: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) 
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Annexe 8 Gross Dutch Government Aid to 
Afghanistan in NLG, Divided per Character of the Aid, 
with Conflict-related Aid split out per DAC Sector 
Category310 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Emergency distress 
relief 
0 0 0 0 0 159,600 0 159,600 
Humanitarian aid 5,000,000 8,000,000 5,500,000 13,766,171 1,505,389 13,376,050 7,845,281 64,992,892 
Emergency medical 
relief 
649,475 500,000 2,441,436 897,964 181,020 0 0 4,669,895 
Refugee education 
relief 
0 0 140,000 0 117,420 16,318 0 273,738 
Emergency food 
relief 
1,500,000 0 1,500,000 1,677,757 3,955,114 0 0 8,632,871 
Reconstruction 
relief 
2,131,964 1,950,000 1,250,000 2,307,868 2,897,094 7,334,481 4,950,000 22,821,408 
Other conflict-
related aid 
3,519,946 2,282,333 1,147,090 2,606,283 1,682,567 3,002,202 2,436,554 16,676,976 
Non-conflict-related 
aid 
0 0 0 0 331,594 106,884 2,543,226 2,981,704 
Total ODA 12,801,385 12,732,333 11,978,526 21,256,043 20,670,199 23,995,537 17,775,062 121,209,085 
 
Sources: MIDAS, FOS, GBS, DAS. 
 
Note: The flows registered in the MIDAS system and other administrative systems of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (except for MIDAS+) form only part of the total gross ODA. The total 
amount of gross ODA, next to the activities mentioned in MIDAS, also consists of funds disbursed via 
the co-financing organizations (MFOs), VPO, PSO, VMP, SNV, GI/KPA, HPI, the reception of 
refugees, and smaller activities.311 Mo t of these funds are shown in MIDAS as lump-sum amounts 
given to the programmes and organizations. More specific information on the way that these funds 
have been spent has to be retrieved from the organization or programme concerned. At the same time 
                                            
310 Data collection and analysis for this table was undertaken by J. van der Lijn. 
311 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs BSC, Mini-questionnaire 1997, financiële stromen tussen 
Nederlanden ontwikkelingslanden (Th  Hague, 21 August 1998). 
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the Ministry of Foreign Affairs registers non-ODA grants in its systems. In particular, NGOs that are 
not officially recognized by the DAC are to be found in this group of non-ODA activities. Therefore, 
this and the following tables concern ‘Dutch development aid’ inst ad of ODA. Dutch government aid 
is defined as: all ODA and non-ODA over which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has direct control of 
its allocation, and which, as a result, can be found on a per activity base in the registrational systems of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 The categorization of aid data has mostly been retrieved from the DAS system, which uses the 
OECD-DAC CRS sector categorizations, as laid down by the DAC in 1991. Data from this system 
have been preferred above the categorizations mentioned in the MIDAS system, because they are 
more punctual. The categorizations in MIDAS are introduced into the system by the activity managers, 
whereas the categorizations in DAS are introduced by a special categorization division, which also 
consults the activity managers on its findings. MIDAS does not always adopt the differences of the 
DAS categorization with the MIDAS system. However, it is on the basis of the DAS findings that it is 
reported to the DAC. The MIDAS-categorization was only applied in the cases that activities were not 
administered in DAS. In the cases of MFO flows, the categorization was undertaken on the basis of 
the description of activities in their ‘kenschetsen’ (profiles).  
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Annexe 9 Distribution of Dutch Government Aid, in 
NLG312 
 Total Dutch government Aid (TDGA) 
 
 NCR CR Total Dutch 
Government Aid 
% CR 
of TDGA 
1992 0 12,801,385 12,801,385 100% 
1993 0 12,732,333 12,732,333 100% 
1994 0 11,978,526 11,978,526 100% 
1995 0 21,256,043 21,256,043 100% 
1996 331,594 20,338,604 20,670,199 98% 
1997 106,884 23,888,653 23,995,537 100% 
1998 2,543,226 15,231,836 17,775,062 86% 
    2,981,705 118,227,380 121,209,085 98% 
 
 
 Dutch government aid administered by the Dutch government 
 
 NCR CR Total 
(NCR + CR) 
% of TDGA % CR of 
Total 
1992 0 0 0 0% - 
1993 0 0 0 0% - 
1994 0 0 0 0% - 
1995 0 0 0 0% - 
1996 31,594 0 31,594 0.2% 0% 
1997 0 8,663 8,663 0% 100% 
1998 63,657 0 63,657 0.4% 0% 
 95,251 8,663 103,914 0.1% 8% 
 
                                            
312 Data collection and analysis for this tables was undertaken by J. van der Lijn. 
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 Dutch government aid administered by the MFOs 
 
 NCR CR Total 
(NCR + CR) 
% of TDGA % CR of 
Total 
1992 0 1,089,100 1,089,100 8.5% 100% 
1993 0 300,000 300,000 2.4% 100% 
1994 0 0 0 0% - 
1995 0 380,734 380,734 1.8% 100% 
1996 0 342,214 342,214 1.7% 100% 
1997 0 255,111 255,111 1.0% 100% 
1998 494,400 364,208 858,608 4.8% 42% 
     494,400 2,731,367 3,225,767 2.7% 85% 
 
 
 Dutch government aid administered by the NGOs 
 
 NCR CR Total 
(NCR + CR) 
% of TDGA % CR of 
Total 
1992 0 3,712,285 3,712,285 29% 100% 
1993 0 4,932,333 4,932,333 39% 100% 
1994 0 5,978,526 5,978,526 50% 100% 
1995 0 11,665,818 11,665,818 55% 100% 
1996 0 11,595,997 11,595,996 56% 100% 
1997 106,884 10,315,278 10,422,163 43% 99% 
1998 1,955,518 9,917,628 11,873,146 67% 84% 
 2,062,403 58,117,865    60,180,268 50% 97% 
 
 
 Dutch government aid administered by the IGOs 
 
 NCR CR Total 
(NCR + CR) 
% of TDGA % CR of 
Total 
1992 0 8,000,000 8,000,000 63% 100% 
1993 0 7,500,000 7,500,000 59% 100% 
1994 0 6,000,000 6,000,000 50% 100% 
1995 0 9,209,491 9,209,490 43% 100% 
1996 300,000 8,400,393 8,700,394 42% 97% 
1997 0 13,309,600 13,309,600 55% 100% 
1998 29,651 4,950,000 4,979,651 28% 99% 
 329,651 57,369,484 57,699,135 48% 99% 
 
Sources: MIDAS, FOS, GBS, DAS. 
 
Note: Dutch development aid flows have been divided into two categories: conflict-relat d (CR) and 
non-conflict-related (NCR). Conflict-related aid is defined here as all aid disbursed with the intention 
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of altering or influencing the intensity, length or consequen es of a conflict. This should be viewed in 
a broad sense. This means that the definition includes: 
· All emergency or refugee aid (humanitarian, food, medical, educational, etc.) that is necessary as a 
consequence of the conflict during or after the conflic . 
· All activities aimed at terminating or de-escalating the conflict. This includes all diplomatic and 
peace-building interventions (negotiations, demobilization, etc.). 
· All interventions aimed at promoting cooperation among parties to the conflict. 
· All relief aimed at rehabilitating all economic and societal sectors that have suffered from the 
conflict back to the pre-conflict level. 
· All activities that support or stimulate ‘good governance’ in the broad sense (human rights, 
democracy, etc.) with the intention of reducing the effects of, terminating or preventing (the 
recurrence of) conflict.  
 
In order to distinguish whether Dutch government aid activities were conflict-related or no , the 
objective of every activity (obtained from MIDAS) has been viewed a d compared with this definition 
of conflict-related aid. If the MIDAS data were not sufficient to determine the character of the aim, the 
MIDAS activity objective was supplemented with information from the BEMO 
(Beoordelingsmemorandum) on the activiy. 
 Dutch government development assistance to the developing world is disbursed in various ways. 
For every development assistance activity, MIDAS distinguishes administrative and executive 
organizations. These executive and administrative organizations vary from non-governmental to 
governmental, international, national, profit organizations, etc. The MIDAS system only mentions the 
names of these organizations, it does not categorize them. In this table these organizations have been 
categorized. We have chosen to show the flows according to their administrative organizations and not 
to their executing organizations, as the administrative organizations are deemed more important for the 
nature of the financial flows:  
· The Dutch government: The Dutch governmet can be the activity administrator through various 
organizations (e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (including DGIS), other ministries, Dutch 
embassies, or lower governmental authorities). In many cases the aid in this category is disbursed 
to a recipient government. A large part of the financial flows administered by the Dutch 
government is therefore bilateral (government to government) in character. However, this cannot 
be seen as the rule. 
· MFOs (Mede-Financierings Organisaties): are national non-governmental development 
organizations that receive an annual lump sum for disbursements on development cooperation 
projects from the Dutch government budget on development cooperation. The Dutch government 
does not define on which (type of) projects the funds should be spent. However, the Dutch 
government may also request a MFO to administer an activity with additional funding by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, a MFO can request the Dutch government to give 
additional funding for a certain project. The funds in this category are additional and do not belong 
to the lump sum. 
· (I)NGOs: Funds disbursed by the Dutch government via non-go ernmental organizations are 
activities under the administration of non-g vernmental non-profit organizations, which can be 
international (INGOs) or national, Dutch or foreign. Excluded, however, are the MFOs and the 
SNV, which are distinguished as separate categories. 
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· The IGOs: Disbursements via Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs) are funds that are under 
the administra ion of organizations such as the United Nations, or its specialized agencies, 
development banks, etc. This type of aid does not concern multilateral aid. According to the DAC 
definition of multilateral aid,313 the funds disbursed via the IGOs in this category r  not 
multilateral, since these funds are not pooled and they retain their Dutch identity. However, the 
development assistance activities in this category do have a multilateral character. In order to 
distinguish this category from multilateral and bil teral aid flows, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs calls it the ‘multibi’ aid flow. 
 
The above tables indicate for each administrative flow: 
· The distribution over conflict-rela ed (CR) and non-c flict-related (NCR) assistance; 
· The total amount disbur ed through the respective channel; 
· The percentage that this flow represents of the total Dutch government aid (TDGA); 
· The percentage of the aid disbursed through the respective channel provided to conflict-relat
assistance. 
 
Some additional projects have not been taken up in the tables: 
· WW 042201: In 1995 three million guilders were earmarked for Afghanistan in the funds spent on 
the 1993 ICRC Emergency Appeal (MIDAS); 
· WWW 109401: In the second voluntary contribution to the ICRC field budget 1996, three million 
guilders were earmarked for Afghanistan (MIDAS); 
· WW 131501: In the 1997 ICRC emergency aid project, two million guilders were earmarked for 
Afghanistan (MIDAS). 
                                            
313 OECD, Development Assistance Committee, statistical reporting directives, DAC(88)10 part 1 (24 
February 1988). 
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